The Clash between Federal and State Arbitration Law and the Appropriateness of Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Process by Harding, Margaret M.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 77 | Issue 3 Article 2
1998
The Clash between Federal and State Arbitration
Law and the Appropriateness of Arbitration as a
Dispute Resolution Process
Margaret M. Harding
Syracuse University College of Law, dvc.research@anu.edu.au
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Margaret M. Harding, The Clash between Federal and State Arbitration Law and the Appropriateness of Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution
Process, 77 Neb. L. Rev. (1998)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol77/iss3/2
Margaret M. Harding*
The Clash Between Federal and
State Arbitration Law and the
Appropriateness of Arbitration as
a Dispute Resolution Process
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction .......................................... 398
II. Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto ................... 405
A. The Facts ......................................... 405
B. Montana Uniform Arbitration Act ................. 407
C. Casarotto v. Lombardi (Casarotto I)-Judicial
Hostility To Arbitration Revisited .................. 409
1. The Majority Opinion .......................... 409
2. Justice Trieweiler's Concurrence ............... 413
3. The Dissents .................................. 415
D. The Supreme Court's Remand ..................... 417
E. Casarotto v. Lombardi (Casarotto 11)-The First
Rem and ........................................... 420
F. The Supreme Court's Opinion in Doctor's Associates,
Inc. v. Casarotto ................................... 422
G. Casarotto v. Lombardi (Casarotto III)-The Second
Rem and ........................................... 425
III. Federalism Issues and the FAA ....................... 425
A. Background of the Passage of the FAA ............. 425
1. Law in the United States Prior to the
Enactment of the FAA-The Revocability
Doctrine ....................................... 425
2. The Demise of the Revocability Doctrine ....... 430
3. The FAA ...................................... 435
© Copyright held by Margaret M. Harding.
Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. J.D. 1986 Ge-
orgetown University Law Center; B.A. 1982 Boston University. I would like to
thank Leslie Bender, Jeffrey M. Stempel, and Arlene Kanter for reviewing earlier
drafts of this article. I would also like to thank T. Alan Naragon and Brett Car-
roll for their excellent research assistance.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
4. The Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA") and State
Arbitration Law ............................... 437
B. Origins of the Clash ............................... 440
1. The Problems Created by Erie and the Court's
Perspective Regarding Arbitration ............. 441
2. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
Resolves the Erie Dilemma .................... 447
3. The Consequences of Prima Paint .............. 454
i. The FAA's Strong Federal Policy Favoring
Arbitration ................................ 455
ii. The Applicability of the FAA to State Court
Proceedings ................................ 460
iii. Consequences of Southland ................ 468
C. Role of State Law After Southland and Doctor's
Associates ......................................... 472
IV. Appropriateness of Arbitration ........................ 476
V. Conclusion ............................................ 491
OF ALL mankind's adventure in search of peace and justice, arbitration is
among the earliest.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The prevalence of arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion has
caused a backlash against arbitration.2 While the Supreme Court is
continuing to expand the scope and reach of the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA")3, some states, relying on their traditional police powers,
1. FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVE-
mENTs 3 (1948).
2. This Article discusses only contractual arbitration, when parties in a written
agreement provide for arbitration as the means of resolving their existing or fu-
ture controversies. In addition to the contract of the parties providing for arbitra-
tion, the "modern concept of arbitration" is characterized by two other elements:
"the parties select a method of dispute resolution intended to obtain a fair deci-
sion by a neutral third party in less time and at less cost than would be expended
in court and.., the decision or award by the arbitrator is, with limited excep-
tions, final." 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAw § 2.1.1 (1995).
3. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994); see, e.g., Barbara A. Atwood, Issues in Federal-State Rela-
tions Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 61 (1985); Rita M.
Cain, Preemption of State Arbitration Statutes: The Exaggerated Federal Policy
Favoring Arbitration, 19 J. CoNTEMP. L. 1 (1993); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbi-
tral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 TuO. L. REV. 1945
(1996) [hereinafter Arbitral Justice]; Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration and the
U.S. Supreme Court: A Plea for Statutory Reform, 5:2 J. DIsP. RESOL. 231 (1990)
[hereinafter A Plea for Statutory Reform]; Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen,
Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. CT. REV. 331; Stephen L. Hayford, Commer-
cial Arbitration in the Supreme Court 1983-1995: A Sea Change, 31 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 1 (1996); Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The
Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305 (1985); David S.
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are either attempting or have attempted to legislatively regulate the
use of arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts.4 Some judges, too,
are expressing suspicion of arbitration, reminiscent of the judiciary's
attitude toward arbitration prior to the passage of the FAA in 19255
and commentators are denouncing arbitration when it is the product
of an adhesion contract. 6 Private arbitration service providers are
even concerned. For example, the American Arbitration Association
("AAA") and JAMS/Endispute have crafted due process standards that
must be followed in mandatory employment arbitrations. 7
The clash between the FAA and state arbitration law was most
acute in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,8 where the Supreme
Court, reversing a decision by the Montana Supreme Court, held that
a Montana law (since repealed) requiring conspicuous notice of a
predispute arbitration clause 9 in a contract was preempted by the
FAA.1O That decision thwarted state legislatures in their effort to pro-
tect persons of unequal bargaining power from unknowingly agreeing
Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Con-
sumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33;
Jeffrey M. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral
Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BRooK L. REv. 1381 (1996) [Arbitral
Infatuation]; Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the
Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996);
Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act's Interstate Commerce Require-
ment: What's Left for State Arbitration Law?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385 (1992);
David P. Pierce, Comment, The Federal Arbitration Act: Conflicting Interpreta-
tions of its Scope, 61 U. CrNN. L. REv. 623 (1992); Jon R. Schumacher, Note, The
Reach of the Federal Arbitration Act: Implications on State Procedural Law, 70
N.D. L. REv. 459 (1994); see also infra Section III.
4. See infra note 280 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 516-42 and accompanying text. But see Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec.
Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("For all ofarbitration's shortcomings,
the process, if fairly conducted, is not necessarily inferior to litigation. .. ").
6. See infra note 516 and accompanying text. But see Eric K. Yamamoto, ADR:
Where Have the Critics Gone?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1055 (1996).
7. See Arnold M. Zack, New Uses of the Due Process Protocol: The Expanding Role of
ADR in the Workplace, 7 WORLD ARm. & MEDIATION REP. 178, 179 (1996); Briefs:
Provider Opposes Compulsory ADR, 14 ALTERNATWrsS TO HIGH CosT LrriG. 65
(1996). The Due Process Protocol that JAMS/Endispute and the AAA incorpo-
rated into their rules was drafted by a task force composed of representatives
from the AAA, the American Bar Association, the American Civil Liberties
Union, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the National Academy of
Arbitrators, the National Employment Lawyers Association and the Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution for resolving claims involving violations of
the antidiscriminaton laws. See Arnold M. Zack & Michael T. Duffy, ADR and
Employment Discrimination: A Massachusetts Agency Leads the Way, 51 Disp.
REsOL. J. 28, 29 (1996).
8. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
9. A predispute arbitration clause is one that provides for the arbitration of any
future controversy between the parties to the contract if one should arise.
10. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996).
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to forego their right to resolve a controversy in a judicial forum.ll
Although at first glance it is hard to believe that the Court would
strike down a state law, the sole purpose of which was to insure that
persons knowingly waive their right to a judicial forum, the decision
was not remarkable or unexpected. Indeed, it clearly followed prece-
dent1 2 and was the "correct" decision from that perspective.
What was remarkable about the Doctor's Associates case was the
reaction of two of the Justices of the Montana Supreme Court to the
opinion. Justices Trieweiler and Hunt dissented from the Montana
Supreme Court's Order remanding the case for proceedings not incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court's opinion, on the basis that the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the FAA was "legally unfounded,
socially detrimental and philosophically misguided."'13 Although a
largely "symbolic protest,"'14 the dissent by Justices Trieweiler and
Hunt highlights the profound difference of opinion regarding the FAA
and its application in state court proceedings and the federalism is-
sues that have arisen due to the Supreme Court's expansive interpre-
tation of the FAA. The Court's continued willingness to find that the
FAA preempts state arbitration law is strikingly contrary to the defer-
ence the Court has otherwise shown to state sovereignty in other ar-
eas of the law.15
It is beyond dispute that arbitration is playing a role today not en-
visioned by those who drafted the FAA.16 When the FAA was enacted,
11. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text discussing the purpose of the Mon-
tana law requiring conspicuous notice of the predispute arbitration clause.
12. "In light of Southland, Perry and Allied-Bruce Terminix, [the] outcome [in Doc-
tor's Associates] was eminently foreseeable ... " Carrington & Haagen, supra
note 3, at 385.
13. Order, Casarotto v. Lombardi, No. 93-488 (Mont. July 16, 1996)(on file with the
author). Justices Trieweiler and Hunt are not alone in their criticism of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the FAA. See, e.g., infra note 421 and accom-
panying text.
14. Richard C. Reuben, Western Showdown, 82 A.B.A. J., 16, 16 (1996)(quoting Pro-
fessor Erwin Chemerinsky).
15. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Carrington
& Haagen, supra note 3, at 380 ("[The]application of the preemption doctrine was
imposed by a Court that was otherwise inclining in the direction of devolving
power to the states and avoidance of implied preemption."). See generally Paul
Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REv. 895 (1996).
16. The commentary is overwhelmingly in agreement that arbitration and the law of
arbitration has clearly gone beyond what was expected and intended by the 68th
Congress that passed the FAA. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 3, at 12-13; Carbon-
neau, Arbitral Justice, supra note 3, at 1950-51; Richard E. Speidel, Consumer
Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-dispute (Mandatory) Arbitration Out-
lived Its Welcome?, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 1069, 1092 (1998); Sternlight, supra note 3,
at 645-47. Professor Strickland stated:
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925, apparently expecting it would apply
only in federal court. Consumer disputes (and other disputes that are
[Vol. 77:397
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arbitration was occurring primarily in the commercial context be-
tween business persons of equal bargaining power.1 7 In fact, such
commercial interests lobbied for passage of the FAA.18 Arbitration
was the mutually chosen method of dispute resolution in this context
because of its perceived advantages over traditional judicial litigation.
It was believed to be more efficient than litigation, less costly and a
better process for parties with continuing business relationships.19
Arbitration today, however, is not limited to the same commercial con-
text. Indeed, provisions providing for arbitration of disputes can be
found in a variety of contracts, many of which are adhesion contracts.
Predispute arbitration clauses can be found in contracts between in-
vestors and broker-dealers, 20  employment contracts, 2 1 franchise
the subject of special consideration in state arbitration statutes) were
unlikely to find their way into federal court in 1925 because they seldom
involved citizens of more than one state and they usually did not meet
the requisite amount in controversy. Indeed, Congress may have consid-
ered such disputes beyond its commerce power in 1925.
Strickland, supra note 3, at 386; see also Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 42 (1991)(Stevens, J., dissenting)("When the FAA was passed
in 1925, I doubt that any legislator who voted for it expected it to apply to statu-
tory claims, to form contracts between parties of unequal bargaining power, or to
the arbitration of disputes arising out of the employment relationship.").
17. See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAw 101-114 (1983); IAN R.
MACNEIL, AMRmcAN ARBITRATION LAW 15-24 (1992).
18. See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 3, at 74-75; Hirshman, supra note 3, at 1311; Ster-
nlight, supra note 3, at 645; see also infra notes 242-46 and accompanying text.
19. See Bills to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements for
Arbitration of Disputes Arising Out of Contracts, Maritime Transactions, or Com-
merce Among the States or Territories or with Foreign Nations: Joint Hearings on
S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th
Cong. 1st Sess. 7 (1924)(statement of Charles L. Bernheimer); see also infra note
237 and accompanying text.
20. Arbitration is the primary method used for the resolution of disputes between
investors and broker-dealers. See Margaret M. Harding, The Cause and Effect of
the Eligibility Rule in Securities Arbitration: The Further Aggravation of Une-
qual Bargaining Power, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 109, 117-19 (1996).
21. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Claims: A
Practical Guide to Designing and Implementing Enforceable Agreements, 47 BAY-
LOR L. REv. 591 (1995); Sarah R. Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case
Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers
and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REv. 449 (1996); William M. Howard, Arbitrating
Employment Discrimination Claims: Do You Really Have To? Do You Really
Want To?, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 255 (1994); Ellwood F. Oakley I, & Donald 0.
Mayer, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims and the Challenge of
Contemporary Federalism, 47 S.C. L. REv. 475 (1996); Ronald Turner, Compul-
sory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims with Special Reference to
the Three A's-Access, Adjudication and Acceptability, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
231 (1996); Michele L. Giovagnoli, Comment, To Be or Not to Be?: Recent Resist-
ance to Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in the Employment Arena, 64 UMKC
L. REv. 547 (1996); William F. Kolakowski III, Note, The Federal Arbitration Act
and Individual Employment Contracts: A Better Means to an Equally Just End,
93 MICH. L. REv. 2171 (1995); Jordan L. Resnick, Note, Beyond Mastrobuono: A
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agreements, 2 2 health care contracts,2 3 and in a whole array of other
consumer contracts,2 4 ranging from contracts for termite services 2 5 to
contracts between depositors and credit card holders and banks.26 Ar-
bitration provisions have been upheld in cases involving breach of con-
tract claims to cases involving violation of statutory rights, including
rights based on the federal securities laws, antitrust laws, and an-
tidiscrimination laws.27
It is the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of the FAA that
has fueled the widespread use of predispute arbitration clauses.
There are few limits on the use of such clauses. The FAA, which
makes predispute arbitration provisions specifically enforceable, re-
quires only that the clause be in writing and that the transaction be in
interstate or maritime commerce for the clause to be enforceable. 28
The Court has further narrowed the possible restrictions on the use of
such provisions by finding that the FAA preempts state laws that pro-
hibit arbitration of certain categories of claims or, like the law in Doc-
tor's Associates, regulate the procedures by which arbitration
Practioners' Guide to Arbitration, Employment Disputes, Punitive Damages, and
the Implications of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 913 (1995).
22. See, e.g., Dennis D. Palmer, Franchises: Statutory and Common Law Causes of
Action in Missouri Revisited, 62 UMKC L. REV. 471 (1994).
23. See, e.g., Alan Bloom et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution in Health Care, 16
WHITTIER L. REV. 61 (1995); Michael Daly, Attacking Defensive Medicine Through
the Utilization of Practice Parameters, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 101 (1995); Amy E. Elli-
ott, Arbitration and Managed Care: Will Consumers Suffer if the Two are Com-
bined?, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 417 (1995).
24. See generally Michael Z. Green, Preempting Justice Through Binding Arbitration
of Future Disputes: Mere Adhesion Contracts or a Trap for the Unwary Con-
sumer?, 5 Loy. CONSUMER L. REP. 112 (1993); Anne Brafford, Note, Arbitration
Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion: Fair Play or Trap for the Weak and
Unwary?, 21 J. CORP. L. 331 (1996).
25. See Allied Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); see also Janet M.
Grossnickle, Note, Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson: How the Federal Arbi-
tration Act Will Keep Consumers and Corporations Out of the Courtroom, 36 B.C.
L. REv. 769 (1995).
26. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Fi-
nancial Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIo ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 267 (1995); John L. Douglas, Arbitration May Help Banks Cut Legal
Costs of Resolving Disputes, 14 No. 13 BANKING Po.'y REP. 1 (1995).
27. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (arbitration of
claim based on violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act upheld);
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)(arbitra-
tion of claim based on violation of the Securities Act of 1933 upheld); Shearson/
Am. Express, Inc., v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)(arbitration of claims based
on violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act upheld); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)(arbitration of claim based on viola-
tion of Sherman Act upheld in international context).
28. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994); see also infra notes 257-59 and accompanying text.
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agreements are formed. 29 Indeed, the Court has stated, time and time
again, that the FAA was enacted precisely to prevent state legislative
and judicial attempts to undercut the enforceability of predispute ar-
bitration agreements. 30 The Court's interpretation of the FAA and
the corresponding weakening of state authority3 i have empowered
those with superior bargaining strength to insist on the inclusion of a
predispute arbitration clause in adhesion contracts.
Such insistence has had the unfortunate consequence of reviving
hostility to the arbitral process itself. While inclusion of a predispute
arbitration clause in an adhesion contract is antithetical to the very
concept of arbitration, the process itself, when viewed realistically,
can be beneficial to both parties to the agreement, including the party
with lesser bargaining power. However, until arbitration is mutually
agreed upon by both parties to a transaction, arbitration will continue
to be viewed with suspicion, compared as inferior to litigation3 2 and
fought every step of the way. Judges and state legislatures will con-
tinue to look for ways to protect parties from arbitration and predis-
pute arbitration clauses, and the arbitration process will be further
undermined. Those compelled to arbitrate will continue to view it as a
cover for the interests of the stronger party 33 and the benefits of arbi-
tration will be largely ignored, deemed irrelevant or belittled.
In Part II of this Article, I will discuss in detail the Doctor's Associ-
ates case. I use that case because it so aptly represents the clash be-
tween federal and state arbitration law. I will describe and critique
the reasoning of the Montana Supreme Court when it refused to stay a
state court proceeding pending arbitration because the predispute ar-
bitration clause failed to comply with Montana law which required
conspicuous notice of the clause. Special emphasis will be given to the
concurring opinion of Justice Trieweiler for the insight it provides into
his view of the arbitral process. I will argue that Supreme Court pre-
cedent existing at the time of that decision clearly called for the con-
clusion that the Montana law was preempted by the FAA. The impact
of Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson34 on the Montana court's deci-
sion will then be analyzed. The Dobson decision called into question
the Montana Supreme Court's decision. However, the Montana
29. See infra notes 461-68 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
31. As will be demonstrated, states are not totally powerless to regulate arbitration
agreements. The FAA does not displace general state contract law. Thus, the
proper avenue of regulation is not through the use of state arbitration law that
singles out arbitration clauses for disparate treatment, but, rather, state contract
law that is applicable to all types of agreements, including predispute arbitration
clauses. See infra notes 482-494 and accompanying text.
32. As used in this Article, the term litigation refers to litigation in a judicial forum.
33. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 19 (Desmond Lee, trans., 2d ed. rev. 1974) (1955).
34. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
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Supreme Court blindly adhered to its earlier decision upholding the
Montana law. Rather than objectively reviewing the Dobson decision,
the Montana court narrowly interpreted the case so that it would not
have to reverse itself and enforce the arbitration provision. The Mon-
tana Supreme Court's treatment of Dobson demonstrates the length to
which it would go to preserve some state power over arbitration law
and to protect the franchisee from the arbitral process-a process it
plainly considered inferior to litigation. I will conclude Part II with a
critique of the United States Supreme Court's expected reversal of the
Montana Supreme Court. The unprecedented and heartfelt dissent by
two of the Justices on the Montana Supreme Court to the Supreme
Court's order reversing and remanding the case will be highlighted.
This dissent demonstrates not only the tension between the federal
and state judiciary as to the role of the states in regulating arbitration
agreements but also the difference of opinion that exists as to the ade-
quacy of arbitration.
The federalism issues that have arisen due to the FAA and the
Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of it will be analyzed in
Part III. The status and history of the law prior to enactment of the
FAA, which reflected some hostility to arbitration, and the campaign
to obtain passage of the FAA will be provided to aid in the analysis of
the Supreme Court's subsequent treatment of the FAA and the cur-
rent clash between state and federal law. The origins of the clash will
be traced to demonstrate the choices the Court had in its interpreta-
tion of the FAA and its applicability to state court proceedings. The
consequences to state arbitration law of the Court's choice and the role
of state law in protecting persons from compulsory arbitration clauses
will be examined. Finally, I will address in Part IV the issue that is
ultimately raised by the clash: the appropriateness of arbitration as a
dispute resolution process. I will argue that the prevalent use of arbi-
tration clauses in contracts of adhesion has undermined the arbitral
process and has revived judicial hostility to arbitration. I will demon-
strate how the Montana Supreme Court reduced arbitration to a sec-
ond-rate dispute resolution process by its simple comparison of it to
the court adjudication process. In reviewing arbitration, the court
only considered the procedures that are absent in the arbitral process;
the court did not evaluate arbitration for what it offers to litigants.
Too often arbitration is simply compared to litigation and found inade-
quate. That kind of comparison, which involves counting the proce-
dural "safeguards" in each process, is a particularly destructive way to
evaluate a dispute resolution process. In this section, I attempt to pro-
vide a more balanced view of arbitration, one that asserts that
although arbitration, like any other dispute resolution process, is not
without its flaws, it is still a viable and sensible process for many liti-
gants with certain types of disputes. The benefits to arbitration will
[Vol. 77:397
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be detailed as will some of the drawbacks to litigation. I do not argue
or suggest that because arbitration may be a good dispute resolution
process for some, that arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts should
be upheld. Rather, I demonstrate how two distinct issues (i) whether
arbitration clauses should be held enforceable in contracts of adhe-
sion, and (ii) whether arbitration is an appropriate dispute resolution
process, have been collapsed by both courts and commentators in their
evaluation of arbitration. Concern and disagreement over upholding
compulsory arbitration clauses have led some to conclude that arbi-
tration is an inferior dispute resolution process. These two issues, I
maintain, must remain distinct or else arbitration will be undervalued
and litigation will be overvalued.
II. DOCTOR'S ASSOCIATES, INC. v. CASAROTTO
A. The Facts
On April 25, 1988, Paul and Pamela Casarotto executed a
franchise agreement with Doctor's Associates, Inc. ("Doctor's Associ-
ates") to open a Subway sandwich shop in Great Falls, Montana,
where they resided.35 Doctor's Associates, a Connecticut corporation
with its principal place of business in Connecticut, is the national and
international franchisor of Subway shops.36 The franchise agreement
was the first and only franchise agreement the Casarottos had ever
signed. 37 After the agreement was signed, the Casarottos were told by
Doctor's Associates' development agent, Nick Lombardi, that their de-
sired location for the Subway franchise was unavailable.38 Based on
Lombardi's oral promise that the Casarottos would be given the exclu-
sive right to their desired location once it became available, the
Casarottos agreed to open the shop at a less desirable location. 39
When the desired location became available, Lombardi and Doctor's
Associates awarded the location to another franchisee.40 This decision
apparently caused the loss of the Casarottos' business.41
35. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 933 (Mont. 1994), cert. granted and
judgment vacated sub nom. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 515 U.S. 1129
(1995), on remand to Casarotto v. Lombardi, 901 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1995), rev'd sub
nom. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
36. See Brief for Petitioners at 3, Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681
(1996) (No. 95-559) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners]. At the time Doctor's Asso-
ciates filed its brief, it was the franchisor of 10,000 Subway shops nationally. See
id.
37. See Brief for Respondents at 5, Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681
(1996) (No. 95-559) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents].
38. See id. at 7.
39. See id.
40. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d at 933.
41. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 37, at 7.
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The Casarottos brought suit in the Montana state court against,
among others, Doctor's Associates and Lombardi, claiming that de-
fendants, inter alia, breached the franchise agreement, defrauded
them, breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and tor-
tiously interfered with their business.4 2 Doctor's Associates moved to
dismiss the action or, alternatively, for a stay of the litigation pending
arbitration of the Casarottos' claims, pursuant to section 3 of the
FAA.4 3 The Montana District Court granted the motion to stay4 4 find-
ing that the agreement involved interstate commerce pursuant to the
FAA, a conclusion that was not disturbed on appeal by the Montana
Supreme Court.45
The arbitration clause, located on page 9 of the eleven page agree-
ment 4 6 and in ordinary typeface, 47 provided as follows:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract or the
breach thereof shall be settled by Arbitration in accordance with the Commer-
cial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association at a hearing to
be held in Bridgeport, Connecticut and judgment upon an award rendered by
the Arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. The
commencement of arbitration proceedings by an aggrieved party to settle dis-
putes arising out of or relating to this contract is a condition precedent to the
commencement of legal action by either party. The cost of such a proceeding
will be borne equally by the parties.
4 8
Although he admitted that he had read the franchise agreement,
Paul Casarotto alleged that no one had told him that the agreement
contained an arbitration clause4 9 and that, by signing the agreement,
he was relinquishing his right to sue Doctor's Associates in Montana
state court.50 The agreement was a standard form franchise agree-
42. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d at 933.
43. See id. Section 3 of the FAA provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in
writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending,
upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is
referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of
one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the
applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such
arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
44. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d at 933.
45. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 684 (1996).
46. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d.at 933. The Franchise Offering Circular
given to the Casarottos also identified the existence of the arbitration clause and
suggested to franchisees that they obtain legal advice. See Brief for Petitioners,
supra note 36, at 4 n.3.
47. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996).
48. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 36, at 4 n.2.
49. See id. at 4 n.3.
50. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 37, at 6.
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ment 5 l Doctor's Associates used with all of its franchisees throughout
the United States.5 2 The agreement also contained a choice of law
clause providing that the agreement would be "governed by and con-
strued in accordance with the laws of the State of Connecticut"5 3 and
a provision, located above the signature line, stating that each party
had read and understood the agreement. 54
The Casarottos appealed the decision of the district court on the
basis that the franchise agreement failed to comply with Montana
law. Montana law provides that "a written agreement to submit to
arbitration any controversy arising between the parties after the
agreement is made is valid and enforceable except upon grounds that
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract."5 5 However, a
contract containing an arbitration clause was not valid under Mon-
tana law if notice that the contract contained an arbitration clause
was not "typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the
contract. ... 56 The franchise agreement clearly failed to meet this
requirement inasmuch as it was placed on page 9 of the contract and
was in ordinary type. Doctor's Associates argued that Connecticut law
applied pursuant to the contract and that the contract was in compli-
ance with the requirements of Connecticut law57 and, in the event
Montana law applied, Montana law was preempted by the FAA.58
B. Montana Uniform Arbitration Act
In 1985 Montana adopted a Uniform Arbitration Act ("Arbitration
Act") based on the Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA") promulgated by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 59
The purpose of the Montana Arbitration Act is to "validate arbitration
agreements, make the arbitration process effective, provide necessary
safeguards and provide an efficient procedure when judicial assistance
51. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996).
52. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 36, at 3. Arbitration clauses in franchise
agreements providing for arbitration at the AAA are not uncommon. See Brief for
the International Franchise Association and the Securities Industry Association,
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1-2, Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto,
517 U.S. 681 (1996) (No. 95-559).
53. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d at 933.
54. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 36, at 4.
55. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(2) (1997).
56. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1994)(repealed 1997).
57. Connecticut law does not contain any requirements regarding the placement or
appearance of the predispute arbitration clause. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-408
to 424 (1993).
58. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d at 933.
59. See Montana State Senate Judiciary Committee Minutes of the Meeting Held on
January 21, 1985, at 6 (statement of Senator Mazurek)[hereinafter Committee
Minutes]. The UAA can be found at 7 U.LA. §§ 1 - 25 (West 1997).
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is necessary."6 0 Prior to the adoption of the Arbitration Act, predis-
pute arbitration clauses were considered void pursuant to a Montana
statute that invalidates any contractual provision whereby a party "is
restricted from enforcing his rights under the contract by the usual
proceedings in the ordinary tribunals .... "61 Montana amended that
statute to specifically exempt from its application the Arbitration
Act.62 Montana's adoption of a modern arbitration statute63 followed
on the heels of the Supreme Court's decision in Southland Corp. v.
Keating,64 where the Court found the FAA applicable to state court
proceedings.
Montana's notice provision, absent from both the FAA and the
UAA, was enacted in response to concerns raised about adhesion con-
tracts.6 5 Its purpose was to ensure that Montana residents did not
unknowingly waive their right to access to Montana courts and that
Montanans not be compelled to arbitrate disputes at distant loca-
tions.66 The inclusion of the notice provision seems to have been an
attempt by Montana to equalize to some extent the power imbalances
inherent in adhesion contracts.6 7 A notice provision is a "specific form
of a larger category of legislative intrusions on freedom of contract to
assure that parties to adhesion contracts know and understand the
terms to which they are formally assenting."68 However, as the
Supreme Court made clear, the FAA does not tolerate such an intru-
sion, and the Montana legislature has responded to that intolerance
by repealing the notice provision.
60. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-114 to -324, ComivnssioNERs' PREFATORY NOTE (West
1997).
61. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (1997); see also Brief for Respondents, supra note
37, at 2; Smith v. Zepp, 567 P.2d 923, 929 (Mont. 1977)(court refused to enforce
predispute arbitration clause "[alithough arbitration may be the most speedy and
economical means available to parties for a binding resolution of their disputes.").
62. Forum selection clauses continue to be void in Montana pursuant to MONT. CODE
ANN § 28-2-708 (1997). See Montana ex rel. Polaris Indus. v. District Court, 695
P.2d 471, 472 (Mont. 1985). Montana's refusal to enforce forum selection clause
is out of step with both federal law and the law of the vast majority of the states.
See Walter H. Heiser, Forum Selection Clauses in State Courts: Limitations on
Enforcement After Stewart and Carnival Cruise, 45 FLA. L. REv. 361, 371 (1993).
63. See infra note 222 defining a modem arbitration statute.
64. 465 U.S. 1 (1984); see also Brief for Respondents, supra note 37, at 2-3.
65. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 36, at 7; see also Committee Minutes, supra
note 59, at 8.
66. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d at 933.
67. See Brief for the American Association of Retired Persons and the National Asso-
ciation of Consumer Advocates as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 10,
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (No. 95-559).
68. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 3, at 386.
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C. Casarotto v. Lombardi (Casarotto /)69-Judicial Hostility
To Arbitration Revisited
1. The Majority Opinion
The Montana Supreme Court reversed the district court's order
staying the lawsuit pending arbitration.70 The court first determined
that, contrary to the plain language of the choice of law clause con-
tained in the franchise agreement, it would apply Montana law.7 ' It
then held that Montana law was not preempted by the FAA and that
the agreement was unenforceable due to its failure to provide notice of
the arbitration clause in accordance with Montana law.72 As the fol-
lowing demonstrates, the court seemed determined to invalidate the
arbitration clause due to its suspicion of and hostility to arbitration
when it is foisted upon a party in an adhesion contract.
In order to invalidate the arbitration provision, the court first
needed to find a way around the choice of law clause 73 and a way to
make Montana arbitration law applicable. The court used its conflict
of laws principles as its avenue. The court first determined that, ab-
sent the choice of law clause, Montana's conflict of laws principles
would dictate that Montana law would apply because Montana had a
greater interest in the controversy than Connecticut.74 The court next
determined whether the choice of law clause in the franchise agree-
ment was effective so as to override that conclusion. The court found
that the clause was invalid and ineffective because it was contrary to
Montana's public policy insofar as it did not require conspicuous no-
tice of the predispute arbitration clause. 75 Accordingly, Montana law,
69. 886 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1994), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub nom. Doctor's
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 515 U.S. 1129 (1995), on remand to Casarotto v.
Lombardi, 901 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
70. See id. at 932.
71. See id. at 933-36.
72. See id. at 936-39.
73. The court assumed that the choice of law provision incorporated Connecticut's
arbitration rules as well as the substantive law of Connecticut. While that may
indeed be the case, courts can no longer make that assumption. Instead, a court
must determine whether the parties intended with its choice of law clause to in-
corporate the state's arbitration law. In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hut-
ton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995), the Supreme Court specifically reviewed a choice of
law clause not unlike the one contained in the franchise agreement the Cassarot-
tos signed, and declined to find that the parties intended to incorporate into their
agreement New York's arbitration law regarding the power of arbitrators to
award punitive damages. See also Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees,
489 U.S. 468 (1989)(choice of law clause included state arbitration laws); see infra
note 89 and accompanying text.
74. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d at 934-35.
75. See id. at 936. The Montana's Supreme Court's holding with respect to the valid-
ity of the choice of law clause was not appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996).
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including its arbitration rules, would apply to the contract, unless pre-
empted by the FAA.
The court scrutinized the arbitration clause in the franchise agree-
ment and the process of arbitration itself to find that Connecticut law
violated Montana's public policy that an agreement to arbitrate a fu-
ture controversy be knowingly made. 76 The court relied on the fact
that the clause required arbitration to take place in Connecticut,
thousands of miles from Great Falls, Montana, and that the costs of
arbitration, which the court stated could be substantial, would be
borne equally by the parties. 77 The arbitral process itself, the court
found, was devoid of the procedural safeguards established by the
Montana legislature to assure the reliability of the outcome of a dis-
pute.78 The court pointed out that pretrial discovery was within the
sole discretion of the arbitrator, that the rules of evidence were not
applicable in the arbitral proceeding, and that the arbitrator did not
have to follow the law or have a factual basis for his or her decision.79
The court concluded:
Based upon the determination by the Legislature of this State that the
citizens of this State are at least entitled to notice before entering into an
agreement which will limit their future resolution of disputes to a procedure
as potentially inconvenient, expensive, and devoid of procedural safeguards as
the one provided for by the rules of the American Arbitration Association, and
the terms of this contract, we conclude that the notice requirement of § 27-5-
114, MCA, does establish a fundamental public policy in Montana, and that
the application of Connecticut law would be contrary to that policy.8 0
The court next determined that Montana's notice requirement was
not preempted by the FAA even though such a result voided an other-
wise enforceable arbitration agreement. While recognizing that the
Supreme Court in Southland Corp. v. KeatingSl and in Perry v.
ThomasS2 had invalidated California's Franchise Investment Law and
Labor Code, respectively, because both laws invalidated predispute
arbitration clauses, the court nevertheless upheld Montana's law on
the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in Volt Information Sciences,
Inc. v. Board of Trustees,83 which the court believed qualified the pre-
emptive force of the FAA.84 Relying on Volt, the Montana court found
that its notice requirement did not undermine the goals and policies of
the FAA, which do not require parties to arbitrate claims they have
76. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d at 936.
77. See id. at 935.
78. See id. at 935-36.
79. See id. at 936; see also infra notes 516-42 and accompanying text critiquing the
court's analysis of the arbitration clause and the arbitral process.
80. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d at 936.
81. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
82. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
83. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
84. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d at 936-37.
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not agreed to arbitrate. Accordingly, the Montana court concluded
that the United States Supreme Court
would not find it a threat to the policies of the Federal Arbitration Act for a
state to require that before arbitration agreements are enforceable, they be
entered knowingly. To hold otherwise would be to infer that arbitration is so
onerous as a means of dispute resolution that it can only be foisted upon the
uninformed. That would be inconsistent with the conclusion that the parties
to the contract are free to decide how their disputes should be resolved.
8 5
Because Montana did not preclude parties from knowingly agreeing to
arbitrate and because the Montana courts will enforce arbitration
agreements knowingly entered, the Montana statute was not pre-
empted by the FAA.86
The court's reliance on Volt is problematic for a number of reasons.
In Volt, the Supreme Court upheld application of a state arbitration
rule that permitted a court to stay arbitration of a dispute pending the
outcome of related litigation in state court between the parties to the
arbitration clause and third parties not bound by the arbitration
clause.8 7 The parties had included a choice of law clause in the con-
tract containing the arbitration provision providing that the law of the
place where the project was located-California-would govern the
contract.8 8 The Supreme Court held that the FAA did not preempt
application of California law in this instance because the parties had
agreed that their arbitration agreement would be governed by the law
of California, including its arbitration rules.8 9
85. Id. at 939.
86. See id.
87. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
88. See id. at 470.
89. See id. at 478-79. The Supreme Court refused to set aside the California Court of
Appeal's interpretation that the choice of law clause was intended by the parties
to incorporate the California rules of arbitration because interpretation of private
contracts is a question of state law, which it does not review. See id. at 474.
Nonetheless, the Court did not find that the California court's interpretation
caused the appellant to waive its "federally guaranteed right to compel arbitra-
tion" because appellant never had the right in the first instance insofar as the
parties' contract did not require arbitration to proceed when there was related
litigation pending in state court with nonparties to the arbitration clause. See id.
at 474-75.
The Court also did not find the California Court of Appeal's interpretation to
be contrary to the principles articulated in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), which held that interpretation of
an agreement to arbitrate shall be made with due regard to the federal policy
favoring arbitration and that all ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration
clause shall be resolved in favor of arbitration. The Volt Court indicated that the
federal policy embodied in the FAA was to ensure the enforceability, according to
their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate; there was no federal policy favor-
ing arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules. See 489 U.S. 468, 472
(1989).
The dissent criticized the majority's refusal to review the state court's inter-
pretation of the choice of law clause, finding that the interpretation was based on
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In discussing the preemptive effect of the FAA, the Volt Court first
pointed out the obvious-that the FAA does not contain an express
preemptive provision.90 Nor does the FAA, the Court continued, rely-
ing on an earlier case,9 i reflect a congressional intent to occupy the
entire field of arbitration.92 State laws, however, that actually conflict
with the FAA, those that "stand[ I] as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of [the] Con-
gress," are indeed preempted by the FAA, even absent an express
preemptive provision or a congressional intent to entirely displace
state law.9 3 The Court thus made a distinction between state laws
that bar enforcement of arbitration agreements which are pre-
empted,94 and state laws that govern the conduct of the arbitration,
which are not preempted when the parties have provided for their ap-
plication in their contract. 95 Inasmuch as the primary purpose of the
FAA was to ensure that agreements to arbitrate were enforced accord-
ing to their terms, application of the California rule did not undermine
the goals and policies of the FAA.96 The Court reached this conclusion
even though it was contrary to the result that would have been
reached if the FAA had applied. 9 7
The most obvious problem with the Montana Supreme Court's reli-
ance on Volt is that the holding in Volt rested upon the existence of the
choice of law clause, interpreted to include state arbitration rules.
The Montana Supreme Court, of course, had invalidated the choice of
both state and federal law and thus did not rest upon an adequate and independ-
ent state ground so as to preclude review by the Court. See id. at 482-83. (Bren-
nan J., dissenting). The dissent did, however, agree with the majority that
parties may draif an agreement to arbitrate that falls outside coverage of the
FAA but did not believe that the parties had done so with its inclusion of a stan-
dard choice of law clause in their agreement. See id. at 481 n.4.
90. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989).
91. The Court relied on Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956), which
upheld application of state arbitration law to an arbitration provision not covered
by the FAA because the transaction was not one affecting interstate commerce.
See infra notes 296-303 and accompanying text.
92. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989).
93. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
94. State laws that barred enforcement of arbitration provisions were found pre-
empted in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)(California law which
made arbitration provision contained in franchise agreements unenforceable pre-
empted) and in Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987)(California law which made
agreements to arbitrate wage collection claims unenforceable preempted).
95. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 478-79 (1989).
96. See id. at 479.
97. The FAA does not contain a provision like the California statute, permitting a
court to stay arbitration pending the outcome of related litigation. See 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-16 (1994); see also Moses H. Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1 (1983)(lower court erred in staying federal action seeking to compel arbitration
pursuant to the FAA pending the outcome of a state court action between
parties).
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law clause contained in the franchise agreement. The court was not
dissuaded that the absence of the choice of law clause rendered Volt
inapplicable or less than controlling. Rather, the court relied on the
Volt Court's general discussion of the preemptive effect of the FAA and
seized upon the Court's statement that Congress did not intend to oc-
cupy the entire field of arbitration9S to justify its result that Montana
law did not undermine the goals and policies of the FAA. However,
when the Supreme Court reached the similar conclusion in Volt, it did
so because the parties had specifically included the choice of law
clause in their contract. The Supreme Court could not have been
clearer in this regard: "application of the California statute is not pre-
empted by the [FAA] ... in a case where the parties have agreed that
their arbitration agreement will be governed by the law of Califor-
nia."9 9 Thus, the Supreme Court did not find preemption precisely
because the parties had agreed to be bound by state rather than fed-
eral law in the conduct of the arbitration. The Court did not address
whether the result it reached would have been the same absent the
choice of law clause. The Court did not have to address that issue
because it had done so on two previous occasions. In Southland and
again in Perry, the Supreme Court had found that the FAA preempted
state laws that actually conflicted with it.100 The Montana Supreme
Court did not see the obvious conflict between the result it reached,
finding the arbitration clause unenforceable, and the holdings in
Southland and in Perry.101
2. Justice Trieweiler's Concurrence10 2
Justice Trieweiler wrote specially to "explain a few things" to the
"federal judges who consider forced arbitration as the panacea for
98. The Montana Supreme Court did not, of course, need to rely on Volt for the propo-
sition that Congress did not occupy the entire field of arbitration law when it
enacted the FAA inasmuch as the Supreme Court had intimated that conclusion
thirty-four years earlier in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
See infra notes 296-303 and accompanying text discussing Bernhardt.
99. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 470 (1989).
100. See infra notes 418-62 and accompanying text.
101. While the Montana Supreme Court did address those two cases, it merely reiter-
ated their facts and holdings and failed to analyze their significance to the issue
at hand. The court relieved itself of this obligation because it found that South-
land and Perry had to be considered in light of Volt. See Casarotto v. Lombardi,
886 P.2d 931, 933 (Mont. 1994), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub nom.
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 515 U.S. 1129 (1995), on remand to Casarotto
v. Lombardi, 901 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
The court also largely ignored decisions by lower federal courts and other
state courts that had found similar notice provisions preempted by the FAA be-
cause those decisions either preceded Volt or contained little or no reference to it.
See id. at 938; see also infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 516-42 for a critique of Justice Trieweiler's concurring opinion.
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their 'heavy case loads' and who consider the reluctance of state courts
to buy into the arbitration program as a sign of intellectual inade-
quacy."' 0 3 It was his opinion that the federal bench's misinterpreta-
tion of the FAA and their "naive assumption that arbitration
provisions and choice of law provisions are knowingly bargained for"
have made it easy for a party with superior bargaining power to avoid
Montana's procedural safeguards and substantive laws.iO4 He gave a
detailed account of Montana's sophisticated system of justice, devel-
oped to assure fairness and access to its users. He specifically dis-
cussed the rules of evidence, the standards for appellate review, the
belief in the rule of law, venue and jurisdictional requirements, liberal
rules of discovery, and the existence of contract and tort laws enacted
to protect Montana citizens from "bad faith, fraud, unfair business
practices, and oppression .... ,,105 Justice Trieweiler highlighted the
fact that Montana courts are provided at public expense to guarantee
access to everyone "regardless of their economic status, or their social
importance."' 0 6 These procedures and substantive laws, he asserted,
were "either inapplicable or unenforceable" in arbitration. 0 7
He took particular issue with federal judges who view compulsory
arbitration as a means for reducing overcrowded dockets.i08 He found
that federal judges, too preoccupied with their own case loads, disre-
gard "the total lack of procedural safeguards inherent in the arbitra-
tion process..." or the "financial hardship that contracts, like the one
in this case, impose on people who simply cannot afford to enforce
their rights by the process that has been forced upon them."'0 9 He
criticized federal judges who believe that arbitration clauses are
knowingly and voluntarily entered; he asserted there is no mutuality
in a franchise agreement, and he claimed that such clauses which are
approved and encouraged by the federal judiciary "subvert our system
of justice."ilO
103. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d at 939 (Trieweiler, J., concurring).
104. See id. at 940.
105. Id. at 939-40.
106. Id. at 939.
107. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d at 940.
108. See id. He focused specifically on remarks made by Judge Selya of the First Cir-
cuit in Securities Industry Association v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989),
who referred to arbitration as a "contractual device that relieves some of the or-
ganic pressure [of already swollen court calendars] by operating as a shunt, al-
lowing parties to resolve disputes outside of the legal system" and who suggested
that the FAA was enacted to overcome state court anachronistic preference to
resolve disputes according to traditional notions of fairness. See 886 P.2d 931,
940 (Mont. 1994)(Triewieler, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 940.
110. Id. at 941.
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It is Justice Trieweiler's view that an expansive interpretation of
the FAA "presents a serious issue regarding separation of powers""' 1
and
permit a few major corporations to draft contracts regarding their relationship
with others that immunizes them from accountability under the laws of the
states where they do business, and by the courts in those states. With a legis-
lative act, the Congress, according to some federal decisions, has written state
and federal courts out of business as far as these corporations are concerned.
They are not subject to California's labor laws or franchise laws, they are not
subject to our contract laws or tort laws. They are, in effect, above the law.1 1 2
These federal decisions have ultimately "perverted the purpose of the
FAA from one to accomplish judicial neutrality, to one of open hostility
to any legislative effort to assure that unsophisticated parties to con-
tracts of adhesion at least understand the rights they are giving
up."113
3. The Dissents
Justice Weber, joined by Justice Turnage, dissented on both issues
resolved by the majority. Relying on the language of the notice provi-
sion, Justice Weber first found that Montana law was inapplicable to
the contract.1 4 The statute requires conspicuous notice only if the
contract is subject to arbitration pursuant to the Montana Uniform
Arbitration Act. Because the parties clearly provided for arbitration
in accordance with the rules of the AAA and Connecticut law, the con-
tract was not subject to arbitration pursuant to Montana law.1 1 5
With respect to the second issue, the preemption of Montana law
by the FAA, Justice Weber disagreed with the majority's analysis of
Volt. Volt, Justice Weber explained, required the court to enforce the
arbitration agreement according to its terms, which, if followed, would
require application of the rules of the AAA as well as the law of Con-
necticut.1 1 6 Unlike the majority, the dissent was persuaded by the
holdings in David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd.117 and
in Bunge Corp. v. Perryville Feed and Produce,1is that preempted no-
tice provisions similar to Montana's notice provision. The dissent
111. Id.
112. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d at 941.
113. Id.
114. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d at 942 (Weber, J., dissenting).
115. See id.
116. See id. at 944.
117. 923 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1991)(the FAA preempted a Vermont law that required that
an agreement to arbitrate be displayed prominently in the contract and signed by
the parties).
118. 685 S.W.2d 837 (Mo. 1985)(the FAA preempted a Missouri law that required in-
clusion of a statement in ten point capital letters that the contract contained an
arbitration provision).
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found both cases to be "clear authority that the Montana statute di-
rectly conflicts with the Federal Arbitration Act."119
Justice Gray wrote a separate dissent, also joined by Justice
Turnage. Justice Gray similarly dissented on both issues reached by
the majority. Like Justice Weber, Justice Gray found that the actual
language of Montana's notice requirement belied the conclusion that
Montana law applied. By its terms, Justice Gray explained, the
franchise agreement was subject to Connecticut law, not the law of
"this chapter"-the Montana Uniform Arbitration Act.120 Justice
Gray criticized the majority for its failure to discuss the specific lan-
guage of the statute and its sole reliance on generalized legislative
history regarding the public policy of the state. He found that because
the Montana statute was inapplicable by its terms, it could not "form
the basis of a public policy broad enough to negate the parties' choice
of Connecticut law."12 1
Assuming the majority was correct that Montana law applied to
the contract, Justice Gray found that law preempted by the FAA. The
majority was wrong in its analysis of Volt, which Justice Gray stated
was not a departure from Southland and Perry, but rather was en-
tirely consistent with those opinions; the issue in each case was
whether the state law would undermine the goals and policies of the
FAA.122 The United States Supreme Court did not find that the stay
provision undermined the goals of the FAA in Volt, because, unlike the
California laws at issue in Southland and Perry, the right to arbitrate
remained. 1 23 The arbitration agreement was not rendered unenforce-
able; the process of arbitration was merely stayed.
Justice Gray next discussed two important differences between
Volt and the case at hand, two differences the majority failed or re-
fused to recognize. The first was that the Volt Court's holding relied
heavily on the parties' affirmative choice of California law to govern
their agreement.1 24 Second, unlike the stay provision at issue in Volt,
which Justice Gray characterized as "merely a procedural matter," the
Montana law rendered the parties arbitration agreement unenforce-
able, which completely undermined the purposes of the FAA.125 As
will be shown below, the United States Supreme Court's decision re-
flects much of the same reasoning set forth by Justice Gray.
119. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d at 944 (Weber, J., dissenting).
120. See id. at 945 (Gray, J., dissenting).
121. Id.
122. See id. at 946.
123. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d at 946.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 947.
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D. The Supreme Court's Remand
The Supreme Court granted Doctor's Associates' petition for writ of
certiorari.' 26 The Court vacated the judgment of the Montana
Supreme Court 12 7 and remanded the case to that court for further
consideration in light of Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,128 de-
cided by the Supreme Court six months earlier.
In Dobson, the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the
meaning of the clause in section 2 of the FAA which makes enforcea-
ble a written arbitration provision in "a contract evidencing a transac-
tion involving commerce."1 29 The Supreme Court, contrary to the
decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama, interpreted the clause
broadly, as reaching the limits of Congress' Commerce Clause
power.30 The Supreme Court of Alabama, 131 as well as other
courts, 13 2 had interpreted the phrase to require that the parties to a
contract have contemplated an interstate commerce connection. Be-
cause the Alabama Supreme Court found that the parties before it had
not contemplated an interstate transaction, despite some interstate
activities, the court concluded that the FAA did not apply. Accord-
ingly, the court refused to enforce an arbitration provision13 3 con-
tained in a termite service contract on the basis of a state statute
which made predispute arbitration clauses unenforceable.134 The
United States Supreme Court rejected this "contemplation of the par-
ties" test and found that because the parties did not contest that the
transaction in fact involved interstate commerce, the FAA was appli-
cable and preempted Alabama's conflicting state statute.135
126. See Doctor's Assocs. Inc. v. Casarotto, 515 U.S. 1129 (1995).
127. See id.
128. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
129. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
130. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995).
131. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 628 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1993), rev'd, 513
U.S. 265 (1995).
132. See, e.g., Lacheney v. Profitkey Intl, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 922, 924 (E.D. Va. 1993);
R. J. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita Band Instrument Co., 642 P.2d 127, 130
(Kan. Ct. App. 1982); Burke County Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Shaver Partnership,
279 S.E.2d 816, 822-23 (N.C. 1981).
133. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 628 So. 2d 354, 357 (Ala. 1993), rev'd, 513
U.S. 265 (1995).
134. See ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3) (1996).
135. See Allied-Bruce Tenninix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 279-81 (1995). The Dob-
son case was extremely significant; predispute arbitration clauses in Alabama
would no longer be rendered "meaningless" but would now be specifically enforce-
able if the agreements affected interstate commerce. See Henry C. Strickland,
Allied Bruce Terminix, Inc. v. Dobson: Widespread Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements Arrives in Alabama, 56 ALA. LAw. 238, 238-39 (1995). One commen-
tator stated that the Dobson case "represents ... the last nail which once and for
all seals the coffin containing the ancient corpus of law espousing deeply rooted
hostility to arbitration contracts." Donald E. Johnson, Has Allied-Bruce
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Before reaching its decision to give the "involving commerce"
clause a broad interpretation, the Supreme Court first discussed three
principles of arbitration law previously decided by the Court. 136 First,
citing Volt,137 among other cases, the basic purpose of the FAA is to
overcome the refusal by courts to specifically enforce arbitration
agreements. Second, citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co.,138 the FAA establishes substantive law applicable
in diversity cases because Congress enacted the FAA pursuant to its
power over interstate commerce and admiralty. The third principle,
citing Southland, 139 is that the FAA is applicable in state court pro-
ceedings as well as in federal court proceedings and it preempts con-
flicting state anti-arbitration laws. With these three principles set
forth, the Court next declined the invitation by the Dobsons, sup-
ported by twenty State Attorneys General, to overrule Southland,
which would have allowed Alabama to apply its anti-arbitration stat-
ute to the termite service contract. 140 The Court declined the invita-
tion for a variety of reasons. The Court had previously considered and
rejected the arguments raised by the Dobsons and amici when it de-
cided Southland and nothing significant had changed in the ten years
subsequent to Southland to require the Court to revisit the argu-
ments: "[N]o later cases [had] eroded Southland's authority and no
unforeseen practical problems [had] arisen."141 In addition, parties
had likely relied on Southland in drafting their written agreements
and Congress, since Southland, had extended, not restricted, the
scope of arbitration. 14 2 Accordingly, the Court found it inappropriate
to reconsider Southland.
The Court next considered whether the "involving commerce"
clause in section 2 of the FAA "limits the Act's application, thereby
carving out an important statutory niche in which a State remains
free to apply its antiarbitration law or policy."1 4 3 It examined the
FAA's language, background and structure and concluded that the
word "involving" is broad, i.e. the functional equivalent of "affecting"
commerce, and that the FAA thus applies when there is interstate
commerce in fact.144 The Court, in addition to rejecting the contem-
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson Exterminated Alabama's Anti-Arbitration Rule?, 47 ALA.
L. REv. 577, 578 (1996).
136. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-71 (1995).
137. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
138. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). See infra notes 323-46 and accompanying text discussing
Prima Paint.
139. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
140. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995).
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 272-73.
144. See id. at 273.
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plation of the parties test, also rejected the reasonable person or objec-
tive version of the contemplation of the parties test, urged by an
amicus curiae. It was argued by the amicus curiae that the objective
test would better protect consumers asked to sign form contacts con-
taining arbitration clauses. 14 5 The Court was uncertain how the ob-
jective version would help consumers inasmuch as it would permit a
business to "disavow" an arbitration provision, "thereby leaving the
typical consumer who has only a small damages claim ... without any
remedy but a court remedy, the costs and delays of which could eat up
the value of an eventual small recovery."14 6
The Court then reminded the parties that the FAA in § 2 gives
States a way to protect consumers from "unfair pressure" to agree to
an unwanted arbitration provision. The Court stated:
States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general
contract law principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause "upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
... What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce
all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its
arbitration clause. The Act makes any such state policy unlawful, for that
kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal "footing" directly
contrary to the Act's language and Congress' intent.147
Unlike Justices Scalia and Thomas, who dissented and advocated
the overruling of Southland,148 Justice O'Connor, in a surprising con-
currence, agreed with the Court's decision not to overrule South-
landl4 9 and in its interpretation of the "involving commerce" language
145. The Court, citing the following legislative history of the FAA, agreed with the
amicus curiae that the drafters of the FAA had considered consumers' needs:
"[t]he Act, by avoiding 'the delay and expense of litigation, will appeal to 'big
business' and little business alike ... corporate interests [and] individuals.'" Al-
lied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1996) (citing S. REP. No.
536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1924)).
146. Id. at 281.
147. Id. (citing Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989)).
148. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284-86 (1995)(Thomas,
J., dissenting).
149. Justice O'Conor's concurrence is surprising and unexpected inasmuch as she
vehemently disagreed with the decision in Southland to make the FAA applicable
in state court. There, she asserted that the FAA is a procedural statute applica-
ble in federal court only. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16
(1984)(O'Connor, J., dissenting). In Dobson, although finding that the Court had,
"over the past decade.., abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional
intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, case by case,
an edifice of its own creation," Justice O'Connor agreed not to overrule South-
land, persuaded by considerations ofstare decisis. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.
v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995)(O'Connor, J., concurring). She stated:
Though wrong, Southland has not proved unworkable and, as always,
"Congress remains free to alter what we have done."... Today's decision
caps this Court's efforts to expand the Federal Arbitration Act. Although
each decision has built logically upon the decisions preceding it, the ini-
tial building block in Southland laid a faulty foundation. I acquiesce in
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
of section 2. Significantly, she expressly recognized that the broad
reading given to section 2 would displace many state statutes "care-
fully calibrated to protect consumers"1 5 0 and state procedural require-
ments "aimed at ensuring knowing and voluntary consent."'1'
E. Casarotto v. Lombardi (Casarotto II)152-
The First Remand
Without giving the parties an opportunity to address or brief the
applicability and relevance of the Dobson decision,153 the Montana
Supreme Court on remand reaffirmed its prior opinion after consider-
ing it in light of Dobson.15 4 The majority, in an opinion by Justice
Trieweiler,155 found "nothing in the Dobson decision which relates to
the issues presented to this Court in this case." 15 6 Casarotto I, unlike
Dobson, did not involve a state law which made arbitration agree-
ments invalid and unenforceable and the decision did not involve any
analysis of how the "involving commerce" clause should be inter-
preted. Moreover, Dobson did not modify any of the principles of Volt
relied upon by the Montana Supreme Court in its earlier opinion.15 7
Although recognizing that some of the language in Dobson concerning
the benefits of arbitration was at odds with Justice Trieweiler's con-
curring opinion, such difference was irrelevant inasmuch as the con-
today's judgment because there is no "special justification" to overrule
Southland.... It remains now for Congress to correct this interpreta-
tion if it wishes to preserve state autonomy in state courts.
Id. at 284 (citations omitted). Commentators have also called upon Congress to
amend the FAA to make it inapplicable in state court. See, e.g., Cain, supra note
3, at 18-19; Carbonneau, A Plea for Statutory Reform, supra note 3, at 1952;
Sternlight, supra note 3, at 642.
150. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282 (1995). As an example of
such a statute, Justice O'Connor cited Montana's law refusing to enforce arbitra-
tion clauses in consumer contracts of $5000.00 or less. See MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 27-5-114(2)(b) (1997).
151. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282 (1995). Justice
O'Connor cited a South Carolina law requiring that notice of the arbitration pro-
vision be prominently displayed on the first page of the agreement. See S.C. CODE
ANN. §15-48-10(a) (Supp. 1993).
152. 901 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517
U.S. 681 (1996).
153. Counsel for the defendants requested the opportunity to brief and be heard on the
issues raised by the remand. The majority issued its opinion without expressly
responding to the defendants' request. See id. at 599-600.
154. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 901 P.2d at 597.
155. Justice Leaphart, who replaced retired Justice Harrison, a member of the major-
ity in Casarotto I, specially concurred to state that he had reviewed Casarotto I,
and was in agreement with it and the present opinion finding that Dobson did not
affect the Casarotto I decision. See id. at 599.
156. Id. at 598.
157. See id. at 598-99.
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curring opinion was not the basis of the court's decision in Casarotto
.158
In its extremely narrow and superficial reading of Dobson, the ma-
jority decision seems to almost willfully ignore the three legal princi-
ples of arbitration law set forth in Dobson by the United States
Supreme Court.' 5 9 As Justice Gray's dissenti 60 pointed out, the
"early language" in Dobson was extremely significant to the issues the
court was deciding.' 6 ' In declining to overrule Southland, the
Supreme Court in Dobson expressly stated that "no later cases [had]
eroded Southland's authority."' 6 2 Accordingly, Dobson made it clear
that the Montana Supreme Court was plainly wrong in its conclusion
in Casarotto I that Southland was somehow qualified by Volt.
The Montana Supreme Court also failed to address the significance
of Justice O'Connor's statement that the decision in Dobson would dis-
place state notice statutes. 6 3 The South Carolina statute cited by
Justice O'Connor is nearly identical to the Montana statute.' 64 Like
the Montana statute, it too invalidated arbitration agreements only if
the notice provision was violated. Justice O'Connor concluded that
such a statute would be preempted by the FAA165 and Justice
Trieweiler's opinion ignored entirely the obvious conclusion that the
Montana law requiring conspicuous notice would be preempted as
well.
Lastly, the Montana Supreme Court also disregarded the Supreme
Court's admonition that if a state seeks to regulate arbitration or in-
validate an arbitration clause, that it do so "upon such grounds as ex-
ist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."' 66
Montana's statute did what the Supreme Court expressly said it could
not-by making the arbitration clause in the franchise agreement in-
158. See id. at 599.
159. See supra notes 128-151 and accompanying text discussing Dobson.
160. Justice Gray's dissent was joined by Chief Justice Turnage and Justice Weber.
See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 901 P.2d at 600 (Gray, J., dissenting).
161. See id. at 600. The dissent also severely criticized the majority's refusal to allow
the parties to be heard regarding the Supreme Court's remand: "While one can
only speculate on the reasons for such an implicit decision, one must assume that
the Court is simply unwilling to consider any analysis that would require a
change in the result it remains determined to reach." Id.
162. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995).
163. See id. at 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also supra note 151 and accompany-
ing text.
164. The South Carolina statute provides in relevant part: "Notice that a contract is
subject to arbitration pursuant to this chapter shall be typed in underlined capi-
tal letters, or rubber-stamped prominently on the first page of the contract and
unless such notice is displayed thereon, the contract shall not be subject to arbi-
tration." S.C. CODE. ANN. § 15-48-10(a) (Law. Co-op. 1998).
165. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282 (1995)(O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
166. Id. at 281 (citing FAA § 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994)).
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valid, it placed that clause on unequal footing with the other terms
and conditions of the franchise agreement. Instead of relying on con-
tractual defenses applicable to any contract, such as fraud, duress or
unconscionability to invalidate the arbitration clause, the Montana
statute singled out the arbitration clause for disparate treatment.
The means used by Montana to regulate the waiver of a judicial forum
were clearly in contravention of the FAA and the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of it.
F. The Supreme Court's Opinion in Doctor's Associates, Inc.
v. Casarotto167
In a rather short 16s 8-1 opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the United
States Supreme Court reversed the Montana's Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Casarotto II. After restating the principle that "[b]y enacting
§ 2 [of the FAA],... Congress precluded States from singling out arbi-
tration provisions for suspect status, requiring instead that such pro-
visions be placed 'upon the same footing as other contracts," 169 the
Court found that Montana's statute directly conflicted with section 2
because the "[s]tate's law conditions the enforceability of arbitration
agreements on compliance with a special notice requirement not appli-
cable to contracts generally."170 Like Justice Gray, the Court found
that the Montana Supreme Court had misread Volt, which involved an
arbitration agreement that had incorporated state procedural rules
which did not affect the enforceability of the arbitration agreement
itself, but rather affected only the order of proceedings. 17 1
As mentioned, the Supreme Court's opinion was not unexpected-
Southland and Perry clearly provided the foundation for it and the
Supreme Court's affirmation of Southland in Dobson quelled any
167. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
168. As aptly stated by Professor Sternlight: "[The Court's decision in Doctor's Associ-
ates is] so brief as to imply that no reasonable person could question the Court's
ruling." Sternlight, supra note 3, at 700-01.
169. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
170. Id. The Court declined to adopt a broader view of the Montana statute, urged
upon it by counsel for Casarotto at oral argument, that the statute represented
an "illustration of a cross-the-board rule: unexpected provisions in adhesion con-
tracts must be conspicuous." Id. at 687 n.3. The Court reviewed only the disposi-
tion of the Montana Supreme Court which did not rest on this rule but rather
rested on the particular statute which set out a "precise, arbitration-specific limi-
tation." Id. at 687. However, the Court again reiterated that a "court may not
'rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law
holding that enforcement would be unconscionable for this would enable the
court to effect what.., the state legislature cannot.'" Id. (citing Perry v. Thomas,
482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987)).
171. See id. at 688. Regardless of the court's assertion, the decision in Volt, while it
may not have rendered the arbitration clause invalid, nevertheless, resulted in a
finding that arbitration did not have to proceed. See infra note 177.
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doubt as to the continuing validity of Southland. The Court made it
clear that Volt should not be read too broadly and was applicable only
when the state procedural rules incorporated into an arbitration
agreements did not render arbitration clauses unenforceable.i7 2 The
Court came to this conclusion even in the absence of a provision
designating Montana law as the law governing the agreement. The
Court did, however, seem to insinuate that if the parties had in fact
expressly chosen Montana law as the choice of law to govern their
agreement, Montana law would nevertheless have been preempted.i7 3
While the actual result in Doctor's Associates seems objectionable
because the Montana state legislature was attempting to protect con-
sumers and others from unknowingly waiving important rights, the
Supreme Court had no choice, if it were to follow precedent, but to find
the statute preempted. 174 The only thing the Court could have
done,' 7 5 short of overruling Southland, which it clearly was unwilling
to do, would have been to agree with the Montana Supreme Court's
assertion that imposing conditions on the enforceability of a predis-
pute arbitration clause does not render such clauses unenforceable or
invalid.176 Adoption by the Court of that specious interpretation of
the statute, although it would have had the salutary result of ensuring
that arbitration agreements were knowingly entered, would have been
disingenuous; the Montana statute expressly refused to enforce
predispute arbitration clauses that did not comply with the special no-
tice requirement. In rejecting the Montana's court interpretation, the
Court looked at the actual effect of the statute and was unwilling to
elevate form over substance in its interpretation of it.'77
172. See id.
173. See 1 MAmN EI, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 2, at § 10.9.22 (Supp.
1996).
174. See infra notes 411-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the FAA and its
applicability to state court proceedings.
175. It has been suggested that the Supreme Court could have taken a "less formalis-
tic and wooden view" of the FAA and upheld the state's nonburdensome rule for
ensuring that arbitration agreements are knowingly entered. See Stempel, supra
note 3, at 1415. Such a course, however, would have required the Court to recon-
sider much of its arbitration jurisprudence. The Court made such a dramatic
change only once-when it first upheld arbitration of a statutory claim. Unlike
the change advocated by Professor Stempel here, that change resulted in more
arbitration, not less.
176. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 901 P.2d 596, 598 (Mont. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Doc-
tor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
177. Of course, it is arguable that the Supreme Court, on at least one prior occasion,
interpreted a state law without regard to the actual effect its interpretation
would have had on whether the arbitration would go forward. The California
statute upheld in Volt permitted a court to stay arbitration proceedings pending
the outcome of related litigation. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trust-
ees, 489 U.S. 468, 470 (1989). Although the statute provided only a "stay" of the
arbitration, application of the rule in reality meant that "the parties dispute will
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Thus, while the Supreme Court came to the inevitable conclu-
sion,17 8 based on precedent and a reasonable and pragmatic interpre-
tation of the Montana statute, the result in Doctor's Associates is
disturbing because it frustrates a state's attempt179 to protect its citi-
zens from unknowingly agreeing to arbitrate a claim.' 8 0 Neither the
majority nor the dissent appeared at all concerned with this result.
The majority repeatedly asserted that states can protect citizens and
invalidate arbitration clauses under "generally applicable" contract
defenses' 8 ' and Justice Thomas dissented on the ground that the FAA
was not applicable to state court proceedings.' 8 2
be litigated rather than arbitrated." Id. at 487 (Brennan J., dissenting). See gen-
erally Arthur S. Feldman, Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior University: Confusing Federalism with Federal Policy
Under the F.A.A., 69 TEx. L. REv. 691 (1991); Zhaodong Jiang, Federal Arbitra-
tion Right, Choice of Law Clauses and State Rules and Procedure, 22 Sw. U. L.
REv. 159 (1992). The Court's present willingness to consider the actual effect of
the state statute reflects the shift that has occurred in the Court's view as to the
purpose of the FAA. In Volt, the Court indicated that the purpose of the FAA was
to provide for the enforceability of arbitration agreements according to their
terms. The purpose implicitly emphasized in Doctor's Associates, as first articu-
lated in Moses H. Cone, was the federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.
178. Professor Sternlight argues that the Supreme Court was wrong in reversing the
Montana Supreme Court because the Montana law was consistent with the pur-
poses of the FAA. See Sternlight supra note 3, at 705-09. The purpose Professor
Sternlight focuses on is the FAA's desire to enforce voluntary agreements to arbi-
trate. While the FAA was enacted to require enforcement of voluntary agree-
ments to arbitrate, the drafters were particularly concerned that such
enforcement be on the same basis as other contracts. See H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at
1 (1924)("An arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing as other con-
tracts, where it belongs."). This purpose is furthered by the FAA when it permits
enforceability of arbitration agreements "save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Thus, the
issue of voluntary consent with respect to arbitration agreements can be ad-
dressed or regulated by the states but the FAA requires that such regulation ap-
ply evenhandedly - to "any contract." Because the Montana statute plainly
applied only to arbitration agreements, it clearly contravened the means chosen
by the drafters of the FAA to further the FAA's purposes.
179. Not only was Montana frustrated, but so are other states who have similar notice
provisions. See infra note 280 and accompanying text.
180. The effect of the Doctor's Associates decision is compounded by the broad reading
the Court gave to the "involving commerce" language of section 2 in Dobson. See
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273 (1995). Based on that
interpretation, more transactions will be found to involve interstate commerce,
thereby making the FAA applicable. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 3, at 666
("[Ilt is now quite difficult to conjure up many transactions that would not be
regulated by the FAA.").
181. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); infra notes 481-
98 and accompanying text discussing the role of state contract law in the regula-
tion of arbitration agreements.
182. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 689 (1996)(Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
[Vol. 77:397
1998] ARBITRATION AS DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS 425
G. Casarotto v. Lombardi (Casarotto III)-
The Second Remandl8 3
The Supreme Court of Montana remanded the case to the district
court for entry of a judgment consistent with the Supreme Court's
opinion. However, Justices Trieweiler and Hunt dissented from the
remand. They stated:
We cannot in good conscience be an instrument of a policy which is as legally
unfounded, socially detrimental, and philosophically misguided as the United
State (sic) Supreme Court's decision in this and other cases which interpret
and apply the Federal Arbitration Act. Therefore, we respectfully decline to
sign the Court's order.184
The dissent epitomizes the tension the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the FAA has created between state and federal courts and leg-
islatures. The Court's broad interpretation of the FAA has challenged
the role of the states in regulating a specific kind of contract, arbitra-
tion agreements, a field traditionally handled by the states. This ten-
sion ultimately reflects serious differences of opinion as to the
appropriateness of arbitration as a dispute resolution process. Each of
these issues will be discussed below.
III. FEDERALISM ISSUES AND THE FAA
A. Background of the Passage of the FAA
The background of the law prior to the passage of the FAA and the
steps taken to reform the law at both the state and federal level are
essential to understanding the current clash between federal and
state law regarding arbitration. The foregoing history provides the
views of the drafters and others regarding arbitration at the time the
federal act was passed, and the reason why the drafters perceived a
need for the enactment of a federal law changing prior law to make
arbitration agreements enforceable.
1. Law in the United States Prior to the Enactment of the
FAA-The Revocability Doctrine
Although arbitration was commonly practiced in the United
States' 8 5 since the colonial period, 186 federal and state courts, follow-
183. Order, Casarotto v. Lombardi, No. 93-488 (Mont. July 16, 1996)(on file with the
author).
184. Id. at 2.
185. "[Alt the turn of the century, arbitration was neither a new nor an uncommon
practice in the United States, particularly in such great commercial and financial
centers as New York and Chicago." MAcNEi., AMERICAN ARBrrRATIN LAw, supra
note 17, at 15.
Although the "origin of arbitration is lost in obscurity," Earl S. Wolaver, The
Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 132, 132
(1934), it clearly predates all formal legal systems. Id. Arbitration was corn-
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ing common law inherited from England, refused to specifically en-
force agreements to arbitrate, regardless of whether the agreement
concerned arbitration of an existing controversy or of a dispute that
arose after execution of the agreement to arbitrate.1 8 7 This meant
that a party could revoke, up until the time of the decision by the arbi-
trator, his or her agreement to submit the controversy to arbitra-
tion.' 8 8  Statutory law, either federal or state, requiring the
enforcement of such agreements did not exist, even in those states
that had arbitration statutes that were otherwise supportive of arbi-
tration.1 8 9 Although American courts, like their English counter-
parts, would not order specific performance of the agreement to
arbitrate, damages were available for breach of the arbitration agree-
monly practiced by the Phoenician and ancient Greek traders. See KELLOR, supra
note 1, at 3. Also, "jilt furnished almost exclusively the tribunals for the settle-
ment of business disputes in the medieval period, and in England up to Lord
Mansfield's day was practically the sole remedy open to English merchants." Ju-
lius Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REv.
265, 266 (1926).
186. See 1 MACNEIL, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 2, at § 4.3.1; Sabra A.
Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United States, 12
MINN. L. REV. 240, 246 (1928) ("In the earliest history of the United States there
is considerable evidence of arbitration;" author details state laws, dating from
mid-1600s, relating to arbitration); see also Fred I. Kent, Pioneers in American
Arbitration, 17 N.Y.U. L. REv. 501, 501-03 (1940). See generally Bruce H. Mann,
The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the American Revolution,
59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 443 (1984).
187. See H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924); MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAw,
supra note 17, at 20; Kent, supra note 186, at 501; Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice,
supra note 4, at 1948-49. See generally Paul Sayre, Development of Commercial
Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 597-603 (1927-1928).
188. This practice, of course, led to abuse; a party would participate in the arbitration,
but if the party believed that the arbitrator was going to rule against him or her,
the party revoked his or her agreement to arbitrate. See, e.g., Bills to Make Valid
and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements For Arbitration of Disputes
Arising Out of Contracts, Maritime Transactions or Commerce Among the States
or Territories or with Foreign Nations: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646
Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15
(1924)[hereinafter Joint Hearings](statement of Julius Henry Cohen, Member of
the Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law of the American Bar
Association and General Counsel for the New York State Chamber of Commerce);
Jones, supra note 186, at 245.
189. See MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 17, at 20. Professor Mac-
neil examined an Illinois arbitration statute, dating back to 1873, as an example
of state statutory law that was largely supportive of arbitration but which, like
all state statutes at the time, contained the weakness of refusing to enforce arbi-
tration agreements before an award was made. See id. at 17-20; see also Kent,
supra note 186, at 503 (describing an 1861 New York law that made the decisions
of the New York Chamber of Commerce's Arbitration Committee binding and es-
tablished them as bases for judgments in a Court of Record).
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ment.' 9 0 However, such damages were usually nominal or ineffective
to induce parties to perform their agreements to arbitrate.' 9 '
The doctrine of revocability is said to have come from Vynior's
Case,19 2 a 1609 English case involving recovery on a penal bond secur-
ing performance of an agreement to arbitrate.' 9 3 In that case, the
court permitted recovery on the bond for the revocation, in an amount
that probably exceeded "any fair recovery on the cause of action it-
self."' 9 4 Although Vynior's Case itself involved only recovery on the
penal bond, it is cited as the controlling authority for the revocability
doctrine because of dictum used by the court: "If I submit myself to an
[arbitration] ... yet I may revoke it for my act, or my words cannot
alter the judgment of the law to make that irrevocable which is of its
own nature revocable."' 9 5 While this dictum was apparently unneces-
sary to the holding of the case,19 6 it was, according to one view, a cor-
rect representation of the common law at that time on the revocability
of arbitration agreements.' 97 That common law was based, the theory
continues, not on hostility to arbitration, as some have suggested, but
rather on the notion that "the authority of the arbitrator was based
upon the submission [by the parties to arbitration] and since this was
a purely private contract ... such submission could be revoked like
powers generally." 9 8 Indeed, if the court had in fact been hostile to
arbitration, it is unlikely that it would have permitted forfeiture of the
bond; rather, it could have voided the bond on a public policy basis.' 9 9
Given the use of penal bonds to secure performance of the agreement
to arbitrate, the dictum in Vynior's Case did not materially affect the
enforceability of arbitration agreements.
It has also been asserted that the courts permitted revocation so
that they could safeguard their jurisdiction; courts would not enforce
an arbitration agreement because, to do so, would oust them of their
190. See MACNEiL, AMERiCAN ARBrrRTiON LAw, supra note 17, at 20; Cohen & Dayton,
supra note 185, at 276 (citing cases holding that damages were available for
breach of an arbitration agreement); Sayre, supra note 187, at 598.
191. See MACNEiL, AMERICAN ARBrrRATION LAw, supra note 17, at 185 n.39 (stating
that expectation damages were virtually impossible to prove); Sayre, supra note
187, at 598, 604-05 (stating that damages were nominal because the court did not
believe actual injury was suffered by forcing parties to litigate in the King's
courts ofjustice; such litigation was assumed to be a privilege and an advantage).
192. 8 Coke Rep. 80a and 81b (1609).
193. See Sayre, supra note 187, at 602 ("In modem times, Vynior's Case has generally
been regarded as the original and controlling authority for revocability."); see also
United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006,
1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1915)(doctrine of revocability seems to rest on Vynior's Case).
194. Sayre, supra note 187, at 603.
195. 8 Coke Rep. 80a and 81b at 8ib. Wolaver, supra note 185, at 138.
196. See Wolaver, supra note 185, at 138.
197. See Sayre, supra note 187, at 602.
198. Id. at 600.
199. See id. at 603; see also Wolaver, supra note 185, at 139.
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jurisdiction. That rationale was stated in a 1746 case, Kill v. Hollis-
ter.20 0 No authority was cited for that assertion and no reason was
provided.20 1 Some have hypothesized that the court made the state-
ment in response to changes that had occurred in English law regard-
ing the use of penal bonds.202
Prior to the change in the law, many parties required execution of
a penal bond to secure performance of the agreement to arbitrate.20 3
The amount of the bond was excessive so as to induce the party to
comply with the agreement. If the parties failed to comply, as we saw
in Vynior's Case, the aggrieved party was entitled to collect the full
amount of the bond.204 The Statute of Fines and Penalties, enacted in
1687, changed the law and only entitled the aggrieved party to actual
damages, not the full sum of the bond.205 Because actual damages
were difficult to prove for breach of the arbitration agreement, 20 6 the
penal bond was no longer a viable way to secure performance of the
agreement. This caused the dictum in Vynior's Case to take on a "new
significance."20 7 Because parties could no longer effectively sue on
their bonds and because only nominal damages were available for rev-
ocation, "it was felt that some added reason must be given to maintain
the doctrine of revocability, since it could no longer be avoided by the
use of bonds."20 That added reason was the creation of the ousting of
jurisdiction doctrine. It has also been theorized that the real basis for
the creation of that doctrine was the judiciary's desire to preserve
their salaries inasmuch as judges' salaries were based upon the
number of cases handled by the court.20 9
Professor Carbonneau suggests that arbitration agreements were
made revocable in order to preserve the role of the courts in society:
[Tihe movement to establish functional national legal institutions precipi-
tated a reaction against informal, nonlegal, and nonjudicial forms of adjudica-
tion. If courts were to function as the national oracles of normative law and
procedural justice, there was little room for makeshift, party-confected modes
of dispute resolution. The courts were a central organ of the state and an
200. I Wilson 129 (K.B. 1746); Wolaver, supra note 185, at 139.
201. See Wolaver, supra note 185, at 139.
202. See Sayre, supra note 187, at 604-605; Wolaver, supra note 185, at 139.
203. See Sayre, supra note 187, at 603.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 604.
206. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
207. Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982 (2d Cir.
1942). The court's treatment of the historical background of arbitration law has
been characterized as "pop history." 1 MAcNEIL, FEDERAL ARBrrARTiON LAw,
supra note 2, at § 9.2.3.3 (Supp. 1996).
208. Sayre, supra note 187, at 605; see also Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trad-
ing Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983 (2d Cir. 1942).
209. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983 (2d Cir.
1942)(citing Scott v. Avery, 25 L.J.Ex. 308, 313 (1855)); see also Joint Hearings,
supra note 188, at 15.
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instrument for implementing the dictates of society's juridical creed. The mis-
sion of achieving justice required public investiture and accountability. Judi-
cial responsibilities, therefore, were too august and serious to be exercised by
just anyone. 2 1 0
Thus, arbitration was "viewed as a process that functioned in deroga-
tion of legality."21 1 Because of this stigma, legal systems were unwill-
ing to enforce agreements to arbitrate future disputes and permitted a
party to revoke his or her agreement up until the time of the award.21 2
Finally, some have asserted that the real reason for the revocabil-
ity doctrine was to protect parties from arbitration,2 i 3 although this
theory too has been questioned because it is possible that the courts'
desire to retain jurisdiction had "much to do with inspiring the fear
that arbitration tribunals could not do justice between the parties."21 4
Whatever the reason, the revocability doctrine remained the law in
England for nearly 300 years, although it was somewhat weakened in
Scott v. Avery, 21 5 where the court held that parties could make arbi-
tration a condition precedent to bringing any action in court for breach
of the underlying contract.21 6 The final blow to the revocability doc-
trine in England came with the enactment of the Arbitration Act of
1889.217 That law provided for, among other things, the irrevocability
of arbitration agreements.
The change in English law is said to be one of the reasons behind
the movement in the United States to reform arbitration law,
although the "actual practice of arbitration" was probably the primary
reason.218 One thing became clear to those seeking to have arbitra-
210. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice, supra note 3, at 1947.
211. Id.
212. See id. Professor Carbonneau explained that legal systems were willing to en-
force agreements to arbitrate an existing controversy and arbitration awards be-
cause the presence of arbitration was "too substantial in legal history and in
romanist practices" to allow the legal systems to completely repudiate the arbi-
tration agreement. Instead, the law made arbitration functionally impotent. See
id. at 1947-48.
213. See, e.g., Joint Hearings, supra note 188, at 15; Sayre, supra note 187, at 610;.
214. S. REP. No. 68-536, at 2-3 (1924). The Second Circuit has questioned whether the
basis of the revocability doctrine was the courts' desire to protect parties from
arbitration inasmuch as those same courts were willing to enforce arbitration
awards. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 976,
983 (2d Cir. 1942).
215. 10 E.R. 1121 (1855-56).
216. Interestingly, American courts did not adopt the "promising route" suggested in
Scott. See MACNEIL, AMERIcAN ARBr&TION LAw, supra note 17, at 20.
217. See id. at 27.
218. See MAcNEIL, A=RiCAN ARBITRATION lAW, supra note 17, at 27. The practice of
arbitration, was "truly an internal, grass-roots movement, not of 'the people' but
of the commercial interests using arbitration." Id. at 26. By the early 1800s,
arbitration had spread from chambers of commerce to trade associations, who
were powerful enough to use disciplinary measures to induce their members to
comply with their arbitration agreements. See Kent, supra note 186, at 502-503.
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tion agreements held irrevocable: 2 19 as in England, the change would
have to come from the legislature because American courts appeared
unwilling to make so dramatic a change in the law.2 20
2. The Demise of the Revocability Doctrine
As early as 1911, lobbying efforts began 22 1 to change American ar-
bitration law to make arbitration agreements, including predispute
arbitration clauses, enforceable. 22 2 The campaign to change the law
had three objectives: 223 (i) passage of a uniform arbitration act by the
states, 22 4 (ii) passage of a federal arbitration act, and (iii) ratification
of an arbitration treaty.22 5
The lobbying efforts paid off; in 1920, New York enacted a "mod-
ern" arbitration statute,226 which had a great impact on the passage
of the FAA insofar as it demonstrated support by one of the larger
New York, in many respects, lead the institutionalization of arbitration. See
MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 17, at 26. The practice of arbi-
tration was instituted by the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York as
early as 1753, and in 1768, the first arbitration tribunal in the United State had
been formed by the Chamber of Commerce. See Kent, supra note 186, at 502. In
addition, as already mentioned, New York had enacted a law, making decisions of
the Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Committee binding. See supra note 189.
Further, in 1874, New York had established the Court of Arbitration in the
Chamber of Commerce. Conciliation and arbitration practices were also occurring
in the Municipal Court of the City of New York. See MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBI-
TRATION LAw, supra note 17, at 26.
219. Professor Macneil characterizes those persons who sought to change the law to
make arbitration agreements irrevocable as "reformers." See MACNEIL, AAIERiCAN
ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 17, at 29.
220. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924)("The courts have felt that the precedent
was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment, although
they have frequently criticized the rule and recognized its illogical nature and the
injustice which results from it."); see also United States Asphalt Refining Co. v.
Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915)(criticizing the doctrine
of revocability, but nonetheless declining to enforce an arbitration agreement).
221. This campaign was spearheaded by the Chamber of Commerce of the State of
New York which had, in 1911, appointed a Special Committee to "revive the lag-
ging arbitration machinery that had lain dormant since the beginning of the cen-
tury." Kent, supra note 186, at 507.
222. See MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 17, at 28-29. A statute
making arbitration agreements irrevocable with respect to both existing and fu-
ture disputes is called a "modern" arbitration statute. See id.
223. See Joint Hearings, supra note 188, at 16 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen); see
also MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 17, at 159.
224. See infra notes 269-81 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding the pas-
sage of the Uniform Arbitration Act.
225. See MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 17, at 159-66 for a discus-
sion of the history of the internationalization of arbitration law.
226. See N.Y. ARBITRATION LAw, ch. 275, §§ 1-10 (Cahill 1923)(repealed 1937). The
New York Act was different from any other arbitration statute that had been
passed because it made predispute arbitration agreements enforceable. See 1
MACNEIL, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAv, supra note 2, at § 5.4.1. The Act was unsuc-
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commercial centers of the United States for arbitration2 27 and it pro-
vided the blueprint for the original draft of the FAA.228
The reformers were successful in obtaining the support of the legal
community for the FAA. Even before the passage of the New York act,
representatives of the New York Chamber of Commerce had ap-
proached the legal community with its three objectives. In 1918,
Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman of the Arbitration Committee of the
Chamber of Commerce, appeared before the Cleveland Conference of
Bar Association Delegates and discussed the "matter of commercial
arbitration."22 9 The issue was referred to the American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA) who referred it to its Committee on Commerce, Trade and
Commercial Law.23 0 Following passage of the New York act, the ABA
Committee produced a tentative draft of the FAA in 1921.231 A more
comprehensive bill was drafted in 1922,232 was introduced in Con-
gress by the ABA in association with numerous chambers of commerce
and trade associations,23 3 and, with some changes, became the
FAA.234
At the first hearing on the bill, Charles L. Bernheimer 2 35 described
the purpose of the bill as follows:
The bill on the one hand aims to eliminate friction, delay and waste, and
on the other to establish and maintain business amity and to reduce the price
of commodities to the consumers; this latter on the theory that a merchant in
cessfully challenged on constitutional grounds. See Berkovitz v. Arbib &
Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288 (N.Y. 1921).
227. See MACNE L, AmERICAN ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 17, at 37.
228. See A Bill Relating to Sales and Contracts to Sell Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce and A Bill To Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agree-
ments for Arbitration of Disputes Arising Out of Contracts, Maritime
Transactions, or Commerce Among the States or Territories or with Foreign Na-
tions: Hearing on S. 4213 and 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 2 (1923)[hereinafter 1923 Hearings](statement
of Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman of the Arbitration Committee of the New
York Chamber of Commerce).
The New York bill was drafted by Julius Henry Cohen, counsel for the Cham-
ber of Commerce. See id. at 8 (statement ofW.H.H. Piatt, Chairman of the Com-
mittee of Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law of the American Bar
Association). Mr. Cohen was the primary draftsperson of the FAA. See id. at 13
(statement of Francis B. James, former Chairman of the Committee on Com-
merce, Trade and Commercial Law of the American Bar Association); see also
MAcNELm, AmERiCAN ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 17, at 194 n.36. The Uniform
Arbitration Act was also patterned after the New York Act. See id. at 41.
229. See 1923 Hearings, supra note 228, at 8 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt).
230. See id.
231. See id; see also MACNEIL, A iERiCAN ARBITRATION LAV, supra note 17, at 86-87.
232. See MAcNEiL, A& .wcAN ARBrrRATION LAw, supra note 17, at 87-88.
233. See 1923 Hearings, supra note 228, at 2-3 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer).
234. The FAA was originally called the United States Arbitration Act.
235. In addition to being the Chairman of the Arbitration Committee of the New York
Chamber of Commerce, Bernheimer was also a cotton goods merchant. See 1923
Hearings, supra note 228, at 1.
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figuring his cost adds to his price a certain amount representing the risk of
rejection, claims, fault-finding, etc., even including litigation. If inexpensive
but dependable arbitration were possible instead of costly, time-consuming,
and troublesome litigation, the risk would be correspondingly smaller and the
price made to conform therewith. Not only will the suggested law accomplish
all of this, but it will help to conserve perishable and semiperishable food
products, and save many millions of dollars in foodstuffs now wasted because
of the lack of legally binding arbitration facilities. 2 3 6
Bernheimer's statement clearly demonstrates that the bill was sug-
gested for the benefit of merchants, 23 7 with some indirect, speculative
benefit to consumers, that it was partly in response to the costs and
delay of litigation, and that there was the belief that arbitration, in-
stead of litigation, was a better method to resolve disputes from the
standpoint of business relationships. The bill did not make it out of
committee in 1923, but not because of any opposition to the bill,238
236. Id. at 3.
237. Bernheimer continued, "The merchants want this very badly. It adds to the cost
to the consumer if the merchant has in the calculation of his prices to consider, in
his overhead, possible litigation, possible claims." Id. at 7. He also provided the
Subcommittee with a list of the 28 trade organizations and chambers of com-
merce who supported the bill. See id. at 3. When the bill was reintroduced a year
later, the list of commercial organizations endorsing the bill had grown to 67. See
Joint Hearings, supra note 188, at 21-22. Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of
Commerce, also endorsed the bill when it was originally introduced in 1923, see
1923 Hearings, supra note 228, at 14, and when it was reintroduced in 1924. See
Joint Hearings, supra note 188, at 20.
It was Bernheimer's belief that arbitration would not increase with the pas-
sage of the bill. He explained that merchants were in favor of arbitration because
they were "by instinct averse to any hearing. [A merchant] is adverse to any
formality." 1923 Hearings, supra note 228, at 4-5. Accordingly, if a merchant
knew that he would have to participate in an arbitration and that the dispute
would be expeditiously resolved, the merchant would settle the dispute much
more quickly than if the dispute was to be resolved by litigation. See id.
238. No one appeared at the hearing to oppose the bill. The only opposition to the bill,
mentioned at the hearing, was an objection by the head of the union of seamen,
who was concerned that the bill would "compel[ ]arbitration of the matters of
agreement between the stevedores and their employers." 1923 Hearings, supra
note 228, at 9. Because it was "not the intention of [the] bill to make an indus-
trial arbitration," language was proposed to amend the bill to state "but nothing
herein contained shall apply to seamen or any class of workers in interstate and
foreign commerce." Id. That language, with minor modification, was added to
the bill when it was reintroduced in 1924. See MAcNEiL, AmICAN ARBITRATION
LAw, supra note 17, at 91. It became part of the FAA: "[B]ut nothing herein con-
tained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1994).
As will be discussed, a concern was raised by Senator Walsh as to the applica-
bility of the bill to contracts of adhesion. See 1923 Hearings, supra note 228, at 9-
10. That concern was never addressed by the sponsors of the bill. See infra note
477-80 and accompanying text.
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but because of timing issues. 239
The bill, reintroduced in the 68th Congress, was again referred to
the Judiciary Committees of the House and the Senate. A Joint Hear-
ing was held on January 29, 1924. Again, there was no opposition to
the bill.240 The testimony, all in favor of enactment, was more exten-
sive than the testimony during the 1923 Hearing. In addition to the
three sponsors who testified at the 1923 Hearing,24 1 additional busi-
ness interests testified at the Joint Hearing,2 4 2 as did two legisla-
tors,2 4 3 a representative of the Arbitration Society of America (merged
in 1926 to become the AAA),244 and, most significantly, Julius Henry
239. See Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, American Bar Ass'n,
The United States Arbitration Law and its Application, 11 A.B_. J. 153, 153
(1925).
240. See id. One commentator called the hearing on the FAA a "love-fest" for commer-
cial arbitration. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 78.
241. Charles I. Bernheimer, W.H.H. Piatt, and Francis B. James. 1923 Hearings,
supra note 228, at 1, 7, 12. Bernheimer's testimony was much the same as it was
at the 1923 Hearing. At the Joint Hearing he stated:
Speaking for those who have had experience and who are engaged in
business, I may say this, that arbitration saves time, saves trouble,
saves money. There is no question about that. We know it. It preserves
business friendships. The usual court atmosphere does not get into the
arbitration hearings.... Friendliness is preserved in business. It raises
business standards. It maintains business honor, prevents unnecessary
litigation, and eliminates the law's delay by relieving our courts.
Joint Hearings, supra note 188, at 7. Piatt's testimony was along the same lines:
The American Bar Association is very hopeful that the Senate and
the House will see fit to enact a statute, as they believe this bill fur-
nishes a constructive line for settling and disposing of disputes. We feel
that the legislation already enacted has had the effect, not of increasing
litigation, not of adding any burden to the courts, but rather of relieving
the burden and of reducing controversies; that instead of creating contro-
versies between those who might become litigants, it has created a spirit
of conciliation and settlement. Men have found that if they must arbi-
trate at once they proceed to carry out their contracts. That we regard
as morally a highly desirable thing....
Id. at 10.
242. For example, Gray Silver represented the American Farm Bureau Federation.
R.S. French represented the National League of Marine Merchants of the United
States, the Western Fruit Jobbers' Association of America, and the International
Apple Shippers' Association of America. Also serving as representatives were
C.G. Woodbury of the Canners' League of California, Henry L. Eaton of the Amer-
ican Fruit Growers, Inc., Thomas B. Paton, of the American Bankers' Association,
and W.W. Nichols of the American Manufacturers' Export Association of New
York. See Joint Hearings, supra note 188, at 11-12, 28, 31.
243. The Honorables Charles I. Stengle, Representative from the State of New York
and John B. Kendrick, Senator from Wyoming, provided statements at the Joint
Hearing. See id. at 1, 5.
244. Alexander Rose represented the Arbitration Society of America. See id. at 25. In
his testimony, he explained why the public was in favor of arbitration:
There is this advantage that appeals to the ordinary man: First of all
... he leaves it to a man who is familiar with the subject of the contro-
versy, he leaves it to a man who is the choice of the disputants who can
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Cohen, the primary drafter of the bill, who also submitted a brief in
support of the bill.245 In addition, numerous letters and telegrams in
support of the bill, primarily from commercial organizations, were in-
cluded in the transcript of the hearing.246
Cohen's testimony and brief discussed, among other things, the
practical and legal need for the federal act. He stated why arbitration
agreements were executed:
The evils at which arbitration agreements in general are directed are three
in number. (1) The long delay usually incident to a proceeding at law, in eq-
uity or in admiralty, especially in recent years in centers of commercial activ-
ity, where there has arisen great congestion of the court calendars.... (2) The
expense of litigation. (3) The failure, through litigation, to reach a decision
regarded as just when measured by the standards of the business world.2 4 7
Cohen urged the Subcommittee to change the common law that re-
fused to specifically enforce agreements to arbitrate.248 He also ex-
plained that a federal act was needed because federal courts, at least
in admiralty cases, had refused to be bound by state laws that made
such agreements enforceable. 24 9 Federal courts refused to be bound
because the enforceability of arbitration agreements was considered a
remedy, a procedural matter, where the law of the forum con-
trolled, 250 and federal courts, relying on common law, refused to en-
hear it immediately and free from technicality. Let each man have his
say unembarrassed by technicalities, so that the full truth may come out
and so that no time will be lost in educating a man in the jury who is
unfamiliar with the subject, and that on what may be doubtful testi-
mony, that of the experts. So it is small wonder that arbitration is
desired.
So that you see you can have here a system of arbitration which is
one that the people want; the public want it. They want speedy justice,
and they want plain justice, in as simple terms as it can be reduced to.
Id. at 27.
245. See id. at 13, 33.
246. See id. at 9, 20-24.
247. Joint Hearings, supra note 188, at 34-35; see also Cohen & Dayton, supra note
185, at 272.
248. See Joint Hearings, supra note 188, at 14-16.
249. See id. at 16. In his brief, Cohen stated:
[T]he question of the enforcement relates to the law of remedies and not
to substantive law. The rule must be changed for the jurisdiction in
which the agreement is sought to be enforced, and a change in the juris-
diction in which it was made is of no effect. Every one of the States in
the Union might declare such agreement to be valid and enforcable (sic),
and still in the Federal courts it would remain void and unenforcable
(sic), unless the Supreme Court of the United States felt at liberty itself
to reverse a rult (sic) recognized for centuries. This, in the absence of a
congressional declaration, it has so far felt itself unable to do.
Id. at 39-40.
250. See, e.g., Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 F. 319, 323 (S.D.N.Y.
1921)("Arbitration statutes or judicial recognition of the enforceability of such
provisions do not confer a substantive right, but a remedy for the enforcement of
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force such agreements. 2 5 1 In his brief, Cohen also provided legal
justifications for the bill, which will discussed in more detail below.252
Bernheimer explained that a federal act was needed because of the
nature of commerce, which was mostly interstate.2 53
The bill proposed to Congress by the ABA was indeed passed with
minor changes. It was signed into law by President Coolidge on Feb-
ruary 12, 1925 and made effective as of January 1, 1926. Upon its
passage, the ABA stated: "No piece of commercial legislation, no en-
actment at the request of lawyers has been passed by Congress in a
quarter of a century comparable in value to this."254 The President of
the New York Chamber of Commerce stated: "The bill is one of the
most far-reaching pieces of legislation that has been introduced in re-
cent times in the interest of sound business practices." 255
3. The FAA
As stated, the primary purpose of the FAA was to change the
anachronism in American law and make enforceable agreements to
arbitrate, including executory arbitration agreements, and thereby
put such agreements on the "same footing as other contracts."2 56 This
objective was accomplished by § 2 of the FAA, which provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction2 5 7 or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce 2 5 8 to settle by arbitration a controversy
the right which is created by the agreement of the parties.... [Ilt is not within
the power of the state to regulate the procedure and practice of a federal court of
admiralty.-), affd, 5 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1924); United States Asphalt Refining Co.
v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co, 222 F. 1006, 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1915)("[The ques-
tion is one of remedy and not of right."); see also Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg,
Inc., 130 N.E. 288, 290 (N.Y. 1921)("The common-law limitation upon the enforce-
ment of promises to arbitrate is part of the law of remedies. The rule to be ap-
plied is the rule of the forum.... Arbitration is a form of procedure whereby
differences may be settled. It is not a definition of the rights and wrongs out of
which differences grow.") (citations omitted).
251. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
252. See infra notes 356-60 and accompanying text.
253. See Joint Hearings, supra note 188, at 7.
254. Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, supra note 239, at 153.
255. Id.
256. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
257. Maritime transactions are defined in § 1, as follows:
"'Maritime transactions', as herein defined, means charter parties, bills
of lading or water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies
furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, collisions, or any other matters in
foreign commerce which, if the subject of controversy, would be em-
braced within admiralty jurisdiction ....
9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
258. Commerce is defined in § 1, as follows:
"[Clommerce", as herein defined, means commerce among the several
States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or
in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another,
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thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform
the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitra-
tion an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or re-
fusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
2 5 9
The remainder of the FAA is concerned with the procedures available
to enforce the arbitration agreement. The drafters of the FAA con-
sciously sought to make the procedures "very simple.... reduc[ing]
technically (sic) and formality to a minimum."2 6 0 A court may, upon
application, stay a pending action if the court is satisfied that the is-
sue therein is referable to arbitration.2 61 A court may compel a recal-
citrant party, upon being satisfied that the making of the arbitration
agreement or the failure to comply is not in issue, to submit the dis-
pute to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. 26 2
Provision is made for the appointment of an arbitrator by the court in
the event the contract fails to provide procedures for appointment or if
a party does not comply with the procedures provided.263 An arbitra-
tor so appointed has the power to summon witnesses and to require
them to bring evidence material to the dispute.2 64 The court may also
confirm an award, 2 65 vacate it, but only under very limited circum-
stances, 2 66 or modify it.267 Procedures regarding the appeal of a
or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or be-
tween the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign na-
tion, but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
259. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). For an explanation of the terms "valid," "irrevocable," and
"enforceable," as used in section 2, see infra note 322 and accompanying text.
260. Joint Hearings, supra note 188, at 35 (brief submitted by Julius Henry Cohen);
see also Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, supra note 239, at
154 ("The provisions for enforcing the agreement assure a prompt, speedy and
non-technical determination of the merits both of the application for enforcement
and of the matter in controversy."); H.R. REP. No. 68-96 at 2 (1924)("The proce-
dure is very simple, following the lines of ordinary motion procedure, reducing
technicality, delay, and expense to a minimum and at the same time safeguard-
ing the rights of the parties.").
261. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
262. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994). If there is an issue respecting the making of the arbitra-
tion agreement or the failure to comply, the court may proceed to trial on the
matter, unless a jury is requested to hear the dispute. See id.
263. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).
264. See 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1994).
265. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994).
266. An award may be vacated:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,
or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to post-
pone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
[Vol. 77:397
19981 ARBITRATION AS DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS 437
court's decision regarding the grant or denial of the application for a
stay, order compelling arbitration, or order confirming or modifying an
award are also set forth in the Act.268
4. The Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA") and State
Arbitration Law
The campaign to get a modern uniform arbitration act approved
and adopted by the states did not go as smoothly as did the campaign
to get the federal act passed.2 69 Although the ABA Committee on
Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law drafted a uniform act much
like the federal act, it was not approved by the Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws. Rather, a draft, excluding enforcement of predis-
pute arbitration agreements, was overwhelmingly approved in
1924.270 The reason for the exclusion of predispute arbitration
clauses was based on a concern about the potential adhesive nature of
arbitration agreements and the fact that a person who signs an agree-
ment to arbitrate may be required to arbitrate at an inconvenient loca-
tion2 71-two concerns voiced by the Montana Supreme Court in
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other mis-
behavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly exe-
cuted them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(a)(4) (1994).
267. Modification is permitted:
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an
evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or prop-
erty referred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to
them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon
the matter submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the mer-
its of the controversy.
9 U.S.C. § 11 (1994).
268. See 9 U.S.C. § 16 (1994). This provision was added in 1988 as part of the Judicial
Improvements and Access to Justice Act. The purpose was to "prevent the appel-
late aspect of the litigation process from impeding the expeditious disposition of
an arbitration." David D. Siegel, Practice Commentary in 9 U.S.C.A. § 16, at 374
(West Supp. 1998).
269. See generally MAcNEm, AAEERiCAN ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 17, at 54-57.
270. See id. at 54; see also Sayre, supra note 187, at 597.
271. See MAcNEIm, A RicAN ARBITRATION Law, supra note 17, at 50-51.
With respect to the exclusion of predispute arbitration clauses, one Commis-
sioner stated:
It is felt by the great majority of the committee that this is wrong in
principle, to call upon men to agree in advance to arbitrate any difficul-
ties that might arise, particularly in view of the fact that that would be
done in most instances without any realization on the part of the con-
tracting parties as to what they were really doing. Of course, we all
agree that men ought to know what they are doing when they are sign-
ing contracts, but we all know from a practical experience that the fine
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Casarotto.272 In an astonishing about-face, the ABA approved the
"nonmodern"27 3 UAA of 1924, after much heated debate and discus-
sion.274 Despite the ABA's approval, the 1924 UAA was adopted by
only four states before the Commissioners on Uniform Rules removed
it from the list of approved uniform rules. In contrast, by that time in
1943, fifteen states had adopted arbitration statutes that required en-
forcement of predispute arbitration clauses. 2 75 The "common law
aversion to arbitration [which ran] deep in state judiciaries, 2 76 pre-
vailed in those states that had not adopted either a modem statute or
the UAA. Accordingly, in a majority of states, predispute arbitration
clauses remained unenforceable and parties were free to revoke agree-
ments to arbitrate at any time before the award was made.
In 1955, twelve years after it withdrew the 1924 UAA, the Com-
mission on Uniform State Laws adopted a new UAA, which provided
for enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future disputes. 27 7 Thirty-
four states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UAA.278 In
addition, thirteen more states have adopted modern arbitration stat-
utes, bringing the total to forty-seven states that specifically enforce
predispute arbitration clauses. 27 9
Although those forty-seven states generally allow for the specific
enforcement of predispute arbitration clauses, important differences
exist between state statutory law, the UAA, and the FAA. For exam-
ple, unlike the UAA and the FAA, numerous states refuse to enforce
predispute arbitration clauses related to a specific subject matter.
Some states require, in order for the provision to be enforceable, that
the print type, size, language, and location of the predispute arbitra-
tion clause comply with certain requirements or that the parties sepa-
rately sign or initial the clause. 28 0 Typical types of contracts
type of contracts whilst entirely binding, is seldom read, and we do feel
that it is a giving up rights that the American people really regard as
sacred and they shouldn't be called upon to do so.
Id. at 51.
272. See infra note 536 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 222.
274. See MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 17, at 54.
275. See id. at 55.
276. Zhaodong Jiang, Federal Arbitration Right, Choice-of-Law Clauses and State
Rules and Procedure, 22 Sw. U. L. REv. 159, 184 n.155 (1992).
277. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 1, 7 U.L.A. 6 (1997).
278. See id. at 1.
279. See MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 17, at 57. Only Alabama,
Mississippi and West Virginia do not specifically enforce predispute arbitration
clauses. See ALA. CODE § 8-1-41 (1998); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-15-1 (1998); W. VA.
CODE § 55-10-1 (1998).
280. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 09.43.010 (Michie 1998)(excludes labor-management
contracts, unless otherwise provided); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1517 (West
1998)(excludes agreements between employers and employees); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-108-201 (Michie 1997)(excludes personal injury or tort matters, employer-
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employee disputes, insurance contracts and annuity contracts); CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 7191 (West 1998)(contracts to work on residential property re-
quired specific notice attributes and language for arbitration clause to be enforce-
able); CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1998)(contracts for medical services
require specific notice attributes and language for arbitration clause to be en-
forceable); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.19 (West 1998)(arbitration provisions in disa-
bility insurance contracts must meet placement and language requirements);
COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-64-403 (1998)(arbitration provision in health services
agreements must comply with guidelines regarding print, type, language and lo-
cation); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5725 (1998)(excludes collective bargaining labor
contracts); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2 (1998)(excludes medical malpractice claims,
collective bargaining agreements; insurance contracts, loan or consumer financ-
ing agreements for less than $25,000, contracts for the purchase of consumer
goods, contracts involving consumer acts and practices, residential real estate
sales or loan agreements, unless the clause is initialed by all signatories, employ-
ment term/condition contracts, unless initialed, and agreements to arbitrate fu-
ture personal injury or wrongful death claims); IDAHO CODE § 7-901
(1998)(excludes agreements between employers and employees); 710 ILL. Com.
STAT. ANN. 5/1, 15/9 (West 1998)(arbitration provision in health care agreements
must meet placement, size, language to be enforceable); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 679A.1 (West 1997)(excludes contracts of adhesion, contracts between employ-
ers and employees, claims sounding in tort, including breach of contract claims
unless provided for in a separately signed writing); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401
(1997)(excludes insurance contracts, employer/employee contracts, and tort
claims); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 417.050 (Michie 1997)(excludes employer/em-
ployee and insurance contracts) LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:4216 (West 1998)(ex-
cludes contracts of employment); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5948 (West
1997)(excludes automobile insurance contracts with respect to claims under the
uninsured motorist coverage); M. CODE ANN., CTs. & JuD. PROC. § 3-206
(1998)(excludes employer/employee contracts, unless otherwise provided); MASs.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 251, § 1 (West 1998)(excludes collective bargaining agree-
ments); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.5001, 600.5005 (West 1998)(excludes col-
lective labor contracts and claims related to titles to real estate); Mo. ANN. STAT.
435.350 (West 1998)(excludes contracts of insurance adhesion contracts); MONT.
CODE ANN § 27-5-114 (1997)(excludes personal injury claims, purchase/credit
contracts for amounts less than $5,000, insurance/annuity contracts and work-
ers's compensation claims); NEB. REv. STAT. 25-2602-01 (1998) (excludes personal
injury claims, adhesion contracts, insurance contracts and worker's compensa-
tion claims); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 542:1 (1998)(excludes employer/employee
contracts unless otherwise provided); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 4406-a (McKinney
1998)(arbitration provisions in contracts between HMOs and enrollees must meet
size, placement and language requirements); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.2 (1997)(ex-
cludes employer/employee contracts unless otherwise provided); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. §§ 2711.01, 2711.23-.24 (Anderson 1998)(excludes controversies related to
title to or possession of real estate, with certain exceptions; arbitration agree-
ments in hospital/medical care contracts must meet specific conditions detailing
the nature of the arbitration process and provision must meet size and language
requirement); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 818 (West 1998)(excludes employer/em-
ployee agreements and contracts between insurer and insured unless both in-
sured and insurer are insurance companies); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.305
(1997)(arbitration provision valid if arbitration held in Oregon); R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 10-3-2 (Cum Supp. 1998)(excludes employer/employee agreements and further
provides that arbitration provisions in insurance contracts must meet placement
requirements or the option for binding arbitration lies only with the insured);
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exempted from coverage of the arbitration statutes are labor/manage-
ment contracts, employer/employee agreements, insurance policies,
annuity contracts, agreements relating to personal injury or tort ac-
tions, and consumer purchase or credit agreements over a specific dol-
lar amount. 28 1 Although the differences between state law and the
UAA do not cause any particular problems, the differences between
state law and the FAA implicate federalism issues concerning the
power of states to regulate arbitration clauses for reasons that argua-
bly transcend a general hostility to arbitration.
B. Origins of the Clash
Although enacted in 1925, the supremacy of the FAA and its dis-
placement of state law was not made explicit until 1984 when the
Supreme Court decided Southland2s2 and held that the FAA was ap-
plicable in state court proceedings. 28 3 While the Supreme Court has
been severely criticized for its holding in Southland,28 4 the Southland
opinion is the culmination of the Supreme Court's resolution of the
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10 (Law. Co-op. 1998)(arbitration provision must meet
placement and size requirements for validity, excludes employer/employee con-
tracts (unless otherwise provided), and workmen's compensation claims, unem-
ployment compensation claims, collective bargaining disputes, pre-agreements
between lawyer-client or doctor-patient, and personal injury, insurance and an-
nuity contracts); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 21-25A-3 (Michie 1998)(excludes insur-
ance contracts); TENN. CODE AN. § 29-5-302 (1998)(arbitration clauses in
contracts relating to farm property, structures or goods or to property and struc-
tures utilized as a residence must be signed or initialed to be valid); TEX. Civ.
PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.001 (West 1997) (excludes collective bargaining
agreements, contracts for acquisition of property, services, money or credit with
value greater than $50,000 unless parties and their attorneys sign provision, and
personal injury claims unless agreed to upon advice of counsel and is signed by
parties and counsel but no including worker's compensation claims); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5652, 5653 (1997)(arbitration provision must contain language
substantially similar to that provided in statute and must be signed by all par-
ties; excludes labor interest arbitration and insurance contracts); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-581.01 (Michie 1998)(statute shall not be construed to create right to arbi-
trate controversy regarding the employment terms of any employee of the State);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.04.010 (West 1998)(excludes employer/employee con-
tracts unless otherwise provided); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 788.01 (West 1997)(excludes
employer/employee contracts).
281. See supra note 280.
282. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
283. The Supreme Court had previously held in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), that the FAA, enacted pursuant to Con-
gress' power under the Commerce Clause, was applicable in diversity actions
brought in federal court.
284. See, e.g., 1 MACNEIL, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 2, at §§ 10.5.1 -
10.6.1; Atwood, supra note 3, at 62; G. Richard Shell, Federal versus State Law in
the Interpretation of Contracts Containing Arbitration Clauses: Reflections on
Mastrobuono, 65 U. CrN. L. REV. 43, 57 (1996); Sternlight, supra note 3, at 699-
700.
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dilemma it faced in interpreting and applying the FAA, caused by a
change in the Court's attitude regarding the nature of the arbitral pro-
cess and by its decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins.28 5 The Court
resolved the dilemma so as to give effect to one of the purposes in-
tended by the drafters of the FAA-application of the FAA in diversity
cases. But with that choice, came a consequence-the application of
the FAA to state court proceedings.
1. The Problems Created by Erie and the Court's Perspective
Regarding Arbitration
Erie, decided in 1938,286 thirteen years after the enactment of the
FAA, overruled Swift v. Tyson,287 which had held that under the
Rules of Decision Act,288 federal courts were not required to apply the
common law of a state but could fashion federal common law in diver-
sity cases. Accordingly, Erie required federal courts to follow state
common law, as well as its statutory law, as the rule of decision in a
diversity case. Erie, however, did more than overrule Swift; it also,
"overruled a particular way of looking at law which dominated the ju-
dicial process long after its inadequacies had been laid bare."28 9
In Erie, the Court held that "except in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in
any case [in federal court based on diversity of citizenship] was the
law of the state, [including its common law.]" 290 The Court further
stated: "Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of com-
mon law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or
'general'; ... and no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such
a power upon the federal courts." 29 1 Accordingly, there being no gen-
eral federal common law, federal courts were no longer permitted to
apply federal common law as the controlling substantive law in diver-
sity actions.
285. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
286. See id.
287. 41 U.S. 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
288. The Rules of Decision Act provides in relevant part: "The laws of the several
states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of
Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1997).
289. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945).
290. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
291. Id. "Swift," the Court stated, "represented an unconstitutional assumption of
powers by the courts of the United States." Id. at 79. With regard to the consti-
tutional basis of the Erie decision, see generally John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible
Myth of Erie, 87 HAnv. L. REv. 693 (1974); Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-
and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383 (1964); Louise
Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805 (1989).
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Some have argued that the Erie decision should have been a
"nonevent"29 2 for the interpretation and application of the FAA in di-
versity cases and in state court proceedings.2 93 Federal courts had
been ignoring the dictates of the Rules of Decision Act with respect to
state arbitration law, whether common or statutory law, because of its
view that arbitration involved a remedy and the governing law for
remedies was the law of the forum.29 4 The FAA was thus character-
ized as a statute regarding procedure and, as such, its continuing ap-
plication in diversity cases was not prohibited by the Erie doctrine
nor, like other federal procedural statutes, could the FAA be applica-
ble in state court.2 95 The Court's later decision in Bernhardt v. Poly-
graphic Co.296 however, rejected this characterization of arbitration
and the FAA, and thereby called into doubt the applicability of the
FAA in diversity actions.
In Bernhardt, the Court declined to apply the FAA to a diversity
action based on breach of an employment agreement because the
transaction did not involve interstate commerce. 29 7 In discussing its
disagreement with the appellate court's conclusion that section 3 of
the FAA, providing for a stay of litigation pending arbitration, ap-
plied, regardless of whether the transaction was one in interstate com-
merce, the Court, citing Erie, stated that if the FAA were to apply in a
diversity case, "a constitutional question might be presented."298 The
Court disagreed with the appellate court's view that arbitration was a
mere form of trial-a procedural device. The Court stated:
292. See MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 17, at 134.
293. At first, it did seem that Erie would be a nonevent. Until the Court's decision in
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956), only a handful of cases consid-
ered the issue of Erie with respect to the application of the FAA in diversity cases
and to state court proceedings. See MACNEIL, AERICAN ARBITRATION LAw, supra
note 17, at 134-36; see also Sternlight, supra note 3, at 650-51.
294. See MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 17, at 134.
295. See Sternlight, supra note 3, at 651.
296. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
297. Bernhardt involved a breach of employment agreement. The action was origi-
nally brought in Vermont state court and was removed to the federal district
court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. The contract contained a predispute
arbitration clause requiring the submission of any dispute to arbitration before
the AAA. The issue facing the Court was whether, in a diversity case, it was
bound, pursuant to Erie, to apply state law, particularly Vermont law, which
made predispute arbitration agreements revocable at any time before an award
was made, or the FAA, which would have made the agreement enforceable. The
Court avoided the clash between state and federal law by finding that the FAA
was inapplicable to the transaction because the contract did not evidence "a
transaction involving commerce" pursuant to § 2 of the FAA- The FAA being
deemed inapplicable on its face, the Court held that state law would apply. See
id. at 200-201.
298. Id. at 202.
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We deal here with a right to recover that owes its existence to one of the
States, not to the United States.2 9 9 The federal court enforces the state cre-
ated right by rules of procedure which it has acquired from the Federal Gov-
ernment and which therefore are not identical with those of the state courts.
Yet, in spite of that difference in procedure, the federal court enforcing a state-
created right in a diversity case is ... in substance "only another court of the
State." The federal court therefore may not "substantially affect the enforce-
ment of the right as given by the State." If the federal court allows arbitration
where the state court would disallow it, the outcome of the litigation might
depend on the courthouse where suit is brought.3 0 0 For the remedy by arbi-
tration, whatever its merits or shortcomings, substantially affects the cause of
action created by the State. The nature of the tribunal where suits are tried is
an important part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of action. The change
from a court of law to an arbitration panel may make a radical difference in
ultimate result.3 0
Although the Bernhardt Court did not expressly reject the long-held
view that enforcement of an arbitration provision was a mere proce-
dural remedy, it did hold that arbitration was nonetheless outcome-
determinative, and "substantive" from that perspective. 3 02 The Court
came to this conclusion by analyzing the differences between arbitra-
tion and litigation. 303 Thus, the Erie conflict was brought to a head by
299. The Court declined to view the FAA as a statute creating a federal right. Id.
300. Id. at 202-03 (citation omitted). The Court is referring here to the test set forth in
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), for determining whether a fed-
eral court should apply a particular state law in a diversity case. There, the
Court declined to characterize a state statute of limitations as either a procedural
or substantive rule. Rather, the Court indicated that the proper inquiry in deter-
mining whether to apply state law in a diversity case was whether the state
statute
concerns merely the manner and the means by which a right to recover,
as recognized by the State, is enforced, or whether such statutory limita-
tion is a matter of substance in the aspect that alone is relevant to our
problem, namely, does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a
federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in an
action upon the same claim by the same parties in a State Court?
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). This inquiry, the Court
stated, satisfied the policy concerns of Erie, that "for the same transaction the
accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State
court a block away should not lead to a substantially different result." Id. Thus,
a "policy so important to our federalism must be kept free from entanglements
with analytical or terminological niceties." Id. at 110.
301. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956).
302. Justice Frankfurter in his concurrence did expressly find that arbitration was
"substantive." See id. at 208 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
303. The Court stated:
Arbitration carries no right to trial by jury that is guaranteed both by
the Seventh Amendment... and by the Vermont Constitution. Arbitra-
tors do not have the benefit of judicial instruction on the law; they need
not give their reasons for their results; the record of their proceedings is
not as complete as it is in a court trial; and judicial review of an award is
more limited than judicial review of a trial.... Whether the arbitrators
misconstrued a contract is not open to judicial review.... Questions of
fault or neglect are solely for the arbitrators' consideration.... Arbitra-
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the Bernhardt Court. If arbitration was outcome-determinative, as
that term was used by the Court in Guaranty Trust Co.,304 federal
courts in diversity suits could not, consistent with Erie, apply the
FAA, but rather were required to follow state law. That result, of
course, would have basically rendered the FAA meaningless. 30 5
The Court's view regarding the process of arbitration, although de-
cidedly different from the view of the drafters of the FAA,306 was not
surprising at this time. Three years earlier, in Wilko v. Swan,307 the
Court had determined that the FAA was inapplicable to a claim based
on the Securities Act of 1933. In reaching that conclusion, the Court
questioned the effectiveness of arbitration to resolve issues brought
pursuant to the Securities Act and expressed suspicion as to the effec-
tiveness of the arbitral process itself.308 The Wilko and Bernhardt
Courts' view of arbitration thus seems to maintain some of the judicial
hostility to arbitration that existed in the common law prior to enact-
ment of the FAA.309
tors are not bound by the rules of evidence .... They may draw on their
personal knowledge in making an award... Absent agreement of the
parties, a written transcript of the proceedings is unnecessary ...
Swearing of witnesses may not be required. ... And the arbitrators need
not disclose the facts or reasons behind their award.
Id. at 203-04 & n.4.
304. See supra note 300 discussing Guaranty Trust Co.
305. See, e.g., Hirshman, supra note 3, at 1313-14 (FAA appeared to provide a compre-
hensive answer to arbitration but Erie brought into question the Act's effective-
ness.); Comment, Scope of the United States Arbitration Act in Commercial
Arbitration: Problems in Federalism, 58 Nw. U. L. REv. 468, 469 (1963)[hereinaf-
ter Problems in Federalism](Act would be "wholly inapplicable to the large cate-
gory of cases in which federal jurisdiction is based on the diverse citizenship of
the parties.").
306. See supra notes 235-53 and accompanying text.
307. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
308. The Court stated:
Even though the provisions of the Securities Act, advantageous to the
buyer, apply, their effectiveness in application is lessened in arbitration
as compared to judicial proceedings.... This case requires subjective
findings on the purpose and knowledge of an alleged violator of the Act.
They must be not only determined but applied by the arbitrators without
judicial instruction on the law. As their award may be made without
explanation of their reasons and without a complete record of their pro-
ceedings, the arbitrators' conception of the legal meaning of such statu-
tory requirements as "burden of proof," "reasonable care or material fact"
... cannot be examined. Power to vacate an award is limited... the
interpretations of the law by the arbitrators ... are not subject ... to
judicial review for error in interpretation.
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435-37 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quizas v.
Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); see also Harding, supra note 20,
at 128-30.
309. See supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
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It is arguable that the Supreme Court's current view of arbitration
is more akin to the view of the drafters of the FAA. In more recent
cases, the Court has likened an agreement to arbitrate as a "special-
ized kind of forum-selection clause,"310 where a party does not give up
substantive rights but rather trades the "procedures and opportunity
for review" of litigation for the "simplicity, informality, and expedition
of arbitration,"3 1 and has expressed its belief that arbitration is an
adequate substitute for litigation in a judicial forum.31 2 One must
wonder whether the Erie issue would have come up in Bernhardt if
the Supreme Court's current view of arbitration had prevailed at that
time. Ironically, if the Erie issue had not come up because of the belief
that arbitration was merely procedural, the FAA would have still been
held applicable in diversity cases but inapplicable in state court pro-
ceeding, 3 3-a result the drafters probably expected.31 4
310. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483
(1989)(quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974)).
The Supreme Court has been criticized for its view that arbitration is akin to
adjudication in a judicial forum:
The argument that arbitration is "merely a form of trial" and therefore,
has no impact on substantive rights is indeed a curious, if not blatantly
specious, contention coming from the highest tribunal in a legal system
the cardinal adage of which is that there are no rights without remedies.
It is a legal culture in which legal procedure-due process and equal
protection concerns-is the primary ingredient ofjustice. In both theory
and practice, arbitration is a reduced form of adjudication to which par-
ties consent because they want to avoid legal intricacies. Judicial and
arbitral proceedings are two very different forms of achieving justice, re-
sponding to variegated goals. It is simply nonsense to equate them and
to disregard the well-settled view that party consent, knowingly and
freely given, is at the very core of arbitral adjudication's legitimacy.
Carbonneau, A Plea for Statutory Reform, supra note 3, at 264-65 (quoting Rodri-
guez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)); see also Ster-
nlight, supra note 3, at 652.
311. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985).
312. See, e.g., G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes:
When Is Commercial Arbitration An 'Adequate Substitute" for the Courts?, 68
TEx. L. REv. 509, 510 n.4 (1990) (author recognizes that Supreme Court views
arbitration as "an adequate substitute for the judicial resolution of statutory
claims," and cites Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987),
where the Supreme Court upheld arbitration of claims based on the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitra-
tion, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 426-27 (1988)(Supreme Court decisions "offer dramatic evi-
dence of contemporary faith in arbitration as a successful, wide-ranging
substitute for civil litigation.").
313. The Supreme Court may be tempering its view, a bit, as to the parity of arbitra-
tion and litigation. In First Options, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995), the
Court recognized that the issue of whom has the authority to determine whether
a party has agreed to arbitrate (judge or arbitrator) can make a "critical differ-
ence to a party resisting arbitration."
314. See infra notes 336-60 & 425-32 and accompanying text.
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Thus, it was not only a change in the law regarding the ability of
federal courts to fashion federal common law that brought about the
applicability of the FAA to state court proceedings, but it was also a
change in attitude about the arbitral process itself.315 Arbitration
was no longer considered "merely a form of trial"3 16 but a process that
could bring about a substantive difference in the ultimate outcome of
the dispute.
The Bernhardt Court's characterization of arbitration is more real-
istic than the characterization that arbitration is merely a form of
trial. It is undeniable that there are significant differences between
arbitration and litigation. Those differences are intentional and are,
in fact, touted by some as the benefits of arbitration over litigation.3 17
Contrary to the recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court,3 18 arbi-
tration is not a substitute for litigation but rather is a qualitatively
different process that, like litigation, has its benefits and
drawbacks. 3 19
Putting aside the differences between litigation and arbitration,
the language of the FAA itself intuitively appears to provide a sub-
stantive right.320 The federal statute, which makes arbitration agree-
ments valid, irrevocable and enforceable, grants parties a "right to a
remedy,"32 1 which had not previously existed:
"Valid"... was meant to overrule the doctrine that future disputes provisions
are "invalid" as attempts to oust courts of their jurisdiction, and... appear[s]
to grant a right where none previously existed, even if a "right" to a "remedy"
for breach of contract is a conceptual oddity. "Irrevocable" [was meant to ad-
dress law which permitted parties to] "revoke" the arbitrator's authority at
any time before [the] final hearing, although a revoking party [was liable for
315. The drafters of the FAA seemed to have accepted the remedial-procedural charac-
terization of arbitration, although also recognizing the significant differences be-
tween arbitration and litigation. See, e.g., Joint Hearings, supra note 188, at 5-8
(statement of Charles Bernheimer).
316. That term was used by the First Circuit in Bernhardt to characterize arbitration.
See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 218 F.2d 948, 950 (1st Cir. 1955), rev'd, 350
U.S. 198 (1956) (quoting Murray Oil Products Co. v. Mitsui & Co., 146 F.2d 381,
383 (2d Cir. 1944)).
317. See infra notes 517-20 & 556-66 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 310.
319. The notion that arbitration is a substitute for litigation has actually harmed the
credibility of arbitration; it creates an expectation on behalf of the parties to an
arbitration proceeding that they will receive all the benefits of litigation, such as
the right to appeal, in the arbitral process. When that expectation is not realized,
the arbitral process is deemed second-rate, or inferior to litigation.
320. That conclusion is influenced by the current way of thinking about substance and
procedure, rooted in Erie, which, of course, came after enactment of the FAA-
321. Note, Erie, Bernhardt and Section 2 of the United States Arbitration Act: A Far-
rago of Rights, Remedies, and A Right to a Remedy, 69 YALE L.J. 847, 858
(1960)(while recognizing that the concept of a right to a remedy is a "difficult one
to grasp," author argues that "arbitration's place in our jurisprudence is unique,
and it is more than just another remedy").
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expenses]. By withdrawing a right to revoke, "irrevocable" may be said to
have granted the converse right to have an arbitration provision respected.
The term "enforceable" seems included... as a prelude to provision for specific
performance remedies-a peculiarly efficacious means of redressing breaches
of arbitration provisions .... So analyzed, the words "valid, enforceable and
irrevocable"... both changed the substantive law of arbitration and provided
a new remedy.3 2 2
2. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,323
Resolves the Erie Dilemma
The Supreme Court faced "the serious question of constitutional
law"3 24 regarding the applicability of the FAA in diversity cases
eleven years later in Prima Paint. Prima Paint sued Flood & Conklin
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, seeking recession of the consulting agreement between the par-
ties because of fraudulent inducement.3 25 The parties had entered
into the consulting agreement as part of the sale by Flood & Conklin
to Prima Paint of its paint business. The consulting agreement re-
quired payment by Prima Paint to Flood & Conklin in exchange for
Flood & Conklin's list of customers, covenant not to compete, and the
consulting services of Flood & Conklin's chairman. 32 6 The consulting
agreement also contained an arbitration clause, requiring arbitration
of the breach of contract claim before the AAA.327 When Prima Paint
put the first payment due to Flood & Conklin in escrow because it
believed that Flood & Conklin had breached the consulting agreement
by fraudulently representing its solvency, Flood & Conklin served no-
tice of its intent to arbitrate.3 28 Prima Paint responded by filing suit
in federal court. Flood & Conklin thereafter sought a stay of the liti-
gation and argued that the issue of whether there was fraud in the
inducement of the consulting agreement was, under federal substan-
tive law, an issue for the arbitrators and not for the court. Prima
Paint argued that under New York law, which it asserted was control-
ling pursuant to Erie, claims of fraudulent inducement of the contract
generally were decided by the court and not by arbitrators.3 29
322. Id. at 854-55. Although the author was discussing the phrases as used in the
New York Arbitration Act, it was asserted that the meaning of the same terms in
the FAA was significant, inasmuch as the draftsperson of the two Acts was the
same and the FAA was clearly based on the New York Act. See supra note 228
and accompanying text.
323. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
324. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 208 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
325. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 397 (1967).
326. See id. at 397.




The district court and the Second Circuit agreed with Flood &
Conklin. The appellate court, relying on a substantially similar Sec-
ond Circuit case, 330 held that the rule that the arbitrator decides
fraud in the inducement claims of the contract generally is one of "na-
tional substantive law" which governs even in the face of a contrary
state rule.3 31 The Supreme Court affirmed, for somewhat different
reasons. It found that section 4 of the FAA332 required arbitrators to
decide claims of fraudulent inducement of the entire contract, and
courts to decide claims of fraudulent inducement of the arbitration
provision itself.333
330. See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
There, the Second Circuit went one step further than the United States Supreme
Court was willing to go in Prima Paint when it stated that the FAA was national
substantive law that governs in both federal and state court. The Supreme Court
did eventually adopt the Second Circuit's view seventeen years later in South-
land. See infra notes 412-21 and accompanying text.
331. See Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 360 F.2d 315 (2d. Cir. 1966), affd,
388 U.S. 395 (1967).
332. See Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967).
Although the Court found that section 4 of the FAA provided the "explicit an-
swer" to the issue, the dissent viewed the Court's holding as, indeed, fashioning
federal substantive law regarding the separability of the arbitration clause. See
id. at 411 (Black, J., dissenting).
333. See id. at 400. Section 4 requires the court to compel arbitration ifit is satisfied
that the making of an arbitration provision or the failure of compliance is not in
issue. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994). The Prima Paint Court concluded that although
Section 4 did not expressly apply to motions to stay litigation, "its principles must
govern to avoid differing results depending upon which party first seeks federal
court assistance." 1 MACNEIL, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 2, at
§14.2.3.
The dissent did not believe that section 4 provided the answer, but rather
raised an important, critical question: "That language, considered alone . . .
merely poses the further question of what kind of allegations put the making of
the arbitration agreement in issue." Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395, 410 (1967)(Black, J., dissenting).
Relying on the language of section 4, the majority held that the validity of the
arbitration clause is not put in issue when there is a claim that the container
contract was fraudulently induced. The dissent disagreed and believed that a
claim of fraudulent inducement of the container contract calls into question the
validity of all provisions of the contract, including the arbitration clause. Both
interpretations of section 4 seem plausible, although one is left with the impres-
sion that the dissent arrived at its view because of its concern over the compe-
tence of arbitrators to decide fraudulent inducement claims:
The Court holds, what is to me fantastic, that the legal issue of a con-
tract's voidness because of fraud is to be decided by persons designated
to arbitrate factual controversies arising out of a valid contract between
the parties. And the arbitrators who the Court holds are to adjudicate
the legal validity of the contract need not even be lawyers, and in all
probability will be nonlawyers, wholly unqualified to decide legal issues,
and even if qualified to apply the law, not bound to do so.
Id. at 407. How the language of section 4 was interpreted seemed to depend ulti-
mately on the interpreter's view of the arbitral process itself. The majority ap-
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Unlike the Bernhardt Court, the Prima Paint Court was unable to
avoid the constitutional issue raised by Erie because it found that the
FAA applied to the transaction. The consulting agreement between
the parties, which contained the arbitration clause, was one "evidenc-
ing a transaction in interstate commerce." 3 34 Because the contract
was within the coverage of the FAA, the Court then had no choice but
to decide which law to apply-New York or the FAA. Although not
entirely free from doubt, New York law required the court to decide all
claims of fraudulent inducement; in contrast, the FAA permitted the
Court to decide only those claims of fraudulent inducement related
solely to the arbitration provision itself.
After finding that section 4 provided an explicit answer to the issue
of the separability of the arbitration clause, the Court explicitly recog-
nized that it had to address the constitutionality of the application of
section 4 of the FAA to the contract. 33 5 The Court had three choices
with respect to the Erie issue raised by Prima Paint.33 6 The Court
could have found (i) that the FAA was a mere procedural statute in-
volving only a remedy and, like other procedural statutes enacted by
Congress pursuant to its powers under Article III, applicable in fed-
eral court only; (ii) that the FAA, although characterized as proce-
dural and enacted pursuant to Congress' power under Article III, was
"outcome-determinative" pursuant to Erie and its progeny and thus
inapplicable in an action brought in federal court on the basis of diver-
sity of citizenship because the Rules of Decision Act requires state out-
come-determinative rules to apply in such cases; or (iii) that the FAA
was enacted pursuant to Congress' power under the Commerce Clause
and as such was applicable in federal court pursuant to the Rules of
Decision Act which explicitly exempts "Acts of Congress" from its
coverage.
The first option was problematic. As has been stated by scholars,
the FAA was a "conceptual oddity of a 'substantive right' to a particu-
lar remedy,"3 3 7 a "peculiar amalgam of substance and remedy...."338
peared more confident, never once questioning the competence of the arbitrators
and thus plainly interpreted the statute. Such confidence was plainly inconsis-
tent with the Court's treatment of arbitration in Wilko. See supra notes 307-308
and accompanying text. The dissent, on the other hand, had serious misgivings
about arbitration, and gave section 4 an interpretation that limited the role of the
arbitrator.
334. Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401 (1967).
335. The Court stated: "There remains the question whether such a rule is constitu-
tionally permissible." Id. at 404.
336. See Feldman, supra note 177, at 695 n.25.
337. Problems in Federalism, supra note 305, at 482.
338. Hirshman, supra note 3, at 1316. Professor Hirshman finds however that even
though the statutory reversal of the common law revocability doctrine by the FAA
"would appear to be a substantive rule of contract law," the view of the drafters
was that it was merely procedural. Id. at 1315.
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This option, however, was closed off by the Court in Bernhardt when it
characterized arbitration as outcome-determinative. 3 39 The second
option is probably the constitutional issue the Court declined to re-
view in Bernhardt34o and the one which Justice Frankfurter in Bern-
hardt would have avoided by making the FAA inapplicable in federal
diversity actions.3 41 The constitutional issue thus raised by this op-
tion was whether Congress had the power under Article III to pre-
scribe rules of decision in diversity cases.34 2 Erie made it clear that
federal courts had no such powers. 34 3
The third option gave Congress the chance to avoid Erie and the
constitutional issue altogether. The Court chose that option and, by
doing so, made Erie irrelevant-not because the FAA was deemed pro-
cedural, but because it was based on Congress' power to enact sub-
stantive law under the Commerce Clause.3 44 The Court stated:
The question in this case, however, is not whether Congress may fashion fed-
eral substantive rules to govern questions arising in simple diversity
cases.... Rather, the question is whether Congress may prescribe how fed-
eral courts are to conduct themselves with respect to subject matter over
which Congress plainly has power to legislate. The answer to that can only be
affirmative. And it is clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration statute
is based upon and confined to the incontestable federal foundations of "control
over interstate commerce and over admiralty."3 4 5
In so finding, the Court relied on the legislative history of the FAA.346
The commentary has overwhelmingly and sharply criticized the
Court's treatment of the legislative history.347 While one scholar has
339. See id. at 1320.
340. See Problems in Federalism, supra note 305 at 471.
341. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 206 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
342. "[1]mplicit in the [Bernhardt Court's] decision is that Congress does not have au-
thority, under its powers over the federal judiciary to make the law that is appli-
cable in diversity cases." Problems in Federalism, supra note 305, at 475. See
also Hirshman, supra note 3, at 1320.
343. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 91 (1938); see also Ely, supra note
291, at 698-699; Friendly, supra note 291, at 394-95; Martin H. Redish & Carter
G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate Di-
lemma, 91 HARv. L. REV. 356, 357 (1977).
344. The United States Constitution grants Congress the power "[tlo regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
345. Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967)(citations
omitted).
346. See id. at 405-06 n.13. The FAA was silent as to the basis of Congress' power to
enact it.
347. See, e.g., MACNEIL, AMERMAN ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 17, at 170; 1 MAC-
NEIL, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 2, at § 10; Atwood, supra note 3, at
79-80; Shell, supra note 284, at 49; Sternlight, supra note 3, at 663.
Justice Black in dissent in Prima Paint also criticized the Court's summary
disposition of the Erie issue with "insufficiently supported allegations" that Con-
gress based enactment of the FAA on its power under the commerce clause. See
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gone so far as to call the Court's discussion of the legislative history a
"mischaracterization, 3 48 another has found the legislative history to
be "somewhat inconclusive."3 49
What is probably the case is that the Congress did not give "serious
consideration as to which of the two alternative constitutional powers
might serve to justify the legislation."35 0 The reason for Congress' and
the drafters' lack of consideration may be explained by the fact that at
the time the FAA was enacted, Congress may have believed, pursuant
to Swift, that "it still had power to create federal rules to govern ques-
tions of 'general law' arising in simple diversity cases-at least, ab-
sent any state statute to the contrary."3 51 Or alternatively, the
drafters may have believed that as long as one alternative was avail-
able, constitutional difficulties "concerning the scope and validity of
the Act did not appear serious."352
In fairness to the Court, the legislative history explicitly cites the
power of Congress over interstate commerce and admiralty as one
source of its power3 53 and the statute itself also restricts its applica-
tion to interstate and foreign commerce and admiralty transac-
tions. 3 54 However, that same legislative history discusses the fact
that enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate is "a question of proce-
dure to be determined by the law court in which the proceeding is
brought and not one of substantive law to be determined by the law of
the forum in which the contract is made."355 Moreover, the brief sub-
mitted by Julius Henry Cohen clearly indicated his belief that the
source of congressional power to enact the statute was "the constitu-
tional provision by which Congress is authorized to establish and con-
Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 409-10 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
348. Atwood, supra note 3, at 80.
349. Problems in Federalism, supra note 305, at 484; see also Hirshman, supra note 3,
at 1314 ("Little emerges from the legislative history other than unhappiness with
prior law.").
350. Problems in Federalism, supra note 305, at 468; see also Hirshman, supra note 3,
at 1316 ("After Erie, Congress' intent in enacting the FAA suddenly became
important.").
351. Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 n.13 (1967). The
Court indicated that if Congress had in fact relied on this power, "it was only
supplementary to the admiralty and commerce powers, which formed the princi-
pal bases of the legislation." Id.
352. Problems in Federalism, supra note 305, at 468.
353. "The remedy is founded also upon the Federal control over interstate commerce
and over admiralty." H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924). Of course, this statement
could merely be setting forth an "additional source of congressional power to di-
rect federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements." MAcNmy , ArmERCAN ARBI-
TRATION LAw, supra note 17, at 117.
354. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
355. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
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trol inferior federal courts."356 However, the brief also suggests that,
although not entirely free from doubt, Congress had the authority
under the Commerce Clause to enact the statute, although it did not
have to rely on it.
So far as the present law declares simply the policy of recognizing and en-
forcing arbitration agreements in the Federal courts it does not encroach upon
the province of the individual States. It seems probable, however, that Con-
gress has ample power to declare that all arbitration agreements connected
with interstate commerce.., shall be recognized as valid and enforcible [sic]
even by State courts. In both cases the Federal power is supreme.
The only questions which apparently can be raised in this connection are
whether the failure to enforce an agreement for arbitration imposes such a
direct burden upon interstate commerce as seriously to hamper it or whether
the enforcement of such a clause is a material benefit....
Even if, however, it should be held that Congress has no power to declare
generally that in all contracts relating to interstate commerce arbitration
agreements shall be valid, the present statute is not materially affected. The
primary purpose of the statute is to make enforcible [sic] in the Federal courts
such agreements for arbitration, and for this purpose Congress rests solely
upon its power to prescribe the jurisdiction and duties of the Federal
courts. 3 5 7
One gets the impression from reading Cohen's brief that he would
have liked to have relied, primarily, if not exclusively, on the Com-
merce Clause as the source of Congress' power, but that he had some
doubts as to the constitutionality of doing so.3 58 He thus relied, as
well, on Congress' power under Article 111.359 Cohen's desire to use
the Commerce Clause, and to even create an ambiguity as to the
source of Congress' power, is consistent with Cohen's ultimate objec-
tive: to make arbitration agreements enforceable at both the state and
federal level.3 6 0
The legislative history makes at least one thing clear: the Court's
pronouncement in Prima Paint that it was "clear beyond dispute" that
Congress was relying on its interstate commerce power when it en-
acted the FAA was certainly an overstatement.
356. Joint Hearings, supra note 188, at 37 (brief submitted by Julius Henry Cohen).
357. Id. at 38.
358. It could also be argued that Cohen emphasized Congress' Article III power rather
than its Commerce Clause power to ensure passage of the Act. Surely, fewer
issues regarding state sovereignty and federalism would have been raised if the
Act were to apply only in federal court. See Problems in Federalism, supra note
305, at 468.
359. See id.
360. At the time of the passage of the FAA, Cohen's work to get the states to adopt a
modern arbitration statute had already succeeded, to some extent. New York
had previously passed a "modern" arbitration statute, shortly followed by New
Jersey. A Uniform Arbitration Act had been drafted and submitted for review.
See MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 17, at 84-91. A federal act,
applicable in both state and federal court, would have ensured, for Cohen, a uni-
form rule of enforceability.
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Irrespective of the Court's conclusion regarding Congress' intent
and belief as to the source of its power to enact the FAA,36s it is unde-
niable that the purpose of the bill was to make arbitration agreements
enforceable in federal court.36 2 The proponents of the bill were at-
tempting to rectify the situation where an arbitration agreement be-
tween two New Yorkers, for example, would be held enforceable in
New York courts, but one between a New York resident and a Con-
necticut resident would not be enforced if the action on the contract
were brought in federal court.3 63 The proponents were also reacting
to the fact that federal courts were unwilling to apply state arbitration
statutes in admiralty cases.3 64 For these reasons, the proponents be-
lieved a federal act was needed to make arbitration agreements en-
forceable in federal court. That was the purpose of the Act. That
purpose could not, however, be attained if the Court were to adopt
option two and find that the FAA was enacted pursuant to Congress'
power over the federal courts. Given the change in attitude regarding
the substantive nature of arbitration, such an exercise of Congress'
power in diversity cases would have been unconstitutional. Although
Erie did not involve Congress' attempt to create a rule of decision to
govern in diversity cases, the Court, by finding that the federal judici-
ary lacked that power, clearly intimated that Congress did as well.3 65
If option two had been chosen, it is likely that the FAA would have
applied only in federal court when the basis for jurisdiction was some-
thing other than diversity. This result would have eliminated applica-
tion of the FAA from the majority of cases brought in federal court and
would have undoubtedly frustrated the intent of the drafters of the
FAA.366
Thus, while the result chosen by the Court may not be entirely con-
sistent with Congress' and the drafters' belief as to the source of Con-
gress' power to enact the statute, it is entirely consistent with the
purpose of the Act. The Court was given an interpretative choice due
to the fact that the FAA predated Erie and that Congress was not en-
361. Or, as has been pointed out, Congress' understanding of what had been presented
to it by the ABA. See MACNEIL, AMEriCAN ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 17, at
108.
362. "[I]t is much more important to look to congressional purpose than to congres-
sional belief as to the source of its powers." Problems in Federalism, supra note
305, at 484.
363. See Joint Hearings, supra note 188, at 6 (statement of Charles Bernheimer).
364. See id. at 16 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen).
365. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 88 (1938); see also Problems in Feder-
alism, supra note 305, at 483.
366. "Even though the 1925 Congress and the drafters of the [Aict may have believed
that they were invoking judicial regulatory authority, the act should not risk
emasculation if other powers are available which would obviate present Erie con-
stitutional problems." Problems in Federalism, supra note 305, at 484.
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tirely clear as the source of its power.3 67 The Court followed the fimc-
tionalist mode 3 6 S and took the route that furthered the purpose of the
Act and made it an effective federal law; a route that made sense given
the language of the statute and the nature of the arbitral process. 36 9
That result, however, displaced in diversity cases New York contract
law which provided that a general allegation of fraud in the induce-
ment of a contract puts into issue the validity of the arbitration provi-
sion.370 Thus, a neutraD7 1 state contract law principle was
preempted by the FAA.372 Although a seemingly narrow consequence,
the Prima Paint case laid the foundation for expansive preemption of
state arbitration law in proceedings in both state and federal court. 37 3
3. The Consequences of Prima Paint
There are at least two consequences of Prima Paint that have im-
pacted on the applicability of state law vis-a-vis the FAA. The first
was the creation by the Court of a liberal federal policy favoring arbi-
tration.3 74 That liberal policy has led the Court to displace state law
regarding contract interpretation and to uphold the arbitration of
claims, based not on breach of contract, but on violation of federal
367. But see MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 17, at 134-35 (assert-
ing that it is clear that Congress was not acting pursuant to its Commerce Clause
powers when it enacted the FAA, but rather was relying on its power over the
federal courts).
368. The functionalist model permits courts to interpret a statute in light of changed
conditions. See Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy,
and the Interpretative Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L.
REv. 761 (1989). The Erie decision and the change in perspective regarding the
substantive nature of arbitration certainly may account for the Court's use of this
model.
369. See supra notes 320-322 and accompanying text discussing the substantive na-
ture of arbitration.
370. Although apparently lost on many, "few knew what had hit them when [Prima
Paint] was decided," 1 MACNEIL, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAv, supra note 2, at
§ 10.5.1, this consequence was not lost on the Prima Paint dissent: "[Tihe Court
necessarily holds that federal law determines whether certain allegations put the
making of the arbitration agreement in issue. And the Court approves the Sec-
ond Circuit's fashioning of a federal separability rule which overrides state law to
the contrary." Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 411
(1967)(Black, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the rule was not only con-
trary to state law "but contrary to the intent of the parties and to accepted princi-
ples of contract law-a rule which indeed elevates arbitration provisions over all
other contractual provisions." Id.
371. "Neutral' insofar as the contract principle at issue did not single out arbitration
provisions for disparate treatment.
372. The New York contract law principle is not the only state contract law principle
preempted by the FAA. See infra note 389-90 and accompanying text.
373. See infra notes 412-20 and accompanying text.
374. See infra notes 381-87 and accompanying text.
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statutes.3 7 5 The second and arguably more far-reaching consequence
has been the applicability of the FAA to state court proceedings.3 76
i. The FAA's Strong Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration
The obvious consequence of holding that the FAA was enacted pur-
suant to Congress' power under the Commerce Clause was the finding
by the Court that the FAA is substantive federal law, applicable in
federal court. Beside the Act itself, the content of that federal law,
however, has not been as obvious. In a finding unsupported by the
legislative history of the FAA, the Court, in Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation,37 7 attributed to that
federal law what was implicit in the Prima Paint Court's confidence in
the arbitral process: 378 a strong federal policy favoring arbitration.
In Moses H. Cone, the Court found that it was an abuse of discre-
tion for a federal court to stay an action seeking to compel arbitration
pending the outcome of a parallel litigation brought in state court.37 9
The Court based its conclusion on, among other things, the fact that
federal law was going to provide the rule of decision on the merits of
the dispute - whether the dispute between the parties was within the
scope of the arbitration clause.3 8 0 The Court stated:
The basic issue presented in Mercury's federal suit was the arbitrability of the
dispute between Mercury and the Hospital. Federal law in the terms of the
Arbitration Act governs that issue in either state or federal court.... Section
2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to
the contrary. The effect of the section is to create a body of federal substantive
law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within coverage
ofthe Act .... The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law,
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the
contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability.3 81
One can only speculate as to where the Court found the strong fed-
eral policy favoring arbitration. The FAA itself contains no such lan-
guage.38 2 The legislative history, while supportive of arbitration,
375. See infra notes 396-409 and accompanying text.
376. See infra notes 412-20 and accompanying text.
377. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
378. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
379. Moses S. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 8 (1983).
380. See id. at 24.
381. Id. at 24-25. The dissent did not address the Court's holding with respect to the
FAA inasmuch as they did not believe that the district court's decision was a final
judgment. See id. at 30 (Rebnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent suggests that the
majority ignored the procedural rules regarding appeals "[i]n its zeal to provide
arbitration for a party it thinks deserving." Id.
382. "The policy is strictly a judicially created policy and not the product of the statute
itself." Sternlight, supra note 3, at 653.
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does not suggest, in any manner whatsoever, that such support should
require that doubts concerning the scope of an arbitration clause be
resolved in favor of arbitration.38 3 Indeed, the legislative history con-
cerns itself more with what the Court has described as the FAA's pri-
mary purpose,38 4 to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as
other contracts, but not more so. 38 5 The policy articulated in Moses H.
Cone goes beyond this and seems to say that inasmuch as Congress
picked out arbitration agreements for special federal law treatment, it
must mean that Congress favored those agreements that provide for
arbitration to resolve disputes; why else would Congress have both-
ered requiring specific enforcement if it did not favor arbitration. The
Court's conclusion was bolstered by the result in Prima Paint that
Congress enacted the FAA pursuant to its powers under the Com-
merce Clause.
However, the Court's holding in Moses H. Cone clearly went be-
yond what the Court did in Prima Paint. The Court there relied on
the language of the FAA itself to find that arbitration clauses were
separable when a claim of fraudulent inducement of the container con-
tract was made.38 6 The Court in Moses H. Cone did not rely on any
383. In an article published after enactment of the FAA, Julius Henry Cohen recog-
nized that arbitration is not appropriate for all kinds of disputes:
It is a remedy particularly suited to the disposition of the ordinary dis-
putes between merchants as to questions of fact- [such as] quantity,
quality.... It has a place also in the determination of the simpler ques-
tions of law.., passage of title, the existence of warranties, or the ques-
tions of law that are complementary to the questions of fact.... It is not
the proper method for deciding points of law of major importance involv-
ing constitutional questions or policy in the application of statutes.... It
is not a proper remedy for ... casual questions-questions with which
the arbitrators have no particular experience and which are better left to
the determination of skilled judges with a background of legal experi-
ence and established systems of law.
Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12
VA. L. REv. 265, 281 (1926).
384. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
385. One scholar, at a loss to find a rationale for the Court's holding that arbitration
agreements should be favored, suggests that the Court "was swayed or at least
influenced by a desire to conserve judicial resources." Sternlight, supra note 3, at
660. Other scholars have made similar comments regarding the Court's decisions
to hold the FAA applicable to diversity and state court proceedings. See, e.g.,
MACNEIL, AMERicAN ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 17, at 195; Carbonneau, Arbi-
tral Justice, supra note 3, at 242; Carbonneau, A Plea for Statutory Reform, supra
note 3, at 1951. At least with respect to Prima Paint, it can be argued that the
Court's holding was based more on the dilemma the Court found itself in due to
the change in the law and the way of thinking regarding substance and proce-
dure, resulting from Erie, than on any desire to reduce the case loads of the fed-
eral and state judiciary.
386. Prima Paint "was itself firmly founded in particular language of the FAA. It need
not therefore, necessarily have led to the development of a large penumbra of
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language in the FAA to support its rule of construction. Rather, the
Court developed the rule based on its perception of the policy underly-
ing the FAA and thereby created binding federal substantive law: the
FAA requires that any doubts concerning arbitrability are to be re-
solve with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration.38 7
Although dealing with a federal statute, the Court was not bound
to create a federal rule requiring liberal construction of the scope of
the arbitration clause. The Court could have adopted a neutral princi-
ple of interpretation of the parties' intent, without any bias in favor of
arbitration, as general contract law does regarding the interpretation
of contracts. 38 8 Instead, as it did in Prima Paint, the Court displaced
state contract rules regarding intent concerning the scope of a con-
tract term,38 9 even though those rules did not discriminate against
arbitration.39 0
Although the rule of contract interpretation set forth in Moses H.
Cone was based on the FAA's liberal policy favoring arbitration agree-
ments, the Court has since declined to apply it in two instances: first,
to the interpretation of a choice of law clause incorporating state arbi-
tration rules3 9X and, second, to the issue of whether a party has
agreed to arbitrate the arbitrability issue. With respect to the latter
issue, the Court stated in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,3 9 2
general federal arbitration law or to one with a pro-arbitration bias." 1 MACNEIL,
FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 2, at § 10.7.4.
387. See Hirshman, supra note 3, at 1347. Although one would expect that a claim
based on federal substantive law would confer subject matter jurisdiction on the
federal courts, the FAA does not. The majority in Moses H. Cone recognized this
anomaly: "[The FAA] creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and
regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not create any
independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 .... " Moses H.
Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 n.32 (1982).
388. See 1 MAcNEiL, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 2, at § 10.7.4.3.
389. See id. at § 10.7.4.3.
390. See Hirshman, supra note 3, at 1347.
391. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989). There the
Court declined to find that the California Court of Appeal offended Moses H. Cone
when it interpreted a choice of law clause to mean that the parties intended the
California arbitration rules to apply to their arbitration agreement. The Court
stated:
There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of pro-
cedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability,
according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate. Interpret-
ing a choice-of-law clause to make applicable state rules governing the
conduct of arbitration-rules which are manifestly designed to en-
courage resort to the arbitral process-simply does not offend the rule of
liberal construction set forth in Moses H. Cone, nor does it offend any
other policy embodied in the FAA-
Id. at 476; see also supra note 89.
392. 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
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that the controlling law is state law principles regarding the forma-
tion of contracts and that the presumption in favor of arbitrability, as
set for forth in Moses H. Cone, is not only inapplicable to the consent
issue, but is actually reversed.3 9 3 Accordingly, the Court should not
find that the parties consented to arbitrate the arbitrability issue un-
less there is "'clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]' evidence that they did
So." 3 9 4
The Court's conclusion that the FAA reflects a strong federal policy
favoring arbitration and its corresponding faith in the arbitral process
itself led the Court to uphold arbitration of federal statutory claims.
Despite its holding in Wilko v. Swan,3 95 where the Court declined to
permit arbitration of claims based on the Securities Act of 1933, the
Court, for the first time, upheld arbitration of a statutory claim in
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 396 There the Court held that Wilko did
not bar arbitration of a section 10(b) claim under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 when the arbitration clause was contained in an
agreement evidencing an international transaction. 3 97 Although the
Court stressed that it was the international aspect of the transaction
that distinguished it from Wilko,398 the Court's willingness to permit
arbitration of claims under the Exchange Act, which was enacted to
protect investors from fraudulent and deceptive practices, demon-
strated unprecedented faith in the arbitral process 39 9 and a sea
393. See id. at 944-45.
394. Id. at 944 (quoting AT&T Techs. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649
(1986)).
395. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
396. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
397. See id. at 513. Alberto-Culver, an American company, purchased from Scherk, a
German citizen, trademarks and businesses which were organized under the
laws of Germany and Liechtenstein. Upon learning that the trademarks were
encumbered, Alberto-Culver attempted to sue Scherk in a United States federal
court even though the contract between the parties provided that any claim or
controversies be referred to arbitration before the International Chamber of Com-
merce in Paris. See id. at 508.
398. See id. at 515. The Court found that difference to be "significant" and "crucial,"
which raised concerns that did not exist in Wilko. See id. Whereas it was clear in
Wilko that the law of the United States would govern the controversy, it was
uncertain what law would apply to the Alberto-Culver-Scherk controversy. That
uncertainty, the Court found, made the predispute arbitration clause an "almost
indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability
essential to any international business transaction." Id. at 516.
399. The dissent, on the other hand, was not convinced that the arbitral process was
appropriate for the Exchange Act claim:
We spoke at length in Wilko ... elucidating the undesirable effects of
remitting a securities plaintiff to an arbitral, rather than a judicial, fo-
rum. Here, as in Wilko, the allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation
will involve "subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge" of the
defendant, questions ill-determined by arbitrators without judicial in-
struction on the law.... An arbitral award can be made without explica-
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change in the Court's prior attitude regarding the competence and ad-
equacy of arbitration for statutory claims.40 0 The Court now looked at
an agreement to arbitrate as "a specialized kind of forum-selection
clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be
used in resolving the dispute."4 0
The Court has, since Scherk, permitted arbitration of other statu-
tory claims, despite arguments that the arbitral process was inade-
quate to effectively vindicate such claims.40 2 Accordingly, the Court
has upheld claims based on the Sherman Act, in an international con-
text,40 3 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in a domestic context,4 04
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),405
the Securities Act of 1933,406 and claims based on the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act.40 7 Indeed, the Court has cited the FAA's
pro-arbitration policy, as articulated in Moses H. Cone, as the basis for
rejecting a blanket prohibition of arbitration of statutory claims.40 In
Mitsubishi, the Court stated:
[W]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbi-
tration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development
of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.... [Tihe FAA
tion of reasons and without development of a record, so that the
arbitrator's conception of our statutory requirement may be absolutely
incorrect yet functionally unreviewable, even when the arbitrator seeks
to apply our law.... [There is no judicial review corresponding to re-
view of court decisions.... The extensive pretrial discovery provided by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for actions in district court would
not be available. And the wide choice of venue provided by the 1934 Act
... would be forfeited.... The loss of the proper judicial forum carries
with it the loss of substantial rights.
Id. at 532 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
400. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
401. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974).
402. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
403. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985).
404. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). In upholding
arbitration, the Court stated that the Wilko Court's "general suspicion of the de-
sirability of arbitration and the competence of arbitral tribunals" had been subse-
quently rejected by the Court. Id. at 231-32. The Court thereafter rebuked each
reason given by the Wilko Court for distrusting the adequacy of the arbitral fo-
rum. The Court had previously recognized that arbitrators are capable of han-
dling complex legal and factual claims, that the streamlined procedures of
arbitration did not entail any "consequential restrictions on substantive rights,"
and that it had refused to assume that arbitrators would not follow the law. Id.
at 232.
405. See id.
406. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)(ex-
pressly overruling Wilko).
407. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
408. See Mitsubishi Motors Co. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625
(1985).
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itself provides no basis for disfavoring agreements to arbitrate statutory
claims by skewing the otherwise hospitable inquiry into arbitrability. 4 0 9
The Court's confidence in arbitration, which likely led it to articu-
late the federal policy favoring arbitration, has profoundly impacted
state contract law and state public policy. State contract law regard-
ing separability and interpretation of arbitration clauses has been dis-
placed by the FAA, and state arbitration law, exempting statutory
claims from coverage, is preempted in those cases where the FAA is
held applicable because of the interstate nature of the transaction.41 0
ii. The Applicability of the FAA to State Court Proceedings
The natural implication of the Court's finding in Prima Paint that
the FAA was enacted pursuant to Congress' power under the Com-
merce Clause, and its finding in Moses H. Cone that the FAA creates
substantive federal law,411 was the applicability of the FAA to state
court proceedings and its preemption of state laws that conflicted with
it. The Court so held in Southland Corp. v. Keating.41 2 The Court's
expansive reading of the FAA and its willingness to interpret it in a
manner to give effect to the broad purposes the Court attributed to it
made the FAA's application in state court proceedings an almost fore-
gone conclusion. Once that conclusion was reached, the FAA's dis-
placement of conflicting state law was preordained by the drafters of
the Constitution, who made federal law supreme to state law and
bound state court judges to recognize such supremacy, 41 3 and by the
Supreme Court's 1816 decision in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, where the
Court held a state court bound by federal law when adjudicating a
state claim.41 4 As stated by a leading scholar on federal courts:
[Tihere has never existed doubt that state courts are obligated to consider and
apply relevant principles of federal law which become applicable in the course
of the adjudication of a state cause of action .... If the federal system is to
function properly, a state court cannot be permitted to ignore federal constitu-
409. Id. at 626-27.
410. See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (holding California Labor Code
exempting claims from arbitration preempted by FAA); Southland Corp. v. Keat-
ing, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)(holding California Franchise Investment Law exempting
claims from arbitration preempted by the FAA).
411. In dicta, the Court in Moses H. Cone stated that the FAA was indeed applicable
in state court proceedings. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1982).
412. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
413. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Au-
thority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
414. See 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). There, the Virginia state court refused to give
effect to a federal treaty when adjudicating conflicting claims to real property.
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tional and statutory principles that conflict with state law. The supremacy
clause does not appear to permit any other result.
4 1 5
Absent evidence that Congress did not intend for the FAA to displace
conflicting state law, it seemed clear, based on its holdings in Prima
Paint and Southland, that the Court would find the FAA preemptive
of conflicting state law. The FAA itself provides no such evidence; it is
silent as to its preemptive effect on state law. The legislative history,
although again not entirely free from doubt, on balance suggests that
Congress did not intend or anticipate that the FAA would be applica-
ble in state court proceedings.4 16 Julius Cohen, however, recognized,
and even informed Congress, that if the FAA was enacted pursuant to
the Commerce Clause, it would be applicable in state court and
deemed supreme over state law.4 17
The clash between federal and state law was unavoidable in South-
land. There, franchisees brought a class action in California state
court against Southland, owner and franchisor of 7-Eleven conven-
ience stores, for breach of contract, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and
violation of California's Franchise Investment Law. The contract be-
tween the franchisees and the franchisor contained a broad arbitra-
tion clause. The Franchise Investment Law, however, prohibited
arbitration of claims brought pursuant to it. The FAA required en-
forcement of the arbitration agreement with respect to all claims as-
serted by the franchisees, even those claims brought pursuant to the
Franchise Investment Law.
The Supreme Court found that the California Franchise Invest-
ment Law directly conflicted with section 2 of the FAA, which "de-
clared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power
of states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which
the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration. 418 The only
limitations to enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate, the Court
found, were those limits set forth in the FAA itself.4 19 Thus, state law
cannot subject the enforceability of arbitration agreements to any ad-
ditional limitations. The Court relied on the finding in Prima Paint
415. MARTIn H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDI-
CIAL POWER 165 (2d ed. 1990).
416. "[Blecause of respect for state sovereignty and autonomy apparent among mem-
bers of the Sixth-eighth Congress, the legislators probably would not have en-
acted the statute had they foreseen the Keating decision." Atwood, supra note 3,
at 62; see also Problems in Federalism, supra note 305, at 469 (suggesting that
Congress did not seriously consider many of the "significant and practical
problems in applying" the FAA).
417. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.
418. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
419. See id. The limitations set forth in the Act are that the agreement must be in
writing and be part of a maritime contract or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce and that arbitration clauses may be revoked upon "grounds
that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Id. at 11.
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that the FAA was enacted pursuant to Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause to justify its application of the FAA to a state court
proceeding:
The statements of the Court in Prima Paint that the Arbitration Act was an
exercise of the Commerce Clause power clearly implied that the substantive
rules of the Act were to apply in state as well as federal courts.... [When
Congress exercises its authority to enact substantive federal law under the
Commerce Clause, it normally creates rules that are enforceable in state as
well as federal courts. 4 2 0
After relying on the natural consequence of Congress acting pursu-
ant to its Commerce Clause power to find the FAA applicable in state
court, the Court next considered the legislative history of the FAA to
determine if that history supported that conclusion. As with its treat-
ment of the legislative history in Prima Paint, the Court has also been
criticized for its treatment of it in Southland.421
The Court reviewed the legislative history of the FAA and found
"strong indications" that Congress intended the FAA to have a broad
purpose and thus to apply to state court proceedings. The legislative
history contains no explicit statement supporting that contention.
The Court cites only one sentence from the House Report that argua-
bly supports its contention.4 22 The Court ignores the bulk of the legis-
lative history detailed by Justice O'Connor in her dissent423 which
indicates that Congress did not, in fact, intend for the FAA to apply in
state court. 42 4
Relying on the legislative history, Justice O'Connor, joined by Jus-
tice Rehnquist, would not have applied the FAA to state court proceed-
ings.4 25 Her conclusion was based solely on Congress' intent when
enacting the FAA. She did not advocate or even suggest that Prima
Paint be overruled. Indeed, she recognized that the Prima Paint deci-
sion was faithful to Congress' purpose when enacting the FAA, to
make it applicable to diversity cases. She was unwilling, however, to
carry Prima Paint further because she believed that such a result was
420. Id. at 12 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 420
(1967)).
421. See, e.g., 1 MACNEIL, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 2, at § 10.2 (discuss-
ing the Court's "painfully misleading history of the FAA").
422. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1984). A persuasive argument
has been made by one scholar that the sentence relied upon by the Court contains
a typographical error that, when corrected, would not support the Court's conten-
tion. See MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 17, at 140-41. It is
that scholar's opinion that, regardless of the typographical error, the legislative
history clearly does not support the Court's holding. See id. at 141.
423. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 23-29 (1984)(O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
424. The Supreme Court's selective reading or misreading of the legislative history
has been comprehensively detailed by other commentators and will not be re-
peated here. See supra notes 347-49 & 421-22.
425. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 23 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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contrary to Congress' intent and unfaithful to Congress' purpose in
enacting the FAA.426
In response to Justice O'Connor's opinion that Congress viewed the
FAA as a procedural statute applicable in federal court only,4 2 7 the
majority offered two arguments. First, the Court asked why, if the
statute was procedural, it was expressly tied to interstate com-
merce. 428 Second, the Court argued that if the statute was applicable
in federal court only, forum shopping would be "encourage[d] and re-
ward[ed]." 42 9 The Court was "unwilling to attribute to Congress the
intent, in drawing on the comprehensive powers of the Commerce
Clause, to create a right to enforce an arbitration contract and yet
make the right dependent for its enforcement on the particular forum
in which it is asserted."430 The Court's argument seems reasonable,
yet it is dependent on questionable conclusions the Court had previ-
ously reached. It makes sense only if Congress was relying on its
Commerce Clause power when it enacted the FAA and if Congress in-
tended the federal law to be supreme. The Court's conclusion that
Congress acted pursuant to the Commerce Clause may be based more
on fiction than reality, and its conclusion that Congress intended such
a result is belied, to a large degree, by the legislative history of the
FAA.
Although contrary to the bulk of the legislative history, the Court's
decision makes sense from at least one important perspective. The
enforceability of arbitration agreements was now going to be uniform.
Accordingly, nondiverse parties, as well as diverse parties, were enti-
tled to have their arbitration agreements enforced.43 1 This important
426. See id. at 30.
427. See id. at 14-15.
428. See id. at 14. One explanation has been provided: "The limitation was probably
induced by fears of the reformers that even though arbitration was a procedural
matter of the forum, an act extending to intrastate commerce might nonetheless
be viewed as improperly intruding on states' rights." 1 MACNEIL, FEDERAL ARBi-
TRATioN LAW, supra note 2, at § 10.5.3 n.31.
429. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 (1984).
430. Id.
431. Justice O'Connor disagreed with the Court's forum shopping analysis. She ar-
gued that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant would gain an advantage by
making the FAA applicable in federal court only. If the parties were diverse, she
maintained, the defendant could always remove the action to federal court. See
id. at 33-34. Justice O'Connor's analysis while correct, is overly narrow: "Erie
was not concerned with an advantage as between plaintiff and defendant, but
with the ability of a diverse plaintiff, unlike a nondiverse plaintiff, to select a
federal forum with a more favorable rule." Hirshman, supra note 3, at 1345
n.265.
Professor Hirshman asserts that neither the position of the majority nor of the
dissent in Southland is without flaw:
Each construct-the FAA as a preemptive federal law governing com-
merce or as a directive only to the federal courts-produces anomalous
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policy consideration, first articulated in Erie, seems to have played an
important part in the Court's decision. Accordingly, arbitration could
no longer be used as a "tactical ploy for forum shopping."43 2 Nondi-
verse parties were no longer subject to state arbitration rules that
either prohibited or limited the enforceability of arbitration
agreements.
As in Prima Paint, the Court's interpretation of the FAA in South-
land can be justified not because it is clearly consistent with the legis-
lative history of the Act, but rather because it attempts a more
dynamic or functionalist approach to the statute, one that focuses
more on Congress' underlying purpose in enacting the FAA than on
the less than clear legislative history.4 3 3 At the very minimum, Con-
gress wanted arbitration agreements to be enforceable. Congress
probably believed it was limited by the Constitution to making them
enforceable in federal court only. But the proponents of the bill were
clearly concerned with the notion that agreements would be held en-
forceable in one forum but not in another and they made that concern
known to Congress. The point was uniformity of enforcement and the
Southland decision achieves that purpose. 43 4
results. The majority envisions a federal statute creating federal rights
and remedies but no federal question jurisdiction. The dissent would
permit parties of diverse citizenship to enforce arbitration under the
FAA, but not nondiverse parties to identical agreements.... Faced with
a choice between two imperfect formulations, the Court aligned its pro-
arbitration inclination with the perceived "broader purpose" of Congress
and took an expansive view of the Act.
Id. at 1345-46.
432. Stempel, supra note 3, at 1414: "Prior to the Court's quiet revolution on arbitra-
tion, contracting parties frequently used judgemade 'exceptions' to arbitrability
simply as tactical ploy for forum shopping or other efforts to gain a step on litiga-
tion opponents." Id.
433. See id. at 1420-21. The Supreme Court's decision in Prima Paint to give the FAA
a functional interpretation is arguably more defensible than its choice in South-
land. In Prima Paint, the Supreme Court, in order to save the FAA from extinc-
tion, interpreted it in a manner to further Congress' purpose and to alleviate the
problems created by Erie and the change in perspective regarding substance and
procedure. The Supreme Court seems to have gone further in Southland and
engaged in a functional interpretation to further, in some respect, the broader
policy of the FAA, not as articulated by Congress, but as articulated by the
Supreme Court in Moses H. Cone. But see Stempel, supra note 3, at 1421-22 (as-
serting that dynamicism of the Supreme Court's approach in Southland can be
defended on numerous grounds).
434. As Professor Stempel stated:
Southland can be well defended on the ground that it modernized the
Act in a manner consistent with longstanding legal, social and political
preferences. Construing the [FAA] to create substantive federal law "up-
dates" and modernizes the statute to make it more useful in an era of
growing caseloads and interest in ADR. When confronted with an inter-
pretative fork in the road, there is nothing inherently wrong with the
Court using these factors to decide the case so long as other, more com-
manding factors do not compel the court to choose a different path.
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Once the Court determined that the FAA was applicable in state
court proceedings, the Court then needed to determine if it preempted
the California Franchise Investment Law. The Court concluded that
the California law directly conflicted with the FAA and was thus pre-
empted. The Court stated: "In creating a substantive rule applicable
in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state
legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration
agreements."43 5 This conclusion, which Justice Stevens436 and
others4 37 have argued was unnecessary, has had the most devastating
consequence to state law seeking to limit the enforceability of arbitra-
tion agreements.
Justice Stevens concurred in the Court's decision regarding the ap-
plicability of the FAA to state court proceedings.438 Although recog-
nizing that the legislative history demonstrated Congress' intent to
enact only a procedural statute, Justice Stevens concluded that "the
intervening developments in the law" compelled the Court's deci-
sion.439 However, Justice Stevens dissented as to the Court's conclu-
sion regarding the preemption of the California law. He asserted that
the exception to the enforcement of arbitration agreements, as set
forth in the FAA's savings clause, left room "for the implementation of
certain substantive state policies that would be undermined by enforc-
ing certain categories of arbitration clauses."440 Because California
law deemed any clause waiving compliance with the terms of the
Franchise Law void, the arbitration clause would then be "revocable
at law or in equity."44 1
While agreeing that under the savings clause of section 2 of the
FAA a party can assert general contract defenses to the arbitration
clause, the majority rejected Justice Stevens' position that a defense
based on the California law was a ground that existed for the revoca-
tion of any contract.442 Rather, it was "a ground that exists for the
revocation of arbitration provisions in contracts subject to the Califor-
nia Franchise Investment Law."443 The majority was also concerned
that if a state public policy such as that reflected in the Franchise
Investment Law could void an otherwise enforceable arbitration
clause, "states could wholly eviscerate congressional intent to place
Id. at 1421-22.
435. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1983).
436. See id. at 17-21 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
437. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 3, at 667.
438. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18 (1983)(Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting).
439. Id. at 17.
440. Id. at 18.
441. Id. at 20.
442. See id. at 16-17 n.11.
443. Id.
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arbitration agreements 'upon the same footing as other contracts'...
simply by passing statutes such as the Franchise Investment Law."444
Unlike the majority, the dissent was willing to give the savings
clause a broad interpretation that would have "respect[ed]" Califor-
nia's public policy to protect franchisees and effectuate the remedial
purposes of the Franchise Investment Act. The majority's decision
was the death knell to other state laws that sought to provide protec-
tion to persons with unequal bargaining power. According to the ma-
jority, section 2 of the FAA left no room for such laws.
Many were troubled by the broad preemptive effect the Court gave
the FAA in Southland insofar as it struck down a state law that was
based not on a uniform policy against arbitration,445 but on "an in-
dependent state law interest such as judicial protection of particular
statutory rights and remedies."446 Even if the statute at issue in
Southland was part of a larger regulatory scheme regarding the rela-
tionship between franchisees and franchisors, the truth of the matter
is that the state legislature determined that franchisees needed spe-
cial protection from certain practices of the franchisors, including the
practice of inserting an arbitration provision in the franchise agree-
ment. That sentiment, while driven by the disparity in the bargaining
power between the franchisor and franchisee, assumes that a fran-
chisee needs protection from arbitration because it is inherently bi-
ased, or because the arbitral forum is inadequate to effectuate the
remedial purposes of the franchise law. If the issue was solely to en-
sure knowing waiver of the right to a judicial forum, one would as-
sume that California contract law would have been adequate to
address that issue, or that the statute would have been more narrowly
drawn, denying enforceability upon a showing that the franchisee did
not voluntarily agree to waive his or her right to a judicial forum. Ac-
cordingly, the statute does seem to rest on a suspicion of arbitration
that is contrary to the Supreme Court's and Congress' endorsement of
arbitration. The broad reading of the savings clause as asserted by
Justice Stevens, while respecting certain legitimate state policies,
would also have had the effect of upholding a state policy reflecting to
some degree suspicion of arbitration in the context of franchise rela-
tionships.447 A direct conflict between state and federal law therefore
existed.
444. Id. at 17 n.11 (citation omitted).
445. California law was indeed generally supportive of arbitration. See Keating v. Su-
perior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 595 (1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); see also Stirlen
v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Ct. App. 1997).
446. Atwood, supra note 3, at 88; see also Feldman, supra note 177, at 702-03;
Hirshman, supra note 3, at 1315-16; Sternlight, supra note 3, at 666-67.
447. If, as Justice Stevens suggested, the FAA preempts only those state laws that are
generally hostile to arbitration and not those where nonenforceability of an arbi-
tration agreement is part of a larger regulatory scheme, a court would have to
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The ink may not be dry on the issue of the applicability of the FAA
to state court proceedings. As previously explained,4 4s the Supreme
Court was recently asked in Dobson44 9 to overrule Southland so that
Alabama could apply its own arbitration law that prohibited enforce-
ment of predispute arbitration clauses. The Court declined to do
so.4 50 However, Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented and advocated
overruling Southland.451
Justice Thomas' dissent, joined by Justice Scalia,4 52 contained the
most comprehensive argument in favor of overruling Southland and
rested on, among other things, federalism concerns. Like Justice
O'Connor in Southland, Justice Thomas concluded that the FAA was
inapplicable in state courts. Enforcement of arbitration agreements
was deemed procedural by the Congress that enacted the FAA and
because "[i]t would have been extraordinary for Congress to attempt
to prescribe procedural rules for state courts" Congress did not intend
the FAA to apply in state court.4 53 He also rejected the notion that
changes in the law, particularly the new meaning subscribed to "sub-
stance" and "procedure" after Erie could alter the original meaning of
the statute.45 4
In further support of his opinion that Southland should be over-
ruled, Justice Thomas focused on the fact that the FAA does not confer
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. He argued that if Congress in-
tended to create substantive law, "then the breach of an arbitration
determine, as to each state law that limited arbitration, whether the statute re-
flected a general hostility to arbitration or whether it embodied a substantive
state policy unrelated to any belief as to the adequacy of arbitration. Such a situ-
ation would undoubtedly invite prearbitration litigation.
448. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
449. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
450. See id. at 271.
451. See id. at 284-97 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
452. Justice Scalia also wrote separately. He indicated his agreement with Justice
Thomas and his belated agreement with Justice O'Connor regarding the proper
interpretation of the FAA. See id. at 284 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although he
stated that he would not in the future dissent from judgments that rest on South-
land (and he did not in Doctor's Associates), he did indicate that he "stand[s]
ready to join four other Justices in overruling" Southland. Id. at 285.
453. Id. at 287-88 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Although rejected three decades earlier in
Bernhardt (see supra notes 296-302 and accompanying text), Justice Thomas as-
serted that a "strong argument" can be made that arbitration statutes are proce-
dural. He characterized arbitration agreements as a species of forum-selection
clauses that "concern procedure rather than substance." He analogized to Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 73, which gives the district court, with the parties
consent, the power to refer their case to a magistrate and Rule 53, which permits
the district court to refer issues to a special master. See id. at 289.
454. See id. at 292. The changes in the law, referred to by Justice Thomas, more than
altered the original meaning of the statute. Rather, those changes rendered the
statute largely ineffective. Justice Thomas clearly rejected a functional interpre-
tation of the FAA.
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agreement covered by § 2 would give rise to a federal question within
the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts." 4 55 One
possible answer to this argument is that Congress, while willing to
make arbitration agreements enforceable, was unwilling to subject the
federal courts to the increased workload that would result from the
additional motion practice seeking to compel arbitration or stay litiga-
tion pending arbitration.456
Justice Thomas also provided a rationale for the link to interstate
commerce set forth in section 2 of the FAA. Contrary to the position
taken by Justice Burger in Southland,457 Justice Thomas did not view
the requirement that the arbitration agreement be one involving an
interstate transaction as evidence that Congress intended the FAA to
have universal applicability. Rather, he argued while Congress may
have believed it had the power "to call upon federal courts to enforce
arbitration agreements in every single case that came before them," it
had no federal interest in doing so.458 He further argued that "[elven
if the interstate commerce requirement created uncertainty about the
original meaning of the statute," such uncertainty should be resolved
"in light of core principles of federalism."4 59 In other words, Justice
Thomas believed that the Court should be unwilling to displace state
law absent more certainty that Congress intended to interfere with
the role of the states in our federal system.4 60 Justice Burger in
Southland resolved the uncertainty, although not expressly admitting
its existence, in favor of effectuating the purposes of the FAA and fur-
thering the strong federal policy favoring arbitration.
iii. Consequences of Southland
The consequence for state law is clear: state laws that prohibit ar-
bitration of certain claims are preempted by the FAA.461 Accordingly,
455. Id. at 291.
456. See Hirshman, supra note 3, at 17; see also Problems in Federalism, supra note
305, at 490 ("Though the concept that a congressional statute can create a sub-
stantive right and yet not afford a basis for federal question jurisdiction may ap-
pear unreasonable, the Supreme Court held.., that such a situation is entirely
possible.").
457. See supra note 428 and accompanying text.
458. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 292 (1995)(Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
459. Id.
460. In response to Justice O'Connor's decision to concur in the majority decision to let
Southland stand Justice Thomas stated "that preserv[ing] state autonomy in
state courts" was sufficient justification to ignore the doctrine of stare decisis.
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 296 (1995)(Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
461. See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 3, at 62 ("Under [Southland] the states lack power to
ensure that specially favored claims, such as claims brought under investor-pro-
tection or consumer protection statutes will be resolved by a court rather an arbi-
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since Southland, the Supreme Court has found that the FAA pre-
empted a California state law that prohibited arbitration of wage
claims,46 2 an Alabama law that refused to enforce a predispute arbi-
tration clause in a consumer contract,463 and the Court stated in dic-
tum that a state law prohibiting arbitrators from awarding punitive
damages would be preempted as well.464 The lower federal and state
courts have also found a whole host of state laws that required a judi-
cial forum for the adjudication of certain categories of claims pre-
empted by the FAA.465 Further, as we saw in Doctor's Associates,
tration panel.");Feldman, supra note 177, at 703 ("After Southland, the ability of
state law or policy to limit arbitration in any respect-even by supplanting arbi-
tration with judicial resolution as a single part of a larger enforcement scheme
... was doubtful."); Jiang, supra note 177, at 184 (asserting that in light of South-
land, the savings clause of section 2 may not apply to state rules that protect
essentially local, parochial interests); Shell, supra note 312, at 65 ("Using the
concept of federal preemption, the Court in Southland wiped out all special state
law objections to arbitration clause enforcement that were based on state con-
sumer and small business protection statutes.").
462. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
463. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
464. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
465. See, e.g., Baravativ. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 1994)(Il-
linois rule, if it existed, which prohibited arbitrators from awarding punitive
damages, preempted by FAA); S+L+H S.p.A. v. Miller-St. Nazianz, Inc., 988 F.2d
1518 (7th Cir. 1993)(Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law that limited arbitrability of
claims preempted); Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 968 F.2d 877
(9th Cir. 1992)(California Polygraph Protection statute's preference for judicial
forum preempted); Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719 (4th Cir.
1990)(Virginia Motor Vehicle Dealer Licensing Act which prohibited automobile
dealers and manufacturers from entering into agreements that contained
mandatory predispute arbitration clauses preempted); Securities Indus. Ass'n v.
Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989)(Massachusetts securities law that made
it an unlawful practice to require execution of a predispute arbitration clause as a
precondition for doing business preempted); Osterneck v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 841 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1988)(Pennsylvania securities law
that precluded enforcement of arbitration provisions in investment agreements
absent voluntary agreement of the parties preempted); Webb v. R. Rowland &
Co., 800 F.2d 803 (8th Cir. 1986)(Missouri law that exempted contracts of adhe-
sion from enforceability of arbitration agreements preempted); Haluska v. RAF
Financial Corp., 875 F. Supp. 825 (N.D. Ga. 1994)(Georgia law requiring judicial
forum for minimum wage claims preempted by FAA); Medika Intl, Inc. v. Scan-
lan, Int'l. Inc., 830 F. Supp. 81 (D.P.R. 1993)(Puerto Rico Dealers' Act which
made unenforceable clauses that provided for arbitration outside of Puerto Rico
preempted); Ceco Concrete Constr. v. J.T. Schrimsher Constr. Co. Inc., 792 F.
Supp. 109 (N.D. Ga. 1992)(Georgia rule that prohibited the award of attorneys
fees in arbitration preempted); Seymour v. Gloria Jean's Coffee Bean Franchising
Corp., 732 F. Supp. 988 (D. Minn. 1990)(Minnesota franchise law prohibiting
predispute arbitration clauses preempted); Russolillo v. Thomson McKinnon Sec.,
Inc., 694 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Conn. 1988)(Connecticut securities law that prohib-
ited waiver of judicial forum preempted); Reed v. Bear, Stearn & Co., 698 F.
Supp. 835 (D. Kan. 1988)(Kansas securities law that prohibited waiver of judicial
forum preempted); Hurst v. Tony Moore Imports, Inc., 699 So. 2d 1249 (Ala.
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Southland has been applied to preempt state laws that conditioned
enforceability on compliance with rules regarding conspicuous notice
of the arbitration clause.4 66 The conclusion that statutes like the
Montana law at issue in Doctor's Associates are preempted by the FAA
seems counter-intuitive inasmuch as the Montana statute was
designed to ensure that persons signing arbitration clauses do so
knowingly.467 However, although the Montana law arguably had a
different purpose than the laws displaced in Southland, Perry and
Dobson,468 its effect was the same-unenforceability of an agreement
to arbitrate.
State laws requiring special notice were obviously enacted to ad-
dress the very serious issue of the prevalent use of arbitration clauses
1997)(Alabama law that prohibited specific enforcement of predispute arbitration
agreement preempted); Beeson v. Erickson, 917 P.2d 901 (Kan. App. 1996)(in
dicta court stated that FAA would preempt Kansas law barring arbitration of tort
claims); Johnson v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 1995)(Minnesota
Human Rights Act that voids agreements that waive right to a judicial forum
preempted); Dowd v. First Omaha Sec. Corp., 242 Neb. 347, 495 N.W.2d 36
(1993)(Nebraska common law that refuses to specifically enforce predispute arbi-
tration agreements preempted); Prudential Sec. Inc. v. Banales, 860 S.W.2d 594
(Tex. Ct. App. 1993)(FAA preempted application of nonwaiver provision of Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act with regard to enforcement of arbitration agree-
ment); Bungard v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., No. 93-0200, 1995 WL 215500 at 7 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1995)(FAA preempted Wisconsin arbitration law that prohibits enforce-
ment of arbitration provision in contracts between employers and employees).
466. See, e.g., David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245 (2d
Cir. 1991)(Vermont's conspicuous notice requirement preempted); Securities In-
dus. Ass'n. v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989)(Massachusetts securities
law that required full disclosure to the investor of the legal effect of a predispute
arbitration clause preempted); Webb v. R. Rowland & Co, 800 F.2d 803 (8th Cir.
1986)(Missouri conspicuous notice requirement preempted); Collins Radio Co. v.
Ex-Cell-O Corp., 467 F.2d 995 (8th Cir. 1972)(Texas requirement, since repealed,
that counsel sign the predispute arbitration clause preempted); Snap-On Tools
Corp. v. Vetter, 838 F. Supp. 468 (D. Mont. 1993)(Montana conspicuous notice
requirement preempted); Third Nat'l Bank v. Wedge Group, Inc., 749 F. Supp.
851 (M.D. Tenn. 1990)(Texas notice statute preempted); Primerica Financial
Services, Inc. v. Wise, 456 S.E.2d 631 (Ga. App. 1995)(FAA preempted Georgia
law that expressly made agreements to arbitrate unenforceable unless initialed
by all signatories); Bunge Corp. v. Perryville Feed & Produce, Inc., 685 S.W.2d
837 (Mo. 1985)(en banc)(Missouri conspicuous notice requirement preempted);
Duggan v. Zip Mail Services, Inc., 920 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. App. 1996)(FAA pre-
empted Missouri law requiring specific notice of arbitration provision in employ-
ment contracts); Mr. Mudd, Inc. v. Petra Tech, Inc., 892 S.W.2d 389 (Mo. App.
1995)(FAA preempted state law that required notice stating that agreement con-
tained an arbitration clause); Woerman Constr. Co. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
846 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. App. 1993)(same); Soil Remediation Co. v. Nu-Way Envtl.,
Inc., 476 S.E.2d 149 (S.C. 1996)(South Carolina statute requiring specific notice
of arbitration clause preempted); Osteen v. T.E. Cuttino Constr. Co., 434 S.E.2d
281 (S.C. 1993)(South Carolina law requiring formal notice of arbitration provi-
sion preempted).
467. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
468. Montana was not interested in protecting certain claims from arbitration.
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in adhesion contracts. Time and time again, the Supreme Court has
shown that it simply does not believe that the FAA should play any
role in limiting enforceability of arbitration clauses in contracts of ad-
hesion-the FAA is unconcerned with protecting the weaker party
from mandatory predispute arbitration clauses. 4 69 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court has upheld the enforceability of arbitration clauses in
classic adhesion contracts/relationships: contracts between investors
and broker-dealers, 4 7 0 franchise agreements, 47 x employment relation-
ships4 7 2 and bills of lading.4 73 The Court has expressly held that
mere inequality in bargaining position in and of itself is not enough to
hold an arbitration clause invalid,474 although courts should "remain
attuned to well-supported claims of fraud and overreaching."4 75 It
should be noted as well that the proponents of the FAA were equally
unconcerned. In the first hearing on the FAA, Senator Walsh raised
the issue of arbitration agreements in adhesion contracts and implied
469. The only time the Supreme Court seemed to take into account the disparity in
bargaining position between the party who insisted on the arbitration clause and
the party who simply had no choice but to agree to it, was in Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995). There, the Court needed to
determine if a choice of law clause should be interpreted to require application of
New York arbitration law, which prohibited arbitrators from awarding punitive
damages. The Court found the choice of law clause ambiguous and, relying on
state law, interpreted it against the interests of the drafter, the stronger party.
The Court stated:
[R]espondents cannot overcome the common-law rule that a court should
construe ambiguous language against the interest of the party that
drafted [the agreement].... Respondents drafted an ambiguous docu-
ment, and they cannot now claim the benefit of the doubt. The reason for
the rule is to protect the party who did not choose the language from an
unintended or unfair result. That rationale is well suited to the facts of
this case. As a practical matter, it seems unlikely that the petitioners
were actually aware of New York's bifurcated approach to punitive dam-
ages, or that they had any idea that by signing a standard form agree-
ment to arbitrate disputes they might be giving up an important
substantive right.
Id. at 62-63 (citations omitted). Of course, the Court relied, not on the law of the
FAA for its finding, but on state contract law.
470. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
471. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
472. Although an "employment agreement" per se was not signed in Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) nor in Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S.
483 (1987), the Court nonetheless required the employees in those cases to arbi-
trate claims against their employers because the employees had signed U-4s
(Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer) providing
for arbitration of disputes with their employers.
473. See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995).
474. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991).
475. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614, 627
(1985).
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that the FAA as drafted would in fact uphold the enforceability of such
contracts.4 76 Senator Walsh stated:
The trouble about the matter is that a great many of these contracts that are
entered into are really not voluntary things at all.... Well, there is nothing
for the man to do except to sign it; and then he surrenders his right to have his
case tried by the court, and has to have tried before a tribunal in which he has
no confidence at all.4 77
Senator Walsh asked Mr. Piatt to come up with a solution as to how
his objection could be obviated.4 78 Mr. Piatt responded that he saw
the problem and that he would take it up with the other members of
the drafting committee immediately.4 7 9 Apparently nothing was done
inasmuch as the bill that was enacted did not contain any language
exempting adhesion contracts from its scope.4S0
The Supreme Court has construed the admittedly broad language
of section 2 of the FAA to impose few limitations on the enforceability
of agreements to arbitrate: to be enforceable arbitration agreements
must be in writing, involve interstate or maritime commerce, and such
an agreement will be enforceable save upon such grounds that exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. Any other limita-
tions, restrictions or conditions imposed by state law are preempted.
This displacement of state law raises the issue of what role, if any,
state law plays, and whether, if at all, states can protect residents
from mandatory predispute arbitration clauses. These issues will be
explored in the following section.
C. Role of State Law After Southland and
Doctor's Associates
It is clear that state arbitration laws that (i) make predispute arbi-
tration clauses unenforceable, (ii) exempt from enforceability certain
transactions or claims or (iii) require special notice of the arbitration
clause, are preempted by the FAA and such state laws now in exist-
ence4 8 ' will be found preempted if the transaction is one involving in-
terstate commerce. Those state statutes that make predispute
arbitration clauses unenforceable or that exempt certain claims from
arbitration reflect residual hostility to arbitration. There is probably
nothing, and there should be nothing, the state can do to further a
public policy per se hostile to arbitration. On the other hand, other
state efforts, particularly state statutes that require conspicuous no-
tice or separate initialing, reflect a concern about the voluntary nature
476. See 1923 Hearings, supra note 228, at 9.
477. Id. at 9.
478. See id. at 11.
479. See id.
480. See MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 17, at 91.
481. See supra note 280.
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of the agreement to arbitrate or, more accurately stated, the unknow-
ing relinquishment of the right to resolve a dispute in a judicial forum.
State efforts to remedy that problem through their arbitration laws
have been overwhelmingly unsuccessful. But all is not lost for the
states. There is another way the states can address the concerns
about mandatory arbitration-they can use their general contract
laws.4 8 2
The Supreme Court in Perry provided insight into the role state
law plays with respect to arbitration agreements-a role specifically
designated by the FAA:
An agreement to arbitrate is valid, irrevocable and enforceable as a matter of
federal law.. . "save upon such grounds as exist at law or inequity for the
revocation of any contract." Thus, state law, whether of legislative or judicial
origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity,
revocability and enforceability of contracts generally. A state law principle
that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at
issue does not comport with the requirement of § 2.4 8 3
Thus, it is the "savings clause" in the FAA that contemplates a role for
state general contract law.48 4 State contract law defenses are indeed
applicable to arbitration agreements. Doctor's Associates itself made
that clear.48 5 However, state contract law that singles out arbitration
agreements for disparate treatment would indeed be preempted as
would judicial decisions that apply consensual defenses more aggres-
sively to arbitration agreements than to other contracts. 48 6 The FAA
requires that the state law, whether statutory or judge-made, be neu-
tral. The goal of the FAA was to put arbitration agreements on the
same footing as other agreements. 48 7 That goal cannot be met if state
law treats arbitration agreements differently. A state law that re-
quires that the nonnegotiable arbitration clause be accompanied by
special language or be in certain type but does not impose the same
482. In other words, state contract law applicable to contracts generally, not just to
contracts to arbitrate. See 2 MACNEiL, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 2,
at § 19.1.1.
483. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492-93 n.9 (1987)(citation omitted).
484. 'The Supreme Court in First Options v. Kaplan has made it clear that consent to
arbitration is governed by general contract law of a particular state.... State
contract law may be subject to supersession if it conflicts with the FAA or with
general federal arbitration law." 2 MACNELL, FEDERAL ARBrrRATION LAw, supra
note 2, at § 17.2 (1996 Supp.).
485. 'Thus, generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or uncon-
scionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contra-
vening § 2." Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). See also
Jonathan E. Breckenridge, Bargaining Unfairness and Agreements to Arbitrate:
Judicial and Legislative Application of Contract Defenses to Arbitration Agree-
ments, 1991 ANN. SuRv. A. L. 925.
486. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FoREsT L. Rav. 1001, 1034 (1996).
487. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
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requirement on other nonnegotiable clauses in the container contract
clearly runs afoul of the FAA. The FAA does not permit unequal
treatment; it does not permit the states to single out arbitration agree-
ments even though they are the product of an adhesion contract. If a
state is sincerely concerned with the adhesive nature of the arbitra-
tion clause, the state may regulate it, but it must regulate all other
provisions in the adhesion contract as well. A state's willingness to
make all adhesion contracts unenforceable or to require conspicuous
notice as to a whole variety of terms in an adhesion contract would
demonstrate that the state was genuinely concerned about consent is-
sues and that the regulation was not a cover for legislation hostile to
or suspicious of arbitration.
It is undoubtedly a tall order for a state to prohibit adhesion con-
tracts generally. Adhesion contracts are typically form contracts; form
or standardized contracts, which account for the vast majority of con-
tracts made,48 8 are, because of their perceived efficiency, considered
"an essential element of modern commercial life."489 Accordingly,
states are discouraged from overregulating them. However, state law
does already regulate, to some degree, all contracts and imposes re-
strictions on the parties' freedom to contract. 49 0 General contract law
defenses are already available to the courts and the states to ensure
assent to arbitration and fairness of the arbitration provision even
when the provision is contained in an adhesion contract. The FAA
does not displace general contract defenses such as fraud in the in-
ducement of the arbitration provision,4 9 1 duress, unconscionability,4 92
488. See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Law-
making Power, 84 HARV. L. REv. 529 (1971).
489. Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts and Contract
Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on
Consumers' Propensity to Sue, 15 BEHAV. SCIENCES AND THE LAW, 83, 84
(1997)(citing E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTs (1990)).
490. See Carrington & Haagen, supra note 3, at 337-38. Hacker v. Smith Barney, Har-
ris Upham & Co., 501 N.Y.S. 2d 977 (Civ. Ct. 1986), aff'd, 519 N.Y.S. 2d 92 (App.
Div. 1987), provides an excellent example of what a state legislature can do to
protect consumers from mandatory arbitration without violating the FAA's man-
date that arbitration agreements be treated like other contracts. There, the court
refused to compel arbitration of a brokerage firm's customer's claim because the
arbitration agreement violated "the size and legibility requirements" of a state
statute which provides:
The portion of any printed contract or agreement involving a consumer
transaction ... where the print is not clear and legible or is less than
eight points in depth or five and one-half points in depth for upper case
type may not be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or proceeding
on behalf of the party who printed or prepared such contract or
agreement....
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4544 (McKinney 1997). The court's reliance on § 4544 is permis-
sible because that statute applies to all provisions in a consumer contract, not
just the arbitration provision.
491. See, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (1997).
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and mistake.49 3 As long as the courts do not apply these doctrines
"more aggressively" to the arbitration provisions than to other con-
tracts,4 94 they remain the sole means available to the states and their
judiciaries for the regulation of arbitration provisions.
While the Supreme Court of Montana could not have "avoided FAA
preemption by labeling the reasoning [it] used in Doctor's Associates
'unconscionability' instead of 'Montana Code section 27-5-114(4),'"495
inasmuch as that reasoning indicated Montana's disparate treatment
of arbitration clauses, the doctrine of unconscionability can be used to
address some of the concerns Justice Trieweiler raised with respect to
the arbitration clause. Courts and commentators have recognized
that provisions requiring arbitration in a distant location may be sub-
stantively unconscionable, 4 96 as would provisions requiring the non-
drafting party to pay for some or all of costs of arbitration. 49 7
492. For a discussion of the role of the unconscionability doctrine in invalidating arbi-
tration provisions and its relationship to the FAA and preemption, see Ware,
supra note 486. See also Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Ct. App.
1997)(court invalidated arbitration provision because it was unconscionable; it
was egregiously one-sided and restricted the remedies the weaker party could
obtain for violation of statutory law and breach of contract).
493. Under the separability doctrine, such defenses to the validity of the arbitration
agreement would be heard by the court. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conk-
lin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
494. See Ware, supra note 486, at 1030.
495. Id. at 1016.
496. See Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563 (Ct. App.
1993)(arbitration provision requiring California residents to arbitrate claim
against finance company in Minnesota unconscionable and unenforceable). But
see Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 1998)(provision re-
quiring arbitration at distant location not unconscionable), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
867 (1999); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975 (2d Cir. 1996)(same). See
also Ware, supra note 486, at 1026-27; 2 MACNEIL, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAw,
supra note 2, at § 19.3.2. Both commentators recognize, however, that the
Supreme Court has been extremely generous in upholding agreements requiring
resolution of disputes in distant forums. See also Breckenridge, supra note 485,
at 965 ("Claims that the designated arbitration forum is too distant have rarely
been successful.").
497. See Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S. 2d 569 (App. Div. 1998)(excessive
costs associated with arbitrating consumer claim before the International Cham-
ber of Commerce rendered arbitration provision unconscionable); Teleserve Sys.,
Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 659 N.Y.S. 2d 659 (App. Div. 1997) (arbitration
provision requiring excessive filing fee unconscionable on its face); see also Rhode
v. E & T Invs., Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (M.D. Ala. 1998)(unconscionability may be
found if showing made that costs of arbitral forum render party unable to pursue
claims); Rollins v. Foster, 991 F. Supp. 1426 (M.D. Ala. 1998)(same); Phelps v.
Dan Tucker Auto Sales, Inc., 718 So. 2d 33, 41 (Ala. 1998)(Lyons J., concurring
specially)(financial hardship, lack of choice and one-sidedness may lead to a find-
ing of unconscionability). But see Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157
(2d Cir. 1998) (arbitration clause not unconscionable even though costs could be
as much as $32,000), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 867 (1997); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v.
Stuart, 85 F.3d 975 (2d Cir. 1996)(same); North Am. Van Lines v. Collyer, 616 So.
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The criticism leveled at the Supreme Court for its refusal to inter-
pret the FAA to permit states to carve out exceptions to enforcement
or to condition enforcement is misplaced. In the savings clause, the
FAA clearly designates state general contract law as the law that
should govern such issues as disparity in bargaining power and assent
to arbitration. If state contract law is insufficient to protect consum-
ers and others from unfair arbitration agreements, which it may very
well be,49s then state contract law must change. But again, the
change must be evenhanded; it must apply to contracts generally and
not just to arbitration agreements.
IV. APPROPRIATENESS OF ARBITRATION
The issue regarding the power of the states to regulate or other-
wise condition enforceability of an arbitration agreement implicates
the ultimate question of whether arbitration is an appropriate method
of dispute resolution. With respect to those parties who have volunta-
rily and knowingly agreed to resolve their dispute by arbitration, reso-
lution of the issue is irrelevant. The parties agreed to use arbitration
and their choice should not be disturbed. Any other result would
surely appear paternalistic and would suggest that a court is dis-
turbing the parties' choice not because arbitration is inadequate, but
because it is attempting to preserve its monopoly on dispute
resolution.
The issue must be resolved against arbitration when the agree-
ment to arbitrate is the product of an adhesion contract. Although it
could be argued that both parties voluntarily agreed to arbitrate, inso-
2d 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (improper to refuse to compel arbitration be-
cause party claims he or she is unable to pay required fees). See also Ware, supra
note 486, at 1023-24.
With respect to arbitration of federal statutory claims, courts have been un-
willing to require the non-drafting party to pay any of the arbitrators' fees. See
Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management, Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir.
1999)(arbitration provision requiring employee to pay part of arbitrator's fee un-
enforceable under FAA); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Technologies, Inc., 134
F.3d 1054 (11th Cir. 1998) (Cox, J., concurring specially) (arbitration provision
unenforceable, for, among other things, not requiring employer to pay the costs of
arbitration); Cole v. Burns Intl Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (court
required employer to pay fees of arbitrator in Title VII arbitration); Billie Davis
v. LPK Corp., No. C-97-3998 AMC, 1998 WL 210262 (N.D. Cal. March 10,
1998)(arbitration agreement requiring employee to pay one half of the arbitra-
tor's fee in Title VII arbitration unenforceable); McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., No.
Civ.A. 95-2500 GTV, 1997 WL 383150 (D. Kan. June 4, 1997)(employer required
to pay entire arbitrator's fee in arbitration alleging violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act). But see Pony Express Courier Corp. v. Morris, 921 S.W.2d
817 (Tx. Ct. App. 1996)(sharing of costs of arbitration is enforceable in arbitration
alleging sexual harassment under state law).
498. One commentator has noted that parties raising such defenses are usually unsuc-
cessful. See 2 MACNEIL, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 2, at § 19.2.1.
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far as the party in the weaker bargaining position had the "choice" not
to do business with the stronger party who insisted on the arbitration
clause, that kind of "voluntary choice" does not go directly to the arbi-
tration clause itself. In other words, although the party agreed to do
business with the other party, he or she did not independently make a
determination as to whether arbitration was appropriate for the type
of dispute that may arise. That is one of the fundamental problems
with compulsory arbitration clauses. Only one party, the party who
insists on the clause, has made the determination that arbitration is
the best method to resolve the dispute. Only that party's costs and
benefits were factored into the decision to use arbitration as the dis-
pute resolution process. 499 The costs and benefits to the party in the
weaker bargaining position were not considered.500 Accordingly, be-
cause the party in the weaker bargaining position has not had the op-
portunity to consider whether the costs and benefits of arbitration
weigh in favor or against the relinquishment of the right to a judicial
forum, arbitration must be considered inappropriate. 50 '
That arbitration is inappropriate or unfair under these circum-
stances is, of course, the natural reaction of those who are deprived of
any real choice but to agree to arbitrate. Arbitration, it is believed,
must be inappropriate because the stronger party insisted upon it and
the stronger party will do all he or she can do to further his or her own
interests.502 It would be inconceivable that the stronger party would
choose a dispute resolution process that would give the weaker party
an advantage. It is equally inconceivable that the stronger party
would choose a neutral process, where both parties interests are
equally addressed. The use of mandatory arbitration clauses has re-
sulted in this very type of thinking about the arbitral process.
Whether or not these conclusions are accurate does not really matter.
What matters is the perception and the perception is that arbitration,
when compelled, must further the interests of the stronger party to
the detriment of the weaker party-and litigation, that process that
499. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of
Civil Justice: Jurisdictional Principles for Process Choice, 1984 WIs. L. REv. 893,
993-94.
500. See id.
501. See Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The
Arbitration Experience, 38 HAs=nas L.J. 239, 242 (1987) ("[N]eitherjudicial nor
alternative dispute resolution devices (including arbitration) are flawless; each
method has strengths and weaknesses and choosing one over another inevitably
requires trade-offs, calculations of relative costs and benefits, and a variety of
value judgments.").
502. It has been asserted, based on admittedly sketchy evidence, that employers, for
example, insist upon arbitration because it reduces their payout. See Schwartz,
supra note 3, at 64-67; see also Sternlight, supra note 3, at 680-84 (suggesting
that "big business" insists on arbitration for the same reason).
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has been denied to the weaker party, furthers the weaker party's in-
terests or else equalizes the inequality in power.5 0 3
When arbitration clauses are presented on a take it or leave it ba-
sis, the very foundation of arbitration is shaken. Commercial arbitra-
tion arose and gained favor in this country as a means for a
community of merchants and businesspeople to control their own dis-
putes.5 0 4 It was believed that the business community could better
handle the dispute than the courts or juries. Arbitrators who were
familiar with the customs in the industry and with the business prac-
tices of the group could make more intelligent decisions than inexperi-
enced and unknowledgeable judges or juries.50 5 Moreover, arbitration
would not cause the same kind of disruption in the business relation-
ship that litigation would cause. Commercial arbitration was thus de-
veloped by members of a community to achieve certain characteristics
in the handling of disputes with other members of the community:
easy access to the process, speed in the resolution of a dispute with
minimal cost, preservation of business relationships, and intelligent
and practical decisions by those intimately familiar with the business
world.5 0 6 Accordingly, when two parties voluntarily agreed to arbi-
trate, their agreement demonstrated a shared commitment to those
values.50 7 The same cannot be said when the agreement to arbitrate
is not voluntarily entered. The party in the weaker bargaining posi-
tion may not be, and most likely is not, a member of the business com-
munity that determined that arbitration is the more appropriate
method of dispute resolution for a commercial dispute. Moreover, the
weaker party may have very different values and expectations con-
cerning the manner in which the dispute should be handled. It is this
disparity in the expectations and values between the parties that
causes the tension seen in so many cases, such as Doctor's Associates,
where the party with less power attempts to use the judicial process to
503. Commentators doubt whether the litigation process is capable of, or willing to,
equalize the power imbalances between the parties. In comparing settlement to
litigation Professor Menkel-Meadow noted the following:
Much of the critique of settlement rests on claims that negotiated set-
tlements, more than adjudicated claims, will be determined by the raw
bargaining power of one party over another. Assumptions abound here
that power imbalances do not occur at trial, or if they do, they can be
corrected by the neutral third party cloaked in a judge's robe.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Dem-
ocratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2687 (1995).
Professor Menkel-Meadow also discussed the possibility that victory in litigation
may be less reflective ofjustice and more reflective of the resources of the parties.
See id. at 2687-88.
504. See, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JusTicE WITHOUT LAw 102-109 (1983); Joint Hear-
ings, supra note 188, at 7; 1923 Hearings, supra note 228, at 3.
505. See Joint Hearings, supra note 188, at 27 (statement of Alexander Rose).
506. See AUERBACH, supra note 504, at 5-6.
507. See id.
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get out of his or her agreement to arbitrate.50 8 Arbitration becomes
suspect; it is viewed by those in the weaker bargaining position as a
cover for the interests of the party in the stronger bargaining posi-
tion.5 09 It is deemed illegitimate. Resolution of the dispute in a judi-
cial forum becomes the only fair method for achieving justice.
However, it is an overstatement to conclude that, even for persons
in a weaker bargaining position, litigation is always the best method
for resolution of the dispute and that arbitration is always inappropri-
ate.51 0 The prevalence of arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts
and the issues surrounding consent have unfortunately led some to
that exact conclusion. When it is forced upon an unwitting party, the
process becomes suspect. The result is that the arbitration process
itself has been undermined; any benefits that could accrue to the
weaker party are deemed illusory or not worth the costs associated
with the process.
The undermining of arbitration is an unfortunate consequence of
the use of arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts. But arbitration
does have its benefits, benefits which may make it an attractive pro-
cess choice to many litigants. Accordingly, it is entirely possible that,
given the particular kind of dispute, arbitration would be a more ap-
propriate dispute resolution choice. Further, it is entirely possible
that the party in the weaker bargaining position would voluntarily
agree to arbitrate if that party had been given a real choice and had
been counseled about the costs and benefits of arbitration vis-a-vis liti-
gation.5 1 ' However, the questioning and examination of arbitration
508. The time and costs associated with the weaker party using the litigation process
to avoid the arbitration clause could, of course, be eliminated if the party in the
stronger position did not refuse to negotiate the clause. Knowledge and negotia-
tion of the clause would undoubtedly help ease the tension and put the parties
closer to shared values. By refusing to negotiate the clause or to even call atten-
tion to it, parties in the stronger position suggest by their behavior that they are
trying to gain an advantage over the other party. It also suggests that if the
weaker party knew about arbitration, that party would not agree to it. That con-
clusion is not necessarily accurate. A party in a weaker bargaining position may
in fact conclude that arbitration is a sensible way to resolve a present or future
dispute. See G. Richard Shell, Fair Play, Consent and Securities Arbitration: A
Comment on Spiedel, 62 BROOK L. REv. 1365, 1368 (1996)(author asserts that a
significant number of investors, when given a choice, would agree to arbitrate
disputes with broker-dealers if arbitration gained a reputation for fairness). It is
the reluctance to bring attention to the clause and the refusal to budge on it that
create the suspicion that ultimately undermines the arbitral process.
509. See supra note 33.
510. It is equally an exaggeration to assert, as those who insist on the arbitration
clause, that arbitration is always the best method for resolution of any dispute
that may arise between the parties.
511. The purpose of this discussion is not to suggest that arbitration is always good for
the party who is bound to arbitrate because of a contract of adhesion but rather to
restore some balance into the discussion about the process of arbitration. Many
commentators have persuasively suggested that arbitration clauses in contracts
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that is occurring today, in response to the use of arbitration clauses in
adhesion contracts, would suggest to some that arbitration is never a
viable dispute resolution process, regardless of the type of dispute,
amount in controversy, relationship between the parties or voluntary
nature of the decision to arbitrate. Compulsory or compelled arbitra-
tion has tainted arbitration as a dispute resolution process. That
taint will undeniably affect the decision by those who have a real
choice to make as to whether to submit an existing or future dispute to
arbitration. Arbitration will be shunned, even though, in many kinds
of cases, it may be a particularly good way to resolve a dispute.
Arbitration should be seriously examined and questioned. To be
fair, however, that questioning and examination of arbitration must
take into account the benefits of arbitration and must be willing to
view arbitration as a distinct and independent process of dispute reso-
lution.5' 2 Too often, arbitration is simply compared to litigation and
when such comparison is made, arbitration invariably comes out look-
ing like a second-rate method to resolve disputes513 and achieve jus-
tice, particularly because of the cultural bias in favor of a formal legal
system.5 14 While comparisons between arbitration and other dispute
resolution methods are indeed necessary in order to help define and
understand the process, arbitration's similarities or dissimilarities to
the litigation model should not be the only measure of arbitration's
worth. Only when arbitration is viewed, not as a substitute for litiga-
tion,5 15 but rather as an distinct and separate dispute resolution pro-
cess, can a fair assessment of arbitration be made.
of adhesion should not be upheld. See generally Schwartz, supra note 3, at 57-59
(explaining that adherents to contracts are inexperienced and likely to under-
value the right to a judicial forum); Sternlight, supra note 3, at 679 (asserting
that any social gains achieved by forcing arbitration on the weaker party are out-
weighed by the inequities and injustices incurred).
512. See Bush, supra note 499, at 990.
513. See Carbonneau, A Plea for Statutory Reform, supra note 3, at 265 ("In both the-
ory and practice, arbitration is a reduced form of adjudication to which parties
consent because they want to avoid legal intricacies.").
514. See generally AUERBACH, supra note 504, at 3, 11; Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice,
supra note 3, at 1946-51. Professor Bush suggests that the bias in favor of court
adjudication is the result of incomplete analysis of the costs associated with the
process. See Bush, supra note 499, at 995-97.
515. The Supreme Court is guilty of planting or legitimizing the notion that arbitra-
tion is a substitute for litigation. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Co. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985); see also Carbonneau, A Plea
for Statutory Reform, supra note 3, at 263-64; Sternlight, supra note 3, at 672-73.
It is not entirely fair or even very accurate to view arbitration solely as a sub-
stitute for litigation inasmuch as arbitration predates formal state sponsored
methods of dispute resolution. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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At least judicially, one of the most recent and less friendly assess-
ments of arbitration5 i6 was made by the Montana Supreme Court in
the Doctor's Associates case-a case where the arbitration clause was
contained in an adhesion contract. The court's critique of arbitration
succumbs to the natural inclination of simply comparing it to litiga-
tion and finding it inadequate.
Both the majority and Justice Trieweiler in his concurrence discuss
the "lack of procedural safeguards" in arbitration.5 17 Justice
Trieweiler gives a litany of the procedural safeguards adopted by the
State of Montana to insure fairness to litigants that are absent in ar-
bitration.518 His discussion assumes that the litigation process, with
its full panoply of procedures, will achieve a fair result.5 1 9 The in-
516. For recent commentary critical of arbitration, see e.g., Carrington & Haagen,
supra note 3, Schwartz, supra note 3 and Sternlight, supra note 3.
517. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 935-36, 939-40 (Mont. 1994), cert.
granted and judgment vacated sub nom. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 515
U.S. 1129 (1995), on remand to Casarotto v. Lombardi, 901 P.2d 596 (Mont.
1995), rev'd sub nom. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
Justice Trieweiler also criticizes judges who endorse arbitration because it
reduces their case loads. See id. at 939 (Trieweiler, J., concurring). While Justice
Trieweiler is right that a court's self interest in reducing its case load should have
no bearing on its interpretation of an arbitration clause or on the FAA, it is im-
possible to determine whether and how a court's decision is influenced by its own
concern over its calendar. It is equally impossible to determine whether an attor-
ney's dissatisfaction with arbitration or his or her advice to a client to challenge
the arbitration clause is influenced by his or her own self interest. Arbitration,
which may be more expeditious than litigation, may mean less fees than if the
case were litigated. "High litigation costs are fees to the clients but they are in-
come to the lawyers. Delays benefit at least one side in every litigation and some-
times both. Those who profit from the present system are unlikely to lead the
assault on the citadel." Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the
Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1646 (1985). Attorney self interest was
identified many years ago as one of the stumbling blocks to the endorsement of
arbitration. See Joint Hearings, supra note 188, at 7.
518. He lists, for example, "standards for appellate review which protect litigants from
human error or the potential arbitrariness of any one individual;" the state's be-
lief in the rule of law which the appellate courts will enforce even if the trial
courts do not; rules for venue and jurisdiction to protect citizens from having to
litigate at an inconvenient forum; liberal discovery rules that ensure candid and
open exchanges of information; accessibility of the courts to everyone; and con-
tract and tort laws that protect citizens from unfair business practices. See
Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d at 939-40.
Justice Trieweiler's assumption that these procedural safeguards adopted by
Montana are indispensable to obtain fairness is not shared by all. See generally
Newman, supra note 517.
519. In this regard, it must be questioned whether the court suffers from "litigation
romanticism," making "empirically unverified assumptions about what courts
can or will do." Menkel-Meadow, supra note 503, at 2669. See also Menkel-
Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the
Road, 80 CoRNEiL L. REv. 1159, 1172-73 (1995).
The court also ignores the fact that the Casarottos' action would most likely
have been settled out of court prior to trial with no decision on the merits or
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tended and inextricable conclusion to be drawn from the discussion is
that, absent those safeguards, the arbitration process is not, and can-
not, be fair, nor can it achieve justice. That argument suggests a nar-
row notion of fairness-that only the procedural protections and other
items listed impact on fairness. Justice Trieweiler does not take into
account the impact on fairness and justice that results when a party
must wait years for a decision which is probably at a cost far in excess
of what the party expected.52o Arbitration undeniably and purpose-
fully does not have all the procedures that exist in a judicial forum. In
order to maintain simplicity and in order to expedite resolution of the
claim, the procedures in arbitration are streamlined. However, it does
not follow that because arbitration does not provide the same proce-
dures to the same extent provided in a judicial forum, it cannot
achieve a fair result. It does not necessarily follow either that the liti-
gation process with its full panoply of procedures will, in fact, achieve
a fair result.521
The majority specifically discusses the fact that the rules of evi-
dence are inapplicable in an arbitration proceeding and according to
the rules of the AAA,522 discovery is at the sole discretion of the arbi-
trator.523 The court does not indicate why the rules of evidence are
essential in an arbitration proceeding where the factfinder is not ajury, but a mutually agreed upon neutral third party or parties who
most likely have some expertise in the subject matter of the dispute.
The discomfort the court feels regarding the AAA rule giving the arbi-
trator(s) discretion regarding the extent of pretrial discovery is, at
first blush, understandable, especially to those trained in the law and
who have knowledge about the origins and purposes of the discovery
process; a process instituted at the pretrial phase to eliminate the ele-
opportunity for the Casarottos to tell their story. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D.
Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44
UCLA L. REv. 1 (1996). Arbitration allows the Casarottos a better chance to get a
decision on the merits either because there will be less pressure on them to settle
their claims because the costs and time delay of arbitration will be less than
would be experienced in litigation or because it is unlikely that their complaint
will be dismissed prior to the hearing for failure to state a claim or for some other
reason. Cf. Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1997)(in
upholding arbitration of a Title VII claim, court stated: "Arbitration also offers
employees a guarantee that there will be a hearing on the merits of their claims;
no such guarantee exits in litigation where relatively few employees survive the
procedural hurdles necessary to take a case to trial in the federal courts.").
520. Most litigants expect to have their "day" in court-not the typical two to three
years it takes to get a case to a jury.
521. See Newman, supra note 517, at 1646-52.
522. The AAA rules are purposefully drafted to ensure "informality, expediency, and
cost savings." Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evo-
lutions: An Assessment and Call for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP REsOL.
343, 363 (1995).
523. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d at 936.
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ment of surprise at trial. However, the court, without any factual ba-
sis, seems to suggest that the arbitrator(s), again, those factfmders
mutually agreed upon by the parties, are either likely to abuse that
discretion or are incapable of making informed decisions regarding the
extent of discovery. That conclusion is unsupported and is contrary to
the ethical duties of the arbitrator. 52 4 The court also seems to con-
clude that the arbitrator will deny discovery and thereby deprive a
person of the opportunity to discover the truth. It has been suggested
by one commentator that the AAA rule regarding discovery is insuffi-
cient, but for the opposite reason suggested by the court: that the rule
does not expressly limit discovery and, consequently, parties are abus-
ing the discovery permitted because arbitrators "often permit lengthy
and repetitive discovery" which has transformed the arbitration pro-
cess into one that too closely mimics the litigation process and under-
mines the objectives of the arbitral process. 5 25
Justice Trieweiler discusses the availability of appellate review in
state court that is restricted in arbitration. 52 6 The FAA limits the
grounds upon which to appeal an arbitrator's award.5 27 Those
grounds are concerned specifically with making sure that the parties
and the factfinder chosen by the parties acted properly in procuring
and making the award. Accordingly, awards may be vacated if pro-
cured by fraud or corruption or where the arbitrator was biased or
guilty of other misconduct. Those grounds alone are available,
although some courts have expressed a willingness to vacate an award
where the arbitrators have manifestly disregarded the law.528 The
limited right to appeal an arbitrator's decision is deemed, by some, to
be one of the hallmarks of arbitration-a benefit rather than a detri-
ment.5 29 The unavailability of a general right to appeal an award
makes the award final so that the parties can move on in their busi-
ness relationships, and it reduces the costs and delays associated with
bringing the claim.5 30
The majority, as well as the concurrence, also touch upon the fact
that the arbitrator does not have to follow the law when rendering a
524. See AEmRICAN ARBrrATION ASSOC'N, THE CODE OF ETHICs FOR ARBITRATORS IN
COimERCLAL DispuTEs, (1996). The Code was originally prepared in 1977 by a
joint committee of the AAA and the ABA and has been approved by both associa-
tions. The Code requires, for example, that the arbitrator "uphold the integrity
and fairness of the arbitration process," Canon I, and that he or she "conduct the
proceedings fairly and diligently," Canon IV.
525. See Wendy Ho, Discovery in Commercial Arbitration Proceedings, 34 Hous. L.
REv. 199, 205, 221 (1997).
526. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d at 939 (Triewieler, J., concurring).
527. See supra note 266.
528. See infra note 532 and accompanying text.
529. See, e.g., Stipanowich, supra note 312, at 475 ("all groups [see] finality of arbitra-
tion awards as a virtue of the process").
530. See id. at 439-40.
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decision on the merits. While it is pretty clear that arbitrators do in
fact follow the law,53 1 it is undeniable that there is no language in the
FAA that imposes such an obligation. 53 2 However, the court assumes
that the lack of such an obligation is necessarily a negative aspect of
arbitration and presupposes that justice is achieved only when there
is strict adherence to the law. The lack of obligation to follow the law
can however be viewed as a positive attribute of arbitration-making
it a dispute resolution process where justice and fairness can be
achieved in spite of the law. Arbitrators who base their decisions on
what is "'fair,' 'just' or 'sensible' under the circumstances,"53 3 may be
more attractive to a party than a judge or jury who is sworn to uphold
and strictly apply the law, even though such application may produce
an unjust result.53 4
The expense of arbitration is also discussed by the court.53 5 The
court is troubled by the fact that the arbitration clause requires the
Casarottos to travel to Connecticut to arbitrate the claim and the
531. See, e.g., Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 846
(1960), cited in Stipanowich, supra note 312, at 473-74.
532. Although the FAA clearly does not require that the arbitrators base their decision
on the law, some courts have expressed a willingness to vacate an award where it
is shown that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law. See, e.g., Carte
Blanche (Singapore) PTE., Ltd. v. Carte Blanche Intl, 888 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.
1989); O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Professional Planning Assocs., Inc., 857 F.2d 742 (11th
Cir. 1988). One court has, in fact, vacated an award because the arbitrators ig-
nored the law or the evidence or both. See Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d
197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial
Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731,
776 (1996).
533. Perry E. Wallace, Jr., Securities Arbitration After McMahon, Rodriguez and the
New Rules: Can Investors' Rights Really Be Protected?, 43 VAMD. L. Rav. 1199,
1248 (1990).
534. Although I am not an expert on contract law, my initial reading of the facts in
Casarotto, as provided in the court opinions, suggested to me that the Casarottos
may indeed be better offwith an arbitrator, who is willing to do what is fair under
the circumstances, than with a judge or jury who is bound to strictly follow the
law. Although it is not entirely clear from the limited facts available, it appears
that the Casarottos, who are claiming that Doctor's Associates made an oral
agreement to give them their preferred location, may have some problems under
various contract theories in proving their breach of contract claim. The statute of
frauds comes to mind, as well as the likely existence of a clause in the franchise
agreement to the effect that the agreement embodies all the representations of
the parties and that no party is relying on any other representation not reflected
in the contract when signing the agreement.
535. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 939 (Mont. 1994), cert. granted and
judgment vacated sub nom. Doctor's Assocs. Inc. v. Casarotto, 515 U.S. 1129
(1995), on remand to Casarotto v. Lombardi, 901 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1995), rev'd sub
nom. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996). Professor Ware ex-
plains the dilemma faced by those drafters who insist on predispute arbitration
clauses. If the drafter agrees to pay the costs of arbitration, an impression is
created that the arbitrator will rule in that person's favor because the arbitrator
is being paid by that person. On the other hand, requiring the weaker party to
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court details the potential expense of the arbitration process, an ex-
pense that, pursuant to the agreement, must be shared by the parties,
regardless of who wins or loses the dispute.536 Undoubtedly, arbitra-
tion is going to cost the parties significant money; filing fees, adminis-
trative fees and arbitrators' fees will be assessed. In discussing the
expense of arbitration however, the court curiously declines here, un-
like in its discussion of the existence of procedural safeguards, to com-
pare arbitration to litigation. Litigation is not going to be a free
proposition to the Casarottos or to anyone else. Although, as Justice
Trieweiler says, courts are provided at public expense,53 7 litigation,
especially a complex commercial case like the one at issue in Doctor's
Associates, is nevertheless costly; the discovery process will, in fact, be
one of the more significant elements of the total cost,5 38 a cost that is
unlikely to be as great in arbitration. Arbitration, for that reason and
others, is generally less expensive than litigation.539 The court tells
us that because Connecticut law is called for in the contract, the
Casarottos would have had to hire a Connecticut attorney. Realisti-
cally, the Casarottos would have to hire an attorney even if the agree-
ment called for the application of Montana law. There are no facts in
the case to suggest that the Casarottos were experts in Montana con-
tract and tort law. In addition, even if the Casarottos were free to
institute suit in Montana state court, it is also likely that they would
feel compelled to hire counsel. The facts suggest a complex commer-
cial case, with issues ranging from breach of contract, to fraud, to vio-
pay the total costs of the arbitration raises serious unconscionability issues. See
Ware, supra note 486, at 1023-24.
536. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d at 935. Of course, in some court proceed-
ings, the party who loses may be responsible for the entire costs. Ironically, the
United States Supreme Court ordered the Casarottos to pay court costs in the
amount of nearly $4,000 to Doctor's Associates and Nick Lombardi. See
Casarotto v. Lombardi, No. 93-488 (Mont. July 16, 1996) (order remanding action
to District Court of the Eighth Judicial District in Cascade County for entry of
judgment consistent with Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto).
537. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d at 939. Of course, if the costs of the arbitra-
tion or the designated location effectively deprive the Casarottos' of their "day in
court," they may seek to have the agreement declared unenforceable on the basis
of unconscionability. See supra notes 496-97.
538. See Stipanowich, supra note 312, at 433 n.38.
539. It is commonly believed that arbitration costs less than litigation: "[Arbitration
is expected (and assumed) to be quicker, less formal, and less expensive than
litigation in court." 1 MAcNEIL, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAw, supra note 2, at
§ 2.6.2. There are, however, some surveys that show that the costs savings may
be minimal or are dependent on the size and complexity of the case. See Stipa-
nowich, supra note 312, at 453-77 for a description of the various studies under-
taken to determine the cost effectiveness of arbitration. Ironically, attorney
conduct has been cited as a major factor in the increasing costs of using arbitra-
tion. See id. at 474.
Costs savings alone, however, may not be the primary advantage of arbitra-
tion for some parties. See infra note 558 and accompanying text.
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lation of state statutory law. Doctor's Associates would, no doubt,
retain counsel to represent it if the litigation were brought in state
court or submitted to arbitration. Certain procedural rules that exist
in most court proceedings can cause a party who fails to comply with
them to unwittingly waive certain claims or defenses. Accordingly,
the Casarottos may feel more compelled to hire counsel if the case
were brought in state court than if it were submitted to arbitration
where such rules do not exist. The expense of an attorney would have
undoubtedly been borne by the Casarottos even in the absence of the
arbitration clause.
What is most troubling about the court's comparison of arbitration
to litigation is the assumption that if a party had not signed the arbi-
tration provision, he or she would have instituted suit in a judicial
forum. It is entirely possible that a party with a grievance may not
make a claim because of the burdens and costs associated with bring-
ing a court action or because of the inaccessibility of the court system
to the litigant. Litigation has many costs, 540 financial as well as emo-
tional,541 it can be destructive to ongoing relationships; it is generally
time consuming. Access to counsel, perceived by many to be indispen-
sable to the successful resolution of a claim, may be difficult. Arbitra-
tion, which is generally more expeditious and less costly than
litigation, may provide a party, who may otherwise not have made a
claim, a viable process for the resolution of the claim. Accordingly,
simply comparing arbitration to litigation is insufficient. Arbitration
has to be compared with other options as well, including the option of
"lumping it."542
The court's opinion is completely devoid of any discussion of the
benefits of arbitration, or for that matter, the disadvantages of litiga-
tion,5 4 3 which may be exacerbated for persons like the Casarottos,
who have little or no bargaining power.544 The court focuses solely on
what arbitration lacks; not what attributes it possesses. There are
benefits to arbitration. Those benefits tend to get overlooked when the
procedures available in arbitration are compared to those available in
litigation. If the benchmark for evaluating a dispute resolution pro-
540. As Learned Hand stated, "[Als a litigant, I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost
anything else short of sickness and of death." Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of
Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter in 3 LEcTuREs ON LEGAL Topics, 89, 105
(1926), quoted in Gross & Syverud, supra note 519, at 63.
541. See Bernard H. Goldstein, Alternatives for Resolving Business Transaction Dis-
putes, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 69, 76 n.15 (1983).
542. See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assess-
ing the Adversary Culture, 15 L. & Soc'y REv. 525 (1980-81).
543. "Modern judicial process is characterized by high cost, excessive formality, and
long delays." Stipanowich, supra note 312, at 427-28. Much has been written
regarding the disadvantages of litigation. See, e.g., Gross & Syverud, supra note
519.
544. See AUERBACH, supra note 504, at vii.
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cess is the number and extent of the procedures available, litigation
will always be deemed more appropriate and more desirable than ar-
bitration. For that matter, it will be deemed more appropriate than
mediation and negotiation and settlement, where there are virtually
no procedural safeguards to ensure that the settlement, if reached by
the parties, is fair or just.54 5 Under this analysis, arbitration, which
most closely resembles litigation, would actually be considered more
desirable than mediation and negotiation and settlement. Such a re-
sult is nonsensical. Mediation and negotiation, which give the parties
the opportunity to come to a mutually agreed upon resolution of a
claim, may be more desirable than arbitration for resolving certain
kinds of disputes. 546 Accordingly, the benchmark cannot be the quan-
tity of available procedures. Each process must be evaluated for its
strengths and weaknesses and contextualized for the type of dispute
at issue.
Although arbitration lacks many of the procedures found in a court
proceeding, it nonetheless possesses what may be deemed the most
important and crucial. This argument, of course, assumes that some
procedures in standard court adjudication are not as important as
others.5 47 Indeed, it has been suggested that there is no guarantee
that certain procedural rules will lead to infallible results and accord-
ingly, some rules may not be worthwhile given the slight chance that
the rules will promote fairness.5 48 Moreover, many litigants may
question whether justice was indeed served when the person,
although ultimately victorious in the court proceeding, waited years
for the result, which cost them "30 to 50" percent of the amount
claimed.5 49
545. With respect to settlement of a class action, a court may play a role in insuring
that the settlement is fair to all class members. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d).
Of course, it could be argued that the lack of procedures in mediation and
negotiation is irrelevant because those processes do not involve a third party who
makes a binding decision regarding the merits of the dispute. Accordingly, be-
cause the parties themselves make the decision to settle and what to settle for,
procedural protections are unnecessary. That argument presupposes that parties
will only settle on fair terms, which may not be true. Cf. Richard Delgado et al.,
Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. Ray. 1359; Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Pro-
cess Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991).
546. See Bush, supra note 499, at 991.
547. "Surely there is a good deal of tosh-that is, superfluous rituals, rules of proce-
dure without clear purpose, needless precautions preserved through habit-in
the adjudicative process as we observe it in this country. Our task is to separate
the tosh from the essential." Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudica-
tion, 92 HARv. L. Ray. 353, 356 (1978).
548. See Newman, supra note 517, at 1648.
549. See Stipanowich, supra note 312, at 428 n.6 (citing Eric R. Max, Arbitration-The
Alternative to Timely, Costly Litigation, 42 ALA. L. Ray. 309 (1981)).
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Professor Fuller suggested that the essence of adjudication55O "lies
in the fact that it confers on the affected party a peculiar form of par-
ticipation in the decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned argu-
ment for a decision in his favor."551 The Casarottos would have been
given the opportunity before the AAA arbitrator(s) to prove their case
by presenting evidence and making opening and closing state-
ments.5 52 Professor Fuller also stresses the need for partisan advo-
cacy in adjudication. 5 53 Under the AAA rules, the Casarottos were
entitled to be represented by counsel at the hearing on their claim.55 4
Finally, Professor Fuller highlights one of the advantages to the ab-
sence of many of the procedural rules found in litigation in a judicial
forum: "Being relatively free from technical rules of procedure, the
wise and conscientious arbitrator can shape his procedures upon what
he perceives to be the intrinsic demands of effective adjudication."55 5
550. Professor Fuller explained that the term adjudication referred not only to "tribu-
nals functioning as part of an established government," but also to "adjudicative
bodies which owe their powers to the consent of the litigants expressed in an
agreement of submission." Fuller, supra note 547, at 354.
551. Fuller, supra note 547, at 364. But see Bush, supra note 499, at 927, questioning
Fuller's approach because it failed to focus on the goals of the civil justice system.
Professor Bush identified seven goals of the civil justice system: resource alloca-
tion, social justice, fimdamental rights protection, public or social order, human
relations, legitimacy and administration cost minimalization. See id. at 934-39.
He asserted that any dispute resolution process must be reviewed to determine
how well it minimizes the "sum of all the different costs associated with failure to
achieve different civil justice goals." Id. at 934.
552. The AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules provide in relevant part:
29. Order of Proceeding and Communication with Arbitrator
The arbitrator may, at the beginning of the hearing, ask for statements
clarifying the issues involved.... The complaining party shall then pres-
ent evidence to support its claim. The defending party shall then pres-
ent evidence supporting its defense. Witnesses for each party shall
submit to question or other examination. The arbitrator has the discre-
tion to vary this procedure but shall afford a full and equal opportunity
to all parties for the presentation of any material and relevant evidence.
Exhibits when offered by either party, may be received in evidence by
the arbitrator.
31. Evidence
The parties may offer such evidence as is relevant and material to the
dispute and shall produce such evidence as the arbitrator may deem nec-
essary to an understanding and determination of the dispute. An arbi-
trator of other person authorized by law to subpoena witnesses or
documents may do so upon the request of any party or independently.
AmERIcAN ARBITRATION Ass'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES (1996)[hereinaf-
ter COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES].
553. See Fuller, supra note 547, at 382.
554. CoMMRcIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 552, Rule 22.
555. Fuller, supra note 547, at 393.
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The more obvious benefits to arbitration have already been
touched upon.55 6 Arbitration is typically less costly and time consum-
ing than litigation.5 57 The savings in time and cost come about for a
number of reasons, although the limited right to appeal and the lim-
ited right to discovery are significant factors that help to minimize or
reduce the costs and time associated with bringing a claim. There are
other benefits as well that may, in fact, play a greater role in the deci-
sion to use arbitration than the cost and time savings.5 58
Another hallmark of arbitration is that the parties get to choose
their decisionmaker(s). 559 Accordingly, parties can choose individuals
who have special expertise and knowledge of the subject matter of the
dispute. An expert decisionmaker(s) will, theoretically, produce better
resolution of the claim and will also help to minimize costs; the parties
556. This entire discussion regarding the benefits of arbitration, is, of course, theoreti-
cal. It is entirely possible, for a variety of reasons, that, in a particular case, the
arbitral process, like any other dispute resolution process, will not live up to its
objectives or will not confer the particular benefit which caused the parties to
choose it as their dispute resolution process. See generally Hayford & Peeples,
supra note 522; Stipanowich, supra note 312, at 441-53.
Generally, when parties decide to arbitrate, they agree to arbitrate in accord-
ance with the rules and procedures of an independent, neutral arbitration service
provider, such as the AAA. It is up to the parties, and/or their counsel, to insure
that the service provider is providing a process that will meet the particular goals
of the parties, such as cost effectiveness and expediency.
557. Concern has been voiced that arbitration is becoming more like litigation, espe-
cially with respect to the amount of discovery that is being requested, and that it
is therefore losing two important benefits once associated with it, cost savings
and expediency. See Stipanowich, supra note 312, at 445.
558. See id. at 474 (discussing study conducted by Harvard Business School which
found that the groups surveyed did not "always consider speed to be of para-
mount importance"); see also Lucy Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Sides of the Same Coin?, 1993 J.
Disp. RESOL. 1, 48-49 ("Most studies report high satisfaction rates with arbitra-
tion and even other ADR methods. Interestingly, however, the aspects of ADR
with which litigants are most satisfied tend not to be cost and speed but qualita-
tive features such as fairness and the need to be heard.")
559. This was the case for the Casarottos. Although they had no choice but to go to
arbitration, they were entitled under the AAA rules to have the same input as
Doctor's Associates in the selection of the arbitrator(s). This is not necessarily
the case in all arbitration adhesion contracts, however. The party insisting on
the clause may also in the contract designate the arbitrators; the weaker party
will have no choice but to agree to the designation if he or she wants to do busi-
ness with the stronger party. If such a clause is not deemed unconscionable, see
Ware, supra note 486, at 1018-23, the weaker party would have a ground upon
which to vacate the award if the arbitrators were biased. See supra note 266
(detailing grounds upon which to vacate award).
That the parties get to choose their arbitrator(s) is in sharp contrast to litiga-
tion. In litigation, disputants get no choice as to the identity and qualifications of
the judge assigned to their case; parties are given more of a choice if the dispute
is to be resolved by a jury, but certainly not to the same extent that arbitration
permits.
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will not have to utilize expert witnesses to educate the deci-
sionmaker(s). It has also been suggested that expert decisionmakers
enhance the predictability of the outcomes because of the arbitrators'
awareness of the trade meaning of the contract terms.560
Because arbitration is contractual, the parties are the architects of
the process. Accordingly, they are free to incorporate whatever rules
or procedures they deem necessary for the just resolution of their
claim. For example, if it is important that a written opinion be given a
practice generally discouraged by the AAA, the parties may so provide
for it in their contract. The parties to the dispute have power over the
process. This attribute as well as others discussed cannot be attained,
however, if the drafter of the arbitration provision refuses to negotiate
it.
The arbitration proceeding is also informal. Its informality may
make the parties more willing to participate in the process, and
thereby not rely solely on their counsel to tell their story. Professor
Menkel-Meadow offers anecdotal evidence that arbitration performs a
cathartic function by letting the parties freely tell their stories.5 6 1 It
is the informality of the process that makes that possible.
The informality also helps to expedite the process. The parties
may schedule the hearing at any day or time as long as the arbitra-
tor(s) and witnesses are able to attend. Accordingly, the parties need
not compete with a crowded docket in order to have their claim re-
solved. The informality of the process, which facilitates expeditious
resolution of the claim, may also help to preserve the relationship be-
tween the parties. Arbitration, theoretically, is not as adversarial as
court adjudication; there are fewer opportunities for the parties to en-
gage in vexatious behavior562 to delay the case, cause unwarranted
expense or otherwise outposition or outmaneuver each other."5 63
Finally, the arbitral process may have a significant impact on the
type of remedy received by the "prevailing" party. Arbitrators are gen-
erally given more flexibility in fashioning remedies than a judge or
jury;5 64 they are not bound by the binary approach seen in court adju-
dication, where either plaintiff or defendant will prevail. Accordingly,
560. See Mentschikoff, supra note 531, at 853.
561. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 503, at 2688.
562. See Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at War
with the Profession and Its Values, 59 BRooK. L. REv. 931, 931-32 (1993), for a
discussion of the escalation in litigation warfare, the use of litigation as a strate-
gic tool and the suggestion that alternative dispute resolution processes have
been adapted to control "strategic and scorched earth litigation." Id. at 946.
563. Bush, supra note 499, at 990-91. It is pretty clear that in court adjudication, the
party with the greater resources can more easily outposition the party with fewer
resources. See id. at 991.
564. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle
Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U. L. REv. 953, 977-82 (1986).
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in addition to the traditional remedies of compensatory damages, pu-
nitive damages or specific performance, 56 5 the arbitrators may also
consider non-zero sum factors in awarding the remedy and need not
reduce each need of the parties to monetary terms.5 6 6
The arbitration process in not flawless; neither is the litigation pro-
cess. Each has it advantages and disadvantages, which may make the
process more or less appropriate depending upon the circumstances of
each case. The flaws with the litigation process and the benefits of the
arbitral process, however, have been overlooked when a party is com-
pelled to go to arbitration because of an adhesion contract. The use of
arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion has collapsed the analysis
of two very distinct issues: should courts under state or federal law
enforce the clause when it is contained in a contract of adhesion, and
is arbitration an appropriate dispute resolution process.5 6 7 The inter-
mingling of the two issues has resulted in the undermining of the arbi-
tral process and in the overvaluing of the litigation process.
V. CONCLUSION
Through its questionable interpretation of the FAA, the Supreme
Court has severely restricted a state's power to regulate the use of
arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts. While such a course has re-
sulted in uniform enforcement of arbitration agreements, it has dis-
placed state law seeking to equalize, to a small degree, the power
imbalances inherent in adhesion contracts. It is unlikely that the
Supreme Court is going to change course and permit states to impose
conditions, even nonburdensome conditions, on the enforceability of
arbitration agreements. If states are stripped of their power to protect
persons from the unknowing waiver of their right to a judicial forum,
we must look elsewhere for the means to ensure meaningful relin-
quishment. There are at least four places to look.
The first and most logical place to look is Congress. An amend-
ment to the FAA requiring conspicuous notice of the predispute arbi-
565. The Supreme Court has suggested in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995), that it will uphold an arbitration agreement that limits
the type of relief an arbitrator may provide, but again, such limitation may be
examined for unconscionability. See Ware, supra note 486, at 1026.
566. The AAA rules permit the arbitrator to "grant any remedy or relief the arbitrator
deems just and equitable within the scope of the agreement." CoMMERcAL ARei-
TRATION RuLEs, supra note 552, Rule 43.
567. That I perceive the issues to be separate and distinct does not suggest that I
advocate upholding arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion. On the contrary,
an arbitration clause should be upheld only when it is shown to have been volun-
tarily and knowingly entered. That analysis may take into account the parties
knowledge of the arbitral process; it need not, however, lead to the conclusion, as
it often does, that arbitration is a second-rate dispute resolution process.
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tration clause568 as a condition to its enforceability, applicable to
contracts executed after its enactment, will undoubtedly be the most
effective way to ensure knowledge by the weaker party of the arbitra-
tion clause. Because such an amendment would be uniformly applied,
corporations and others, who include predispute arbitration clauses in
form contracts and who do business in a variety of states, will not be
subject to different rules impacting on the enforceability of the predis-
pute arbitration clause. Each contract must contain conspicuous no-
tice in the manner proscribed by Congress, regardless of where the
contract is executed or enforced. Accordingly, form contracts can con-
tinue to be used; the economic benefits derived from their use will not
be compromised by the amendment. While Congress has not recently
indicated an inclination to amend the FAA in such a manner, the con-
tinuing prevalent use of predispute arbitration clauses with terms
that smack of one-sidedness in favor of the drafting party,5 69 may, and
should, force Congress' hand.570
The second place to look is state general contract law. Although it
has been noted that such law in the past has not been particularly
effective in protecting the weaker party, states can amend general
contract law to breathe new life into consensual defense doctrines so
as to prevent unfairness in the terms and conditions of the arbitration
provision. Of course, states walk a fine line here. Consistent with the
FAA, states must apply such amendments to contracts generally. If
states are willing to step up to the plate and provide across the board
protection to the weaker party, states can safeguard the rights of par-
ties compelled to arbitrate a dispute.
568. Congress should enact very specific rules regarding the type and placement of the
clause. Congress may also enact other rules designed to alert the parties to the
clause, such as requiring the parties to initial the clause or requiring the parties
to sign a statement acknowledging that he or she has read the clause. See Spei-
del, supra note 16, at 1093 (author proposed a Federal Consumer Arbitration Act,
which, among other things, would require conspicuous notice of the arbitration
provision); see also Paul Carrington, Regulating Dispute Resolution Provisions in
Adhesion Contracts, 35 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 225 (1998)(proposing legislation regu-
lating the enforceability of arbitration provision in certain adhesion contracts,
including agreements between franchisees and franchisors).
569. See Sternlight, supra note 3, at 638 (discussing arbitration clauses that, for ex-
ample, limit remedies or require arbitration in inconvenient forums).
570. Due to the "take it or leave it" basis of most arbitration provisions in consumer
and employment contracts, other amendments to the FAA may be in order to
ensure a fair process. For example, in order to ensure a neutral decisionmaker,
the FAA should be amended to prohibit only one party from choosing the arbitra-
tor. To ensure access to the process, the FAA should be amended to prohibit the
practice of requiring arbitration in a distant forum. These are only a few exam-
ples of the changes that are needed if arbitration provisions in adhesion contracts
remain enforceable and states remain powerless to intervene through their arbi-
tration law.
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The third place to look is to the arbitration service providers. As it
did with employment arbitration, 571 the AAA and JAMS/Endispute,
among others, can refuse to administer an arbitration if the arbitra-
tion clause does not meet certain requirements. Such a course, while
providing no guarantees, can be effective if uniformly applied and fol-
lowed by, at the very least, the major arbitration service providers.
There are, however, two dangers with this approach. First, it may
encourage businesses to select arbitration service providers who do
not impose such requirements to administer the arbitration; indeed it
may actually create a market for such providers. Second, it may cause
businesses to "go underground" and administer their own arbitration
programs.
The final place to look is to the parties who insist on the inclusion
of the predispute arbitration clause. The only impetus, however, for
these parties to change their behavior is if they recognize that it is in
their self-interest to do so. If these parties insist on arbitration be-
cause they believe it is a qualitatively better method for all parties
involved for the resolution of the dispute (and not because they believe
their pay out will be less than it would be if the case were to be liti-
gated), then these parties should be willing to stand by arbitration by
drawing attention to the clause, explaining it, and negotiating it. This
approach will ultimately benefit these very same parties by restoring
confidence in the arbitral process, a confidence that has been shaken
due to their unwillingness to openly and candidly discuss and negoti-
ate the predispute arbitration clause and their abuse of the arbitral
process to gain an unfair advantage. The most difficult aspect of this
option, however, is getting this message across.
Amendment to the FAA requiring specific notice of the predispute
arbitration clause appears to be the most effective method to protect
the weaker party from unwittingly waiving his or her right to a judi-
cial forum. Such an amendment would also have the additional bene-
fit of redeeming arbitration as a dispute resolution process.
571. See supra note 7.
